

August 31, 1970

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**STATEMENT BY SENATOR MUSKIE  
ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE  
SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT**

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask for unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a statement made by me on Friday, August 28, 1970, before the Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, concerning appropriations for the supersonic transport.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

**STATEMENT BY SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE  
BEFORE THE TRANSPORTATION SUBCOMMITTEE  
OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COM-  
MITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE SST,  
AUGUST 28, 1970**

Mr. Chairman, in 1963 President Kennedy announced that the Federal Government would embark on a program to develop a supersonic transport. He pledged a \$750 million limit on Federal support of the project.

We have now spent almost \$700 million on this project and are being asked to appropriate \$290 million more. It is now likely that the prototype costs to the Government will rise to at least \$1.3 billion. Many people suspect that the Government will even be asked to finance production of these aircraft.

It is now time, Mr. Chairman, to take a second look at the SST . . . to re-evaluate it . . . and to ask whether we can afford to continue the program.

This is an appropriate time to take a second look . . .

For this year Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act. We said that major Federal programs must be carefully examined in light of their potential impact on the environment.

This year we are considering significant changes in our national transportation policies. We recognize the need to spend our money more carefully and more wisely . . . on programs that do the most good for the most people.

And this year we are faced with substantial unemployment in one-fifth of our major labor markets. We must deal with this problem effectively and quickly.

So we should ask what the SST means to us . . . with respect to our environment, our priorities and our people.

To many Americans, the SST is a symbol of man's lack of concern for his planet.

I am aware that proposed rules would prohibit SST's from flying over populated land areas. But this does not answer the questions of—

What effects sonic booms would have on ships at sea, and on fish and animal life;

What effects sideline takeoff noise four or five times that of the 747 would have on people who work in the airports or live in neighboring communities;

What effects jet vapors would have on the upper atmosphere, on world climate, and on radiation levels.

Even the Chairman of the President's Council on Environmental Quality has stated that this last question "has not received the attention it deserves." The MIT Study of Critical Environmental Problems concluded recently that "the projected SST's can have a clearly measurable effect on the world climate." The National Academy of Sciences has reached a similar conclusion.

I know that proponents of the SST have promised that these problems will be studied as soon as the prototypes are built and before the production phase.

I hope that an increasing financial commitment would not weaken that resolve. But I am concerned that this research would occupy environmental research resources that are being stretched thin as we seek to solve

the problems of air and water pollution that we have already created.

We should ask whether new research on the environmental effects of the SST—research that would be admittedly necessary before production—is the wisest use we can make of our limited capacity.

I am also concerned, Mr. Chairman, with the question of whether the FAA has complied with the National Environmental Policy Act.

Section 102 (2) (c) of the act requires a "detailed statement" from the agency on the environmental impact of any major proposal—whether or not work on the project had begun before passage of the act. The FAA has not submitted a detailed statement.

Section 102 (2) (c) of the act requires each agency to "study, develop and prescribe appropriate alternatives to recommend courses of action." The FAA has not submitted those alternatives.

The Appropriations Committee should not report the appropriations bill to the floor until the requirements of section 102 of the Environmental Policy Act have been met.

Then the Senate can make its own decision on the merits. At this time too many environmental questions have not been answered.

We should also ask whether we need the SST . . . as much as we need new mass transit systems for our cities, new airport facilities for the planes already flying, or new schools, homes and a clean environment.

These programs also cost money—as much or more than the SST. And the funds must come from the same kitty . . . resources that are limited.

This year's budget for air pollution control is \$106 million. To restore our air to a breathable, healthy level will cost the Government almost \$400 million a year. Appropriations bills for medical care, Education and Housing have been vetoed . . . yet these needs are not being met.

We cannot afford everything under the sun. We must face the realities of difficult choices . . . and say "no" to some things we should like but do not need.

Those are the questions we must ask about our priorities.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we ask what the SST means to our people.

The levels of unemployment in the State of Washington is unacceptable . . . as unacceptable as in thirty other major labor markets across the nation.

We cannot ignore the fact that the problem in Washington may get worse if the SST program is halted. But we know that the program will not reverse the rising levels across the nation . . . and this must be our first concern . . . with first call on our resources.

We must meet the challenge of unemployment nationwide. It will take new programs, more imaginative ideas and perhaps more expensive efforts. It is a problem that affects all our States . . . and that demands remedies for all our States.

The SST program is not without merit, Mr. Chairman—

It would provide job opportunities;

It would be a technological victory;

And it would be an exciting advance in air travel.

But at this time, Mr. Chairman, it is not the best use of our resources . . . the environmental, social and human costs are too high.

And at this time, with the kinds of needs that have gone unmet, dropping the SST is the kind of difficult decision we must make.

**MILITARY AID FOR CAMBODIA**

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on July 23 the President signed a determi-

nation, required by law, which authorizes up to \$40 million in military aid for Cambodia in fiscal year 1971. This will be in addition to the \$8.9 million already given Cambodia in fiscal year 1970.

The last sentence of the determination, which was in the form of a memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State, stated:

You are requested on my behalf to report this determination and authorization promptly to the Senate and House of Representatives.

This is in accord with the requirement in the Foreign Assistance Act that the Congress be notified promptly of such decisions. Webster's defines "prompt" as "Done or rendered readily; given without delay or hesitation." The determination, transmitted by a letter from the Department of State dated August 21, was received by the Committee on Foreign Relations on August 24. Another reporting requirement, contained in the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act, requires that determinations of this nature be reported to the Congress "within 30 days after each such determination." It was 29 days from the date of the President's signature to the date of the Department's transmittal letter. I note, however, that the basic information had been leaked to the press well before the committee received any official notice of the decision. I ask unanimous consent that the President's determination be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,

July 23, 1970.

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION No. 71-2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Determination and Authorization Under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, and Under the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Permitting the Furnishing of Defense Articles and Services to Cambodia up to \$40 Million

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of June 27, 1970, I hereby:

(a) Determine pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act that the authorization of the use of up to \$40 million of funds available for the grant of defense articles and services to Cambodia, without regard to the limitations of Section 505(a), 505(b) (2), second clause, 509, 620(t), or any other provision of the Act limiting the furnishing of military assistance to Cambodia, is important to the security of the United States;

(b) Authorize pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act such use of up to \$40 million for the grant of defense articles and services to Cambodia without regard to the limitations of the Sections of the Act referred to in (a) above;

(c) Determine pursuant to the third proviso of the military assistance paragraph of Title I of the Foreign Assistance Act, 1970, that military assistance to Cambodia for FY 1971 in an amount of up to \$40 million is essential to the national interest of the United States.

You are requested on my behalf to report this determination and authorization promptly to the Senate and House of Representatives.

RICHARD NIXON.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, unfortunately, the Secretary of State's recommendation, which contains the justification for the President's decision, is classified "Secret" and cannot be made public.

The handling by the executive branch of the requirements of law which must be met prior to furnishing military aid is practically a rerun of the earlier decision to send arms to Cambodia, which involved a determination made retroactive a month from the President's signature in order to legalize arms shipments which had been made a month before. The Foreign Assistance Act, quite properly, contains a number of restrictions which must be satisfied before arms aid can be given to a country. These restrictions were designed both to insure the most effective use of our citizens' tax dollars and to act as a restraining influence on executive branch relations with arms aid recipients. Here are the requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act that have been waived in the decision to give more arms to Cambodia:

First, Section 505(a) requires that military grant aid not be given unless the country has agreed to comply with a number of specific requirements, pertaining to use, transfer, and U.S. access to the equipment. Such an agreement was proposed to the Cambodian Government on August 20, 4 months after aid was first given, but apparently the agreement has not yet been concluded.

Second, Section 505(b)(2) requires that any defense articles totaling more than \$3,000,000 in a fiscal year cannot be furnished unless the President determines that the arms will be used to maintain its own defensive strength and "the defensive strength of the free world."

No such determination has been made nor is one likely to be made in view of Cambodia's claim of neutrality.

Third, Section 509 requires that before any defense article having a value greater than \$100,000 be given to another country that the head of the appropriate U.S. group in Cambodia certify 6 months prior to delivery that the country "has the capability to utilize effectively such article."

No such assurance has been given and we have no information on what type of equipment we plan to give her that costs more than \$100,000. A \$100,000-plus weapon would hardly fit in the "small arms" category, however.

Fourth, Section 620(t) requires that, in the case of a country that has broken diplomatic relations with the United States, diplomatic relations must be restored and a new aid agreement negotiated before military aid is provided.

We do not have an aid agreement with Cambodia.

However, section 614 of the act gives the President general authority to waive all of those and any other requirements of the act "when the President determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States." The President used this authority to waive the requirements I have listed. He is perfectly within his rights in exercising that authority. And the State Department is fully within its legal

rights in waiting 29 out of the 30 days allowed by the statute to send the determination to the Congress.

But the issue involved is not so much one of legal niceties as it is of comity between the legislative and the executive branches of Government. In recent years there has been a great erosion of the executive branch's credibility in the Congress. Instead of mutual trust and confidence there is now mutual distrust and suspicion, not only on foreign policy but across the board. I cannot believe that the President is conscious of the erosive effect on the relationship between the two branches caused by actions of this nature. In the handling of such a matter he is, I believe, a captive of a bureaucracy which, in large measure, seems to have little respect for the legislative branch. Credibility is a fragile thing and once destroyed is very difficult—and often impossible—to restore. This most recent incident is of little practical consequence but it does, I think, illustrate the operation of a way of thinking now prevalent in the bureaucracy of the executive branch. It is an attitude which seems to consider the Congress of little importance in the running of this country's affairs—foreign or domestic. There is a lesson here for every Member of Congress.

#### LACK OF ADEQUATE INSPECTION OF IMPORTED MEATS

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I never could quite understand why the people of the United States are so concerned about the strictest kind of inspection of meats of all kinds slaughtered in the United States and at the same time have very little or no concern about the lack of adequate inspection of vast amounts of imported meats.

It is wrong to believe that much of this imported meat is subjected to anything like the careful and stringent inspections made of our domestic meat products.

Mr. President, an excellent article on this subject appeared in a recent issue of the Western Livestock Reporter. It was written by Mr. Patrick K. Goggins, the publisher. It is an article that I think would be of real interest to the vast consumer public in the United States. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### AS I SEE IT . . .

In this world and in this age of laws and regulations and rules it certainly seems odd how the United States Department of Agriculture and others can turn a blind eye on inspection of foreign meat.

The absolute whammy that they are putting on the American packer, both at the federal and state level is unbelievable and yet, they turn their back on the uncleanness and the standards of inspection of imported meat.

This particular item has been fought out the last three weeks in Congress to a fair-  
three-week. I don't know exactly what is going to come of it but there are more Republicans and Democrats alike joining arms in the fight to get something done. And it certainly needs to be done.

Dr. H. M. Steinmetz, Assistant Deputy Ad-

ministrator of consumer protection of the USDA is one of the biggest fighters against any passage of any kind of a meat import inspection bill. He comes up with some pretty weak arguments in my estimation of why we shouldn't touch it.

Of course the State Department, the Department of Consumer Affairs and the USDA all feel that if any kind of stringent, more strict inspection law is put into effect, the foreign countries will then counteract and put quite a lot of pressure upon American products that they buy through similar acts.

Bruce E. Hackett from Overbrook, Kansas testified in a letter to Senator Robert Dole (R. Kansas) that he and his family lived and had a trucking business in Australia from September 1963 to December of 1967 and that his brother is still there running that business.

He testifies that on in-plant handling the meat was moved from building to building in non-refrigerated cars. They did not have refrigerated vans for in-plant and that most of the meat is hauled in flat cars or flatbed type trailers with a canvas over the top of it from the plant down to the docks where it waits in the hot sun for up to 8 to 10 hours without refrigeration before it is loaded into ships.

The few inspectors we have over there who are trying to get something done, can't begin to. Here is a paragraph for instance on page 20, paragraph 53 of the Rules and Regulations of the Commonwealth of Australia: "When an officer considers that vermin are likely to come in contact with meat at an export establishment—this is on processing meat to be sent out of the country—the establishment, require the occupier to cause to be taken effective measures for the purpose of destroying the vermin."

In other words they can use poison to get rid of the rats but nothing is done with the meat. Here in the U.S., if rats get into meat, the whole lot is condemned and goes in the tank. When it gets here to the U.S. approximately 180 pounds out of 32,000 pounds is looked at and looked at quite hastily. The U.S. inspectors then put USDA Inspected and Passed on these crates.

Now hear this: This same meat can then go into interstate shipment. It can go to federal inspected plant.

Now we have our state packers who are under state rules, who are under the same regulations as our federal packing houses. They cannot ship meat interstate. They have to ship intra-state. Our regulations won't even let this state inspected meat even get near a federal inspected packing house. Why should this imported, uncleaned meat be allowed to enter those channels without any strings attached.

They kill horses in the same plant that they kill cattle in Australia. They kill rabbits for people in the same plants as they do cattle.

And the 14 roving inspectors that we have over there don't live in Australia or New Zealand or Argentina, they live in the United States and maybe see the plant once a year. Then when they inspect, they inspect their systems, but they don't inspect livestock.

Then you look at the U.S. packer. He's forced to pay U.S. inspectors overtime any time he works over 8 hours and when there is an inspector on the line, the whole packing house stops, because they want to look at every carcass and do.

The packing industry in the United States has paid in excess of \$15 million dollars last year alone in over-time to USDA meat inspectors to keep their plants running. This was just to the inspectors themselves, not to mention all the man-hours and loss of time waiting for these inspectors while the whole process stopped and employee pay scale went on.

Then in Australia they allow wild rabbits that are destroyed on ranches to be brought

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in to their meat establishments to be prepared for export without inspection.

Now maybe many of you ranchers who have not written to your Senators and Representatives and the President of the United States will do it. Something has got to be done. . . .

This is a very unfair, unhealthy situation for you in the cow business. Because one of these days some kind of a disease is going to break out over this deal and you know who is going to get the black eye . . . meat producers.

#### SENATOR MCGEE PRAISES THE TROOPERS OF CASPER, WYO.

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, many Senators, at least those who share my interest in football, undoubtedly had the opportunity last night to witness the half-time show put on by the troopers of Casper, Wyo., at the New York Jets-Minnesota Vikings game in Bloomington.

Those who did witness this show saw an example of the skill and precision of an outstanding youth organization. Casper, and indeed all Wyoming, is vastly proud of the drum and bugle corps which recently took its second straight class A world open title in competition in Lynn, Mass., on the heels of a first-place win in the Veterans of Foreign Wars national drum and bugle competition in Miami, thus capping its most successful season to date.

The troopers, a band of dedicated youngsters who train and work year-round under the direction of equally dedicated adult leaders, are Wyoming's official musical ambassadors, Mr. President. They are expected to arrive home in Casper late tomorrow, in time for the youngsters to get back to the classroom after another victorious sweep of the country. As always, Casperites will turn out by the thousands to welcome the troopers home. For those people, and for all of us, really, this organization represents living proof of the determination to excel, the willingness to work hard, and the talent to achieve success which is present in America's young people.

#### A BRIGHT SIDE TO EVERY PROBLEM

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, in a recent editorial, the Daily Oklahoman points out that there is a bright side to almost every problem facing our Nation. In our efforts to right our wrongs, we tend to look only at the negative side, that which we hope to better.

Occasionally it is good to know a positive side to many problems does exist. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial entitled "There Is a Bright Side" be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

##### THERE IS A BRIGHT SIDE

Americans want more optimism from their public officials and business leaders, President Nixon is reported to have told recent visitors to the San Clemente White House.

It is natural for any elected leader to prefer that the voters look on the bright side of life, especially in an election year. In Nixon's case, his concern that we may be forgetting what is right with America in our concern with what is wrong was the theme of his

speech to the Jaycee convention in St. Louis some weeks ago. It has some basis.

Much of the gloom and doom polluting the national atmosphere emanates from a noisy clique in Congress. Some Senators see the end of civilization in our involvement in Southeast Asia's fight to remain independent. The same Senators see equally dire consequences if America does not take a more active part in Israel's fight to survive. Almost the same names are signed to every cry of despair over the pollution of the atmosphere, lakes and streams, and seashores. They seem to find nothing inconsistent in demanding an end to atomic power projects and an immediate end to power blackouts in the same areas.

There is a bright side to almost every problem facing this nation. In Southeast Asia, withdrawal of more and more American military units and men is accompanied by increasing self-confidence and independence among the local peoples. Instead of deploring their lack of skill with modern weapons, Americans ought to be organizing cheering squads, and maybe "bundles for Vietnam" programs to help them help themselves.

American involvement in the Middle East is nearly as old as this republic. American universities at Cairo and Beirut have educated many thousands of business and governmental leaders who now regard the current alienation between this country and the Arab states as temporary. For over two decades, we have also been in the mainstay of Israel's independence. There is a wealth of untapped good will and confidence for Secretary of State Rogers' peace proposals to take root in.

Nuclear power plants are the subject of hysterical protests. Yet in this ecology-happy era, we should note that they do not emit noxious gases, sulphur dioxide, or particle pollutants into the air. Their byproducts that do give some trouble are heat—which any energy plant involves—and radiation in fuel wastes, which can be disposed of safely. A dozen heat dissipation schemes are under study or test. Instead of screaming about possible dangers from these cleanest of all power plants, while we gag on existing air pollution, we should be rejoicing that we know how to furnish the energy needs of our growing population.

The new jumbo jets are smokeless. Older model airliners are being fitted with new engines that leave no black plumes in their wakes. The good news that this annoyance is being dealt with is drowned out by the walls of those whose only contribution to solving problems is walling.

There is so much that is right about America, and the world, that it is unhealthy to look only at the problems not yet fully solved.

#### RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMBODIA

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on April 27, 3 days before the President's speech announcing the U.S. intervention into Cambodia, the Committee on Foreign Relations held a meeting with the Secretary of State to discuss recent developments in that country. The discussion between committee members and the Secretary concentrated on the questions concerning possible U.S. military aid to the Lon Nol government.

At the close of the meeting I asked the Secretary to supply for the record answers to a list of questions which we had either not been able to discuss or to cover adequately during the course of the meeting. Three months later on August 20, the Department submitted the unclassified replies to these questions. In

view of the fact that the replies provide additional information concerning the administration's policy on Cambodia and other aspects of the war in Southeast Asia, I ask unanimous consent that the questions and answers be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the information was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C., August 20, 1970.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,  
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to a mimeographed list of questions which was handed to him after his appearance before your committee on April 27, 1970.

I have enclosed the answers to your questions.

If I can be of assistance to you at any time, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,  
Assistant Secretary for Congressional  
Relations.

#### CAMBODIA

1. Would you explain how the Nixon Doctrine applies to the situation in Cambodia?

The Nixon Doctrine calls for a threatened country to make maximum efforts and assume the major responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense. Cambodia is certainly doing that. Second, the policy stresses regional cooperation and Cambodia's neighbors are providing help to assure Cambodia's continued independence and neutrality. Third, the U.S. is to assist self-help and regional actions where our participation can make a difference and this is being done through the supply of small arms and other materiel. Finally, we are also considering a program of economic assistance as are other nations.

2. (a) Does the Administration plan to consult with the Committee before a decision is made concerning the furnishing of arms to Cambodia? the sending of advisors? Air strikes in Cambodia?

We have already informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of our initial grant of 8.9 million dollars in small arms and other materiel to the Cambodian Government and our plans for additional military assistance. We intend to continue to inform the appropriate Congressional Committees of any further Presidential Determinations concerning assistance to Cambodia.

The President has made clear there will be no U.S. advisors with Cambodian units and that U.S. air strikes will be authorized only as necessary to protect U.S. forces in Vietnam.

(b) Did U.S. personnel participate in drawing up Cambodia's arms request?

No.

(c) Will the Administration make public any agreement with Cambodia, or any other government, concerning U.S. aid to or military action in Cambodia? Can you assure us that there will be no repeat of the experience in Laos or Thailand?

We have no plans for any secret agreements concerning U.S. aid to, or military action in, Cambodia. We have provided the facts concerning the extent and limits of U.S. involvement in Cambodia and will continue to do so. In order to satisfy the requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act, on August 15 we exchanged notes with the Government of Cambodia whereby that government undertook to abide by the obligations of the Act. These notes in no way involve a new commitment.

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3. (a) Do you think that arms can be supplied to Cambodia, and used effectively, without sending in American advisors to train the Cambodians in how to use the equipment?

The request from the Cambodian Government was for arms support only, and we are supplying small arms and other materiel that can be used immediately without advisors by the Cambodian military. We have no plans to provide more complex equipment which would require advisors for training purposes.

(b) Did the Cambodians ask for arms alone, or both arms and advisors?

The Cambodians asked for arms alone.

4. (a) Have any Asian nations offered to supply Cambodia with arms?

Yes. The Republic of Viet-Nam has supplied and intends to continue supplying weapons captured in enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia to the Cambodian government. The Thai Government has also supplied military equipment to Cambodia including river patrol craft and individual equipment.

(b) Is the United States doing anything to encourage Thailand, South Korea, or other Asian nations to give arms to Cambodia? Have we offered to reimburse, or otherwise pay for aid that other countries may give to Cambodia?

The President announced that we will encourage and support the efforts of those countries which wish to furnish Cambodia with arms and materiel. We have no present plans to reimburse nations taking such initiatives, but the question of replacement of armaments expended could arise, in which case we would hope to consult with the Committee.

(c) Would the Administration look with favor on an offer by Thailand or South Korea to send advisors or troops to Cambodia?

This would depend on the Cambodian view of any such offer, and on the military situation at the time. We do not think a large number of foreign troops are needed at present.

5. (a) Are U.S. officials consulted, or notified, in advance by the Vietnamese of plans for combat operations in Cambodia?

Yes.

(b) Have the combat operations by South Vietnamese forces across the Cambodian border been carried out with the approval of U.S. officials? If not, have any attempts been made to prevent further attacks?

ARVN operations in Cambodia are coordinated with U.S. counterparts in South Viet-Nam to prevent weakening of joint operations or defensive positions there by the deployment of ARVN forces in Cambodia.

(c) Have any U.S. personnel participated in the planning of operations in Cambodia by South Vietnamese forces?

As indicated above, to the extent that ARVN operations in Cambodia are relevant to joint operations and positions in South Viet-Nam-U.S. counterparts are consulted.

6. (a) Have any U.S. personnel—military or civilian—crossed the South Viet-Nam-Cambodian border since the trouble began? If so, give the details.

After the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops on July 1, 1970 no U.S. personnel have crossed the South Viet-Nam-Cambodian border except those assigned to, or visiting, the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh.

(b) Has there been any change in the orders to U.S. personnel concerning "hot pursuit" as a result of the change in the situation in Cambodia?

No.

(c) Have any U.S. aircraft flown into Cambodia, either on combat or cargo missions, since the new government took over? If so, what are the details?

This question has been overtaken by events. The Committee is aware of U.S. air strikes to interdict enemy supply and troop

replacement activities, as authorized and announced by President Nixon. There have also been flights carrying arms for the Cambodian Government, as well as supply and support missions for our Embassy at Phnom Penh.

7. What is your assessment of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese intentions in Cambodia? Do they view the developments there as favorable to their objectives?

In view of recent developments in Cambodia, we suspect that the Communist Vietnamese themselves are unsure of their ultimate objectives there. It will take them some time to reorganize and resupply their operations. In view of this fact, it is very difficult to estimate whether they view recent developments as favorable to their interests or not. Clearly, our attacks on their sanctuaries delivered a severe blow to their short term interests.

8. (a) Do you think Cambodia's forces could hold out if the enemy forces make a determined effort to take over the country?

In order to answer such a hypothetical question we would have to know with complete accuracy enemy intentions and capabilities. However, the Cambodian forces (FANK) recently have shown an increasing capability to fight effectively on their own.

(b) If not, how much help would they need from outside sources—in personnel and supplies? What effect would this have on the military situation in South Viet-Nam?

We are studying Cambodia's needs at the present time pursuant to its request for military aid, and we are heartened by the determination shown by the Cambodian Government thus far in its own defense. The amount of assistance Cambodia would need if the enemy made a "determined effort" would be a function of the assets which the enemy would be prepared to devote to the conquest of Cambodia and this, of course, is impossible to determine.

(c) What effect would a Communist takeover in Cambodia have on the U.S. position in South Viet-Nam? In Laos?

If the Communists were to take over and secure all Cambodia, giving them, *inter alia*, free access to the deepwater port of Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) there would be a serious adverse effect on our position in South Viet-Nam and Laos.

(d) What are the alternatives available to the United States if the Communists should move to take over Cambodia?

As noted above, the intentions of the Communists are unclear. In any event, the President, in recent public statements, has clearly defined the policy we will follow in Cambodia.

(e) What would the United States do if Sihanouk returned to Cambodia and set up a government in the Viet Cong controlled area?

Again, we are not prepared to speculate upon questions of such a hypothetical nature. If Sihanouk were to return to Cambodia our policy would be contingent upon a consideration of other related, and as of now indeterminate, factors.

9. (a) What are the prospects for the development of a united front against the United States by the enemy forces of North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia?

The above mentioned enemy forces already operate as a *de facto* united front. If they were establish a united front in name, the military situation would not be altered to any significant degree.

(b) What would be the likely effects of such a move?

The enemy might attempt to exploit such a move as a propaganda victory.

10. How many U.S. government personnel are now in Cambodia? Are there any plans for sending more people in, even on a temporary basis?

All operational military personnel have

been withdrawn from Cambodia, 36 positions have been authorized at the U.S. Embassy, of which 9 are Defense Attaches and 5 Marines Guards. Only 24 of the 36 have arrived on post, but 26 additional personnel are on temporary duty in connection with reconditioning of the new Chancery and establishment of other facilities. This staffing pattern will be subject to reconsideration, as conditions require.

11. Is the Administration giving consideration to permitting U.S. bombing of enemy bases in Cambodia? What would be your position if such a request came from our military officials?

Covered by 2(a) above.

## VIET-NAM

1. Did the President's speech last week represent, in any way, a change in U.S. policy? If so, in what respect?

The President's April 20 speech and his TV news conference in Los Angeles on July 20 did not represent any change in U.S. policy. The President also made clear, in response to a question, that President Thieu's position with regard to negotiation is "on all fours" with ours. "We have consulted with him and he with us before any negotiating positions have been presented."

2. Is the United States considering any new initiatives in Paris? the replacement of Ambassador Lodge?

As President Nixon has said, Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, the new head of our delegation in Paris, has wide latitude in the negotiations. We hope our move in sending a senior negotiator will be reciprocated by the North Vietnamese and that serious negotiations will ensue.

3. Do you think the military situation in South Viet-Nam has improved, or deteriorated, as a result of developments in Cambodia?

The military situation in South Viet-Nam has improved considerably since the beginning of the combined allied attacks on the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. The destruction and capture of arms and supplies have prevented the enemy from mounting large offensives in the center and south, thus allowing Vietnamization and pacification to proceed with less interference than before. Operations against North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia have confirmed that an impressive improvement has taken place in the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) recently. These operations have also increased ARVN confidence and self-reliance.

4. Are there any plans for replacing Ambassador Bunker?

There are no present plans for replacing Ambassador Bunker.

## LAOS

1. Has there been any change in the basic military situation in Laos in recent weeks?

There has been little or no change in the basic military situation. The rainy season, which slows down North Vietnamese military activities, is in full progress. The capture of Saravane by North Vietnamese troops on June 9 was more significant as a political psychological setback for the Royal Lao Government (RLG) than it was as a military one. Nonetheless, although north Laos has quieted, continued hostile pressure in south Laos, particularly in the area contiguous to northeast Cambodia, continues to concern us.

2. (a) What effect, if any, have developments in Cambodia had on the political situation in Laos?

The political situation in Laos bears a close relationship to the course of military events in the field. The allied operations against communist lines of communication in Cambodia probably contributed to the North Vietnamese decision to attack isolated Government-held pockets in south Laos, thereby provoking discussion in Vientiane about the viability of neutralism. The U.S.



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government has made it clear that our support both for the Prime Minister and Lao neutralism remains steadfast.

(b) Have there been any further exchanges between the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma?

Prince Souphanouvong wrote on June 12 to Souvanna Phouma essentially reiterating the Lao Popular Front (LPF) terms of March 6 which called for an unconditional halt in U.S. bombing as a prelude to talks among the Lao factions. The RLG replied on June 25 that the LPF precondition of a complete and unconditional halt in American bombing in Laos, without the withdrawal of the more than 60,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos, was unacceptable. The RLG, however, reiterated its willingness to send representatives to talk with Souphanouvong's envoys, and proposed a site. The RLG also said that a bombing halt could be dealt with as a priority topic in talks between the Lao factions. In early July, the Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane told the Prime Minister that a high-ranking LPF emissary would be sent to carry the LPF's formal reply to the RLG and would be empowered to discuss modalities for holding talks. This emissary, Prince Souk Vongsak, arrived July 31 and he has entered into preliminary discussions with Souvanna and other members of the Government. From these discussions it is still not yet completely clear whether the LPF has abandoned its bombing halt precondition as the price of beginning the talks, but in any event this item will be of first order of priority if and when talks are held. Further discussions with Souphanouvong's emissary—possibly including reference back to LPF headquarters—will be necessary to conclude final agreement on modalities put forth by the two sides.

3. What is your assessment of North Vietnam's intentions in Laos?

The North Vietnamese intend to protect their western border with a band of territory sufficiently controlled so that their war effort in South Viet-Nam can proceed and major threats to the homeland are avoided or minimized. They doubtless further wish to see areas immediately to the west (i.e. the Mekong valley), if not directly under their hegemony, at least not in unfriendly hands.

4. What has been the reaction from the Soviet government to the release of the transcript of the hearings on Laos? From China?

At the time it was released publicly, the report of the Symington Subcommittee hearings on Laos was mentioned prominently in the Soviet mass media. The Soviets maintained that public and Congressional pressures had forced the Nixon Administration to acknowledge certain U.S. military actions in Laos.

Although the Symington Subcommittee transcript provided the Soviet media with readily usable source material, it did not cause a basic shift in the Soviet position.

The Symington report was briefly mentioned in the first week of May in New China News Agency broadcasts, but was not mentioned in later broadcasts. (It was incorporated in a long and detailed propaganda blast in English to Southeast Asia by the Pathet Lao Radio on July 21 commemorating the 8th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Agreements.)

5. Do you think that it is possible to reach any kind of settlement on Laos as long as the war in South Viet-Nam continues?

In view of the many interconnections between the situation in Laos and the war in South Viet-Nam, particularly the North Vietnamese use of the Ho Chi Minh trail, it is difficult to foresee a long-term settlement in Laos at this time. However, current exchanges between Souvanna and Souphanouvong may indicate that some aspects of the

Laos situation can be worked on despite the continuation of the war in South Viet-Nam.

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA ISSUES IN GENERAL

1. (a) Do you think the prospects for bringing peace to Southeast Asia are better, or worse, now than they were before the fighting began in Cambodia?

As a result of our operations in Cambodia the enemy is in a weaker position. It remains to be seen whether they will now begin to negotiate seriously or whether they choose to prolong the fighting. Nevertheless, our operation has won time for the South Vietnamese to train and prepare themselves to carry a greater burden of their defense, and it has contributed to the continuance and success of our withdrawal program.

(b) Has the United States political position improved, in your view, as a result of recent developments? Is the United States negotiating position better?

The United States political position has improved in the sense that more of the world is now aware of what the Communists have been doing and continue to do in Cambodia. Strictly speaking, our negotiating position remains the same: that is, we have publicly and privately offered generous and forthcoming proposals for settlement of the war; we have not presented these proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, but we are quite prepared to discuss them. We have appointed Ambassador Bruce as head of our delegation in Paris, and we have given him great flexibility in the conduct of the negotiations. The other side remains intransigent, but we hope they will soon recognize that it is in their best interests to negotiate, now rather than later.

(c) How do you think the other side views the recent developments—as a setback for them or as creating a greater dilemma for the United States?

As the President said, the Cambodia operation, from a military point of view, was the most successful operation of this long and difficult war. To world opinion the communist occupation of large areas of Cambodia is a blatant violation of Cambodia sovereignty and neutrality. The other side must certainly recognize that it has suffered these setbacks. On the other hand, so long as the Cambodian government is in a weak and precarious position, the other side hopes that we will face an insoluble problem of helping the Cambodians defend themselves while carrying out our troop withdrawals from Viet-Nam.

2. (a) Are developments in Cambodia likely to have any effect on Russia's willingness to help bring the war to an end?

The Soviets recognize that an expanded or protracted war in Indochina would ultimately be to the benefit of China and to their own disadvantage. In order to maintain their influence in the area, they would seemingly want to help end the war. Nevertheless, it remains true that they are anxious to avoid the appearance of forcing Hanoi to make any substantial concessions to the U.S.

(b) If China encourages a united front in Southeast Asia against the United States, can the Soviet Union afford to do any less?

Certainly one of the motivations of the Soviet Union is its concern with maintaining influence with the Communist parties of Southeast Asia, particularly with that of North Viet-Nam. Naturally, Chinese actions to increase its degree of influence in SEA must be taken into account by Moscow in determining its own positions on such issues as the united front.

(c) Do you think the Soviet Union is likely to agree to a Geneva-type conference as long as North Viet-Nam is opposed to such a move?

Probably not, because of the strong tangible and ideological interests which bind the two.

3. Do you think that recent developments in Southeast Asia make it more imperative

that there be a political settlement which affects the entire area?

Recent developments indicate the continuing desirability of a political settlement, without which dangers of expansion or escalation of the war remain, regardless of current military trends. A viable peace must be based upon a general agreement that all the countries of Southeast Asia have a genuine political role to play in the future of the region, and without such an agreement a limited but highly undesirable level of hostilities could persist indefinitely.

#### WORLD BEGINS TO REALIZE JUSTICE OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE FOR PRISONER CRUELTY

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, this is the last day of August, and for most Americans that means summer is nearly at an end. It has been a summer of great concern for America, concern about the war in Vietnam, and concern about domestic tranquility. For some this concern has been self-centered and in some cases self-serving. But for most Americans this concern has gone far beyond self and has centered on the great issues and problems of the day.

Among the issues that have been the focus of attention has been that of the Americans being held prisoner by the North Vietnamese. Although few in number, these Americans have become a cause that far outstrips their numerical strength. They have, indeed, become a thorn that pricks the conscience not only of this Nation but of the world.

The brutal and inhumane treatment to which these men have been subjected has caused a great revulsion against the Communists both here in America and among thinking, feeling people the world over. By the tactics they have used the Communists have demonstrated to the world the nature of their system and the harshness of their type of government.

We in America must continue through the coming seasons to work with utmost diligence and skill toward the release of these American prisoners. In the task we can now count on more and more support from all free nations everywhere. Our cause is just; the realization of its justice is spreading across the globe.

#### STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, today I wish to review the status of the major human rights treaties pending before the Senate. For more than 3 years I have urged the Senate to ratify three of these treaties—the Genocide Convention, the Political Rights of Women Convention, and the Convention of the Abolition of Forced Labor. As of today, none of these have been ratified by the Senate. Hearings were first held on the Genocide Convention in 1950. No further action was taken on the convention until just recently, when the Committee on Foreign Relations reopened hearings. Unfortunately the committee has not yet reported the treaty to the Senate.

Hearings were held on the Political Rights for Women Convention in 1967 in the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-

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tee. Like the Genocide Treaty, it has never been reported out of committee.

The Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labor was submitted to the Senate on January 22, 1963. Hearings were held on the treaty in 1967, but the Foreign Relations Committee did not report it for Senate action.

Mr. President, we cannot delay action on these treaties any further. I strongly urge members of the Foreign Relations Committee to give these treaties careful consideration. Senate action on the Genocide Convention is long overdue. Twenty years have passed since hearings were first held on the treaty. There can be no excuse for delay in ratifying these treaties. I urge the Senate to act on these treaties now.

#### NIXON ADMINISTRATION PROGRESS ON THE INFLATION FRONT

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, the efforts of the Nixon administration to bring the inflation which it inherited, under control without seriously disrupting the economy continues to make progress. Even the President of the AFL-CIO, Mr. George Meany, in an interview published in this morning's Washington Post, concedes that the economy is basically sound.

I think the President and his economic advisers are to be commended for their efforts and policies in helping to stop inflation gradually and in a reasonable way without any economic reversals and without a costly recession.

President Nixon has proved to be a farsighted and capable manager of domestic economic problems. Recently the Detroit Sun News and the Des Moines Register published editorials describing the Nixon policies. I ask unanimous consent that these editorials be included in the RECORD as a reflection of responsible press opinion recognizing that problems do exist in the economy but also admitting that President Nixon is having success in pursuing the only reasonable alternative.

My purpose in doing this is to counteract those prophets of gloom who in the forthcoming election will try to blame all of the economic problems on President Nixon, who inherited them but has managed to bring them under control without serious disruption. This coupled with his continuing success in the field of foreign policy convinces me that we have at the helm a wise and able administrator.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

##### YEAR OF THE TURTLE?

It's exasperating but it looks as though 1970 will be the Year of the Turtle. The economy is moving slowly but surely along a plateau just above recession and just below rapid growth. In many ways, it is the best course even though the nation has never had turtle-like patience in waiting for economic recovery.

The spurt of economic news, mostly statistical, coming from Washington in recent days is "quietly encouraging." The indicators show the economy is growing, although marginally and with persistent but moderating inflation.

As a result, fears of a deep or prolonged recession no longer seem reasonable even as an outside chance. Still, the figures are not exuberant enough to justify the expectation of a surging economic rebound. We know the economy, like the turtle, is moving but it's hard to resist the temptation to push it along a bit faster.

Yet what other course would we choose? With unemployment at 5 percent and likely to go higher on a temporary basis, no one wants the economy to halt dead in its tracks. With inflation still proceeding at a 4.3 percent annual rate in the June quarter, few people would trade the turtle for the hare.

Our economic goal is full employment with relative price stability. We stand a better chance of reaching the goal line with a steady turtle than the flash and fade-out of the fabled hare.

##### "RECESSION" ENDED?

The major economic activity indicators showed a modest rise in July, and the economy managed a slight growth in output of goods and services in the second quarter of the year. The statistical trend has changed enough to cause several government economists to say the "recession" has ended.

Actually, the performance of the economy in the last year has been such as to hardly justify the term "recession." The turnaround in GNP in the last quarter of 1969 and first quarter of 1970 was very small. Industrial production this July was only 3 per cent below that of July 1969. In the postwar recessions of the 1950s, industrial output fell from 5 to 14 per cent.

However, it is premature to declare "no recession." One reason the industrial production index rose in July was the return to work of several large groups of strikers. Without their return, the figure would not have looked so good. Industrial output also rose last March, with three successive declines after that.

If the downturn in GNP really has reached bottom, as optimistic government economists think, the Nixon Administration will be in a position to claim a "first" in economic management.

In a time of serious inflation, President Nixon has had the nerve to avoid the slam-bang, crackdown type of inflation restraint which appealed to former Treasury Secretary George Humphrey. Instead, he has insisted upon gradualism in both fiscal and monetary policy. He has chosen to permit a greater degree of inflation rather than to precipitate a serious recession and heavy unemployment.

This episode is not yet over. Inflation is still troublesome, although there have been some recent signs of cooling down. The stock market is still sagging and dragging. Unemployment stands at 5 per cent. Nixon and his advisers are not out of the woods and may yet have to turn to stronger measures than the wage-price "alerts" they have started issuing.

But the July economic figures indicate that the deep recession predicted to set in this fall has been stalled off, if not prevented. That is a considerable feat. It is especially noteworthy that Nixon, a Republican with broad support among businessmen and financiers, has been able to take a "liberal" line in economic policy. That is, he has chosen a policy which favors people over dollars; employment stability over "sound currency."

Nixon was greatly impressed by the three recessions of the 1950s, while he was Vice-President, and he has learned something from them.

#### THE SST: THROWING GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, last week the Janesville, Wis., Gazette pub-

lished an excellent editorial on the SST, which hits the nail on the head. The editorial urges the Senate not to be swayed by the fact that we have already spent \$700 million on this frill into voting money for a venture which "could cost taxpayers \$3 billion, earn little or no return, pollute the upper atmosphere and benefit few people except for the Boeing Corp. and jet-set travelers who want to get to Europe a few hours sooner."

The editorial also has the perfect answer to Congressman BROWN's suggestion that we might have never discovered the New World if the Joint Economic Committee had been advising Queen Isabella in 1492. The Gazette notes:

We can think of a more pertinent analogy: If the efficiency committee had been advising Congress when funds were first committed for the SST, we would be \$700 million to the good right now instead of \$700 million in the hole. Too bad it wasn't.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial entitled "Throwing Good Money After Bad," published in the Janesville Gazette of August 24, 1970, be printed in the RECORD. I also ask unanimous consent that excerpts from the report of August 17, 1970, by the Economy in Government Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee entitled "Federal Transportation Expenditure" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

##### THROWING GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD

We heartily concur with a Senate efficiency panel's recommendation that the government get out of the program to develop a supersonic transport plane (SST).

This commercial venture financed at public expense (\$700 million so far) could cost taxpayers \$3 billion, earn little or no return, pollute the upper atmosphere and benefit few people except for the Boeing Corporation and jet-set travelers who want to get to Europe a few hours sooner.

The House, to its discredit, has approved \$290 million more for this airborne white elephant. Now the Senate is being asked to do the same.

Sen. William Proxmire of Wisconsin, chairman of the efficiency committee, opposes any additional funds for the SST. "If Congress succeeds in reordering priorities this year, there is no doubt in my mind that the SST will wind up right at the bottom of the list, where it belongs."

Rep. Clarence J. Brown of Ohio, however, dissented from the majority viewpoint, saying that if the efficiency panel "had been advising Queen Isabella, we would all still be in Barcelona waiting to prove the world round before daring the Atlantic."

We can think of a more pertinent analogy: If the efficiency committee had been advising Congress when funds were first committed for the SST, we would be \$700 million to the good right now instead of \$700 million in the hole. Too bad it wasn't.

##### FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION EXPENDITURE

###### I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

In May of this year, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee held hearings on Federal transportation expenditure policy. This examination was part of the subcommittee's continuing study of Economic Analysis and the Efficiency of Government. This subcom-

Judge Haymond also is the only ABA member to serve twice on the Association's Board of Governors, 1943-46 and 1966-68. He has been the West Virginia state delegate in the House of Delegates for a total of 27 years, was a founding member and the second chairman of the Section of Insurance Law, and has served on a number of committees.

He also was a founding member of the Conference of Chief Justices. Judge Haymond has been vice president and a director of the American Judicature Society, and past president of the Marion County and West Virginia Bar Associations. He has served as a member of the state legislature and of the West Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision. And he has lectured at the West Virginia College of Law.

"During his long and distinguished career on the Bench, Judge Haymond zealously pursued his duties toward the Bar," President Segal said at the presentation. "He has been extraordinarily devoted to his Association and has made major contributions to its work and progress. He richly shares credit for the leadership the Association has attained in professional and public affairs."

President Segal added that Judge Haymond "has won the high esteem and warm affection of his associates on the Bench, of the members of the Bar who practice before him, and of his countless friends and associates in the work of the organized Bar."

Born in Fairmont, W. Va., on April 13, 1887, he was graduated with distinction from Harvard College in 1910 and completed his law studies at Harvard Law School in 1912. He also holds honorary law degrees from Morris Harvey College and West Virginia University.

Judge Haymond practiced law in Fairmont from 1912 to 1939, except for military service from March, 1918 to August, 1919. He was a member of the West Virginia Legislature from 1916 to 1918 and served on several committees of the House of Delegates.

The judge represents the fourth generation of his family to serve on the West Virginia bench. His great grandfather, Thomas S. Haymond, was a justice of the peace and president of the Marion County Court. His grandfather, Alpheus F. Haymond, served on the supreme court from 1873 to 1882 and was a member of the Second Constitutional Convention in 1872. William S. Haymond, his father, was a circuit judge.

"I feel that this office offers an unusual opportunity for public service," said Judge Haymond. "And that is what I have tried to do, to the best of my ability and according to the law as I see it."

# THE LATE HONORABLE G. ROBERT WATKINS

SPEECH OF

## HON. JOHN J. ROONEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 13, 1970

Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, the passing of the Honorable G. ROBERT WATKINS came as a severe shock to us all because we knew him as such a warm human being. He was a man of great integrity and honor and though we voted differently on many phases of legislation, I had nothing but the deepest admiration and respect for him. He loved life and lived it fully and by doing so made life for those around him that much better.

Life was not always easy for Bob, perhaps that is why he savored it so much.

He started earning his way at 9, selling newspapers aboard ships tied up in his then hometown of Newport News. He went on to form his own longshoring and trucking company. He entered politics and in time was sheriff, State senator, county commissioner, and finally U.S. Representative in Congress. Bob was a hard-working and productive Member of the House and we shall all miss his presence. To his wife and family I extend my deepest sympathy in their sad bereavement.

# STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

## HON. JOHN C. CULVER

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 14, 1970

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Speaker, the second phase of the strategic arms limitation talks has recently been concluded in Vienna with an indication that significant progress continues to be made.

The United States has been seeking discussions with the Soviet Union on limiting the arms race since 1964. The first indications of reciprocal interest appeared in 1967, and on July 1, 1968. The President announced that an agreement had been reached to open talks "in the nearest future." The subsequent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia followed by the U.S. election and the presidential transition period delayed further action until last November, when preliminary talks began in Helsinki.

The arms race today is costing the world \$182 billion a year, almost the entire U.S. budget, and 16 times the amount of the total world investment in the potentially explosive emerging countries of Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

The ultimate hopes for SALT are that a formal agreement will be reached. That will certainly be a long and difficult process. But in the shorter term, SALT, may be of major importance just by providing the forum for a closer understanding of each other's nuclear philosophy and an unwritten agreement for mutual restraint.

A recent article in the Washington Post by Chalmers M. Roberts, ably describes the level which the talks reached before their recent adjournment and some of the issues which will be coming up during phase III, which will begin in November. I insert pertinent excerpts of the article in the RECORD at this time:

ARMS TALKS: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

Many long months ago, when the way finally was cleared for what have become known, redundantly, as the SALT talks, some American arms controllers argued that the talking would be more important than any agreement that might be reached. Now that phase II of SALT, (the four months at Vienna), has ended and phase III (at Helsinki) has been scheduled to begin Nov. 2, it appears that the talking has been highly profitable but that the agreement is vital.

Despite the official lid of silence on the substance of the talks, a number of points are clear. One is that the United States started out far in advance in its think-

ing, both inside and outside government, on the subject of the nuclear arms race—its problems and how it might be curbed. Some experts estimate there was perhaps a year's time gap involved.

Historically, the Soviet bureaucracy forces the diplomats, the scientists and the military to stay in their own bailiwicks, sending their ideas up their own bureaucratic ladders to the top. Only then, if approved, does an idea of one group start down the bureaucratic ladder of the others. Now there is evidence that this procedure has been altered radically, that, for example, foreign office desk officers can talk directly to military counterparts and others about the issues involved in SALT.

One reason for the change has been the Soviets' observation of how the process works in the United States. Another has been a necessity born of the thousands of pages of printed hearings of last year's American ABM debate, plus the Congressional Record's account of Senate floor debate, all of which had to be absorbed. There has been more such material, though not in equal amount, pouring into Moscow this year. Another factor in the changing Soviet ways has been, the United States effort to speed up the Soviet process by letting Moscow know in advance of Vienna how it was itself proceeding. This was the so-called "building block" technique described in President Nixon's State of the World report last spring. There is evidence the Soviets have accepted the technique.

This talking out process appears to have speeded up Soviet understanding of the complex nuclear arms issue and produced some common understandings of the elements involved—elements that have no ideological coloration and are susceptible to a high degree of mathematical precision, as in the case of the laws of nature.

Because this process has proved so valuable at the SALT talks it is expected to become a permanent part of any treaty. The idea is not to establish a new international bureaucracy but to provide, in an arms limitation treaty, for periodic Soviet-American meetings. Such meetings would offer an opportunity for one side or the other to raise what seem to it suspicious goings on that hint of treaty violation, or for one side to tell the other why it is doing this or that outside the treaty if its actions might be taken as an infringement of the treaty's provisions. For example, if the United States were to erect new radars for airways control or as part of an early warning system to protect against Soviet missiles, its actions could be construed by Moscow as work toward an ABM system banned by the treaty. Explanation, with evidence, might be vital in avoiding a crisis.

Beyond the value, both in the SALT talks and as part of a treaty setup, of the talking process, however, there remains the necessity of an agreement. SALT has made it clear beyond doubt that any treaty must be built around a trade-off of the American Safeguard ABM system for a Soviet curb on its massive SS-9 missiles. Since the talks began last November in Helsinki (phase I), both sides have proceeded with testing and deployment of these and other strategic nuclear weapons. Only a treaty will halt the process.

The treaty now in prospect, however, is limited to an initial "building block" quantitative control. It would permit qualitative improvements in numerous respects. Most widely known among these is the continuation of multiple warhead development and deployment—the MRVs and MIRVs. The way the American treaty proposal has been framed substitutions would be permitted under a gross ceiling on missiles with a special sub-ceiling for huge missiles such as the SS-9. Thus Poseidon could be substituted for Polaris on submarines, Minuteman III for Minuteman I and II and the B-1 bomber

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for B-52s; each represents a major qualitative improvement. The same would be true for comparable Soviet weapons systems. The dramatic new submarine project, ULMS, however, might be inhibited by the sub-celling for huge missiles. That sub-celling would limit the size of missiles that might be deployed for this system which is still at the drawing board stage. Some ULMS concepts call for missiles beyond the proposed limitation.

But even though the treaty in prospect would basically limit only numbers, it would certainly represent a major gain. It would be the first substantive curb on the nuclear arms race in history, and beside it the nuclear test ban treaty would pale in importance.

Given the treaty now in prospect, what logically should follow is the next building block: a curb on further qualitative improvements. Continued multiple warhead testing, the initial American deployment of Minuteman III with MIRV warheads and the scheduled January deployment of Poseidon along with similar Soviet advances all make this more and more difficult as time goes on. One possibility being discussed is a second stage SALT agreement that would lower the permissible number of missiles from that set by the first agreement. But such a move would make only a dent in the problem, especially with MIRV warheads in place.

It should be observed at this point that the Vienna phase did not get as far as some in Washington hoped. Not until July 24 did the United States put forward its proposal in what amounted to one package, although the pieces had been discussed long before. And the Soviet Union simply did not make the necessary decisions before the Vienna phase closed. Part of the reason was the thinking lag, but another part, as far as can be perceived, has been Kremlin hesitancy in taking the momentous steps involved.

By now, however, SALT has reached a fish-or-cut-bait point for Moscow. A counter proposal is expected at Helsinki, and—unless the Americans at Vienna have totally misconstrued their Soviet counterparts—it cannot vary on the major premises and thus the parameters of the American proposal. It might, of course, vary in detail and quite probably will. If the Kremlin gives a "go" signal and if the counter-proposal is within range of the American proposal, it should take perhaps six months to hammer out a treaty. History teaches, as the Soviets say, that once the necessary political decisions are taken in Moscow and Washington the details are manageable.

By most accounts the Soviet military are the most resistant to, or at least suspicious of, a treaty. Yet there are military subdivisions, it is believed. The Navy wants to go on expanding its global role; the Army wants to hold onto its manpower, especially given the Chinese threat; the rocket forces perhaps may be the hardest to convince that a ceiling is acceptable.

The alternative, as the Kremlin knows, is a continuing arms race moving into new levels of strategic systems. If there is no treaty, Safeguard will proceed and might become an area defense system. There will be new bombers in larger numbers than otherwise and perhaps ULMS will get off the drawing boards. Land based missiles probably would go into hard rock silos and become mobile as well.

Billions of rubles—and dollars—are involved here. But perhaps even more persuasive to Moscow is the technological strain of a new weapons round. Currently thousands of scientists badly needed elsewhere are locked into the weapons business. The Kremlin's answer, and the fate of the treaty, thus are unlikely to be known until sometime after Nov. 2. It will be a critical decision for the world.

## FIFTY YEARS OF BROADCASTING

## HON. JAMES G. FULTON

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 14, 1970

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a brief history of Pittsburgh's excellent radio station KDKA, the world's first radio station, which this year is celebrating its 50th anniversary. The citizens of our good community can rightly be proud of the many historic firsts in the broadcasting industry that have been accomplished by KDKA radio 1020. Even today in an era of advanced communications we note in the programming of this fine station the spirit of pioneering for the future of this important medium. And though KDKA's signal today beams around the globe and has the entire world as its domain, it is especially gratifying for us to know that KDKA is the descendant of a small experimental station built in our community a half century ago.

The information follows:

## PITTSBURGH'S KDKA RADIO 1020—50 YEARS OF BROADCASTING

KDKA Radio 1020, the world's first radio station, began a continuous schedule of broadcasting with the Harding-Cox elections of November 21, 1920. KDKA was licensed by the federal government on Oct. 27, 1920 and its call letters were assigned from a roster maintained to provide identification for ships and marine shore stations, these being the only regular radio services then in operation under formal license at that time.

KDKA is the direct descendant of experimental station 8XK constructed and operated by Doctor Frank Conrad from a garage at the rear of his residence in Wilkinsburg, a Pittsburgh suburb. First official record of this station appears in August 1, 1918 edition of the radio service bulletin issued by the Bureau of Navigation of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Conrad had become interested in radio in 1915, when to settle a \$5.00 bet on the accuracy of a \$12.00 watch made with a friend, he built a small receiver to hear time signals from the Naval Observatory at Arlington, Virginia. Experimental station 8XK was off the air due to the wartime amateur ban from April 7, 1917 until Oct. 1, 1919.

Dr. Conrad was kept busy answering mail from listeners in widely separated locations. Radio messages, in early days, were chiefly discussions of the kinds of equipment being used and the results obtained. Bored by this monotonous routine and anxious to save his voice Dr. Conrad, on Oct. 17, 1919 placed his microphone before a phonograph and substituted music for voice. Requests poured in for records to be played at certain times to convince skeptics. Because of the demand, within a few days, Conrad announced that instead of complying with individual requests he would "broadcast" records for two hours each Wednesday and Saturday evenings.

By late summer of 1920 interest in these broadcasts had become so great that the Joseph Horne Company, a Pittsburgh department store ran an ad in the Pittsburgh Sun featuring Dr. Conrad's "wireless concerts" and offering amateur wireless sets at \$10 up.

H. P. Davis, Westinghouse Vice President, an ardent follower of the Conrad venture, reasoned that the real radio industry lay in the manufacture of home receivers and in supplying radio programs which would make people want to own such receivers. Westinghouse officials were won to the same view and a station was authorized, license appli-

cation submitted, and election night—then only a little more than two weeks away—selected for the grand opening.

KDKA has broadcast regularly ever since and many of KDKA's firsts are firsts for the radio industry.

On January 21, 1921, KDKA broadcast the first religious service live from the Calvary Episcopal Church.

On March 19, 1921, KDKA aired the first official government broadcast with members of President Harding's cabinet speaking.

On April 11, 1921, the first sports broadcast, a boxing bout for the lightweight title, Johnny Ray vs. Johnny Dundee, was broadcast from Motor Square Garden.

The first farm program was May 19, 1921.

On October 5, 1921, the first World Series broadcast was transmitted from the Polo Grounds in New York City.

A Newark, New Jersey, station WJZ was listed in the radio service bulletin of June 1, 1921, although not officially licensed until September 20, 1921, went on the air September 19 with a remote pickup from the eastern states exposition at West Springfield. KDKA, WBZ, and WJZ constituted broadcastings first group of stations under one ownership, and Westinghouse became the first such owners. Today the Group W, Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, owns seven radio stations and five television stations in the United States.

KDKA began in a tiny transmitter shack atop the East Pittsburgh Westinghouse plant. Today its 50,000 watts clear channel has been heard in every state and at some time in every foreign country around the world. KDKA Radio 1020 has become an integral part of the Pittsburgh community through direct involvement. In cooperation with the urban coalition KDKA sponsors "Call for Action" an urban hot line for residents to get direction on solving housing and related problems. KDKA and the Allegheny Board of Trial Lawyers produce an annual "Mock Trial" hearing to spur legal awareness in the community and give encouragement to promising law students. In 1970 KDKA received the annual Judge Wallace S. Gourley Award for this service. KDKA utilizes the services of worldwide Group W and press services as well as a staff of news specialists to keep Pittsburghers informed with objective reports on their world. KDKA's "Open Mike" show features experts and personalities in the news and allows listeners a chance to talk back to newsmakers.

KDKA is proud to be the pioneer station of broadcasting and witness the growth of radio from a handful of wireless amateurs to today's industry which reaches all Americans through over 350,000,000 radio receivers.

## MRS. MAXINE BROWN AND CITIZENS OF BURLESON, TEX., SPEAK OUT ON THE STATE OF THE NATION

## HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 14, 1970

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, back in June, I received a letter from Mrs. Maxine Brown of Burleson, Tex., which letter was also signed by a number of other citizens of the same town. I believe the letter to be one of the finest I have received ever from a constituent and portrays vividly the great concern of what I believe to be the majority of my constituency on the state of the Nation. The people of Burleson, Tex., are



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prevent undue reliance upon insecure foreign oil.

This subcommittee reaffirms its position that it is necessary to control the inflow of foreign crude and unfinished oils in order to maintain a strong and healthy domestic petroleum industry for the protection of this Nation in time of emergency.

2. Imports of crude oil and refined products now make up a very substantial portion of this Nation's petroleum requirements. Imports now average approximately one-third of domestic production and one-fifth of domestic demand. In the opinion of this subcommittee any significant increase in the import must be avoided as they have already reached dangerous proportions.

3. Any future estimates of petroleum supply or demand are subject to the uncertainties of forecasting. However, the task force majority report appears to be unrealistically optimistic on the development of as yet undiscovered reserves in the Western Hemisphere and, accordingly, that available from these sources. At the same time it has underestimated the probable need for Eastern Hemisphere oil and the degree of dependency on this insecure source under the majority's recommended program.

4. Supplies of natural gas are already critical and unless immediate relief is provided the shortage will undoubtedly increase. Any decrease in the price of domestic crude, brought about by increased imports, will further discourage the search for both petroleum and natural gas.

5. The estimated cost of the present control program, as compared to no controls, has been greatly overstated. Rather than the \$5 billion annual cost suggested by the task force, a more realistic figure probably is less than \$1 billion. When full consideration is given to intangibles and the very real probability of higher foreign crude prices once this Nation's dependency on foreign sources is well established, there actually may be a net benefit to the economy from the present import program.

6. The immediate effect of the proposed tariff proposal would fall hardest on the small operator. The small producer, the small refiner, and the stripper well operator would be forced out of business.

7. The 5.5 billion barrels of oil now estimated as reserves in stripper wells would be immediately lost. Such a loss cannot be recovered later. This is not proper conservation of a valuable and nonrenewable natural resource. Costly secondary recovery of oil from marginal and partially depleted fields would also be discouraged.

8. Adoption of the task force majority proposal would have an immediate adverse effect on this Nation's balance of payments. This has been estimated at not less than \$2.2 billion per year.

9. The subcommittee recognizes imperfection and inequities in the existing mandatory oil import program. It believes, however, that these are faults of administration rather than deficiencies in the program as conceived.

10. During the past 15 years the petroleum industry has spent about \$68 billion searching for oil and gas. Much larger amounts of capital will be needed in the future. Any decline in the price of domestic crude will not provide the necessary incentive for increased exploration. Less exploration will result in less oil found. However, if proper incentives for exploration and development are provided this Nation has the potential of remaining substantially self-sufficient in the energy field. The vast potential energy reserves in coal and oil shale have not been developed. Our oil shale reserves (estimated at 2 trillion barrels) exceed the petroleum reserves of the Middle East and coal reserves are estimated to exceed 1,000 years supply. Estimated undiscovered oil in the United States is placed at 2 trillion barrels and natural gas at 1,200 trillion cubic feet.

While some small percentage increase in imports may be expected in the normal course of events, this subcommittee must conclude that this is not a nation lacking in energy supplies. The real question is our desire and ability to develop and use the resources available.

11. Prorating, as practiced by the several States, is a necessary conservation practice to assure maximum economic recovery from a field. Elimination of prorating as suggested by the task force majority may result in a temporary increase but would result in an overall loss of production.

12. The task force majority places more confidence and reliance on the estimated shut-in capacity than is justified. Although there is undoubtedly some shut-in capacity in the United States, the subcommittee believes it to be substantially less than that estimated by the majority report. Undue reliance on this source for future supplies may prove unwise.

13. The displacement of coal by oil is of special concern to the subcommittee. The east coast now relies largely upon imported residual fuel oil. The subcommittee does not believe that the amount of residual oil imported is likely to be cut back but it does believe that immediate attention must be given to working out a formula under which imports would be permitted to increase at a rate which would be consistent with the increase in the overall demand for competitive fuels on the east coast. In this way imported residual fuel oil would be permitted to share in, but not dominate, the east coast growth market for industrial fuels.

In reaching this conclusion, the committee took note of the published concern of the Secretary of Defense over the effects of east coast dependence on foreign fuel, as well as the fact that a shift toward North Africa, an unstable area of the world, as a source for imported residual is now beginning to develop.

14. The subcommittee recognizes the problems of the petro-chemical industry and its need for adequate low-cost feedstocks. This was also recognized by both the majority and the separate reports of the task force. If this industry is to retain a competitive position in the world market it will require an improvement in the present feedstock situation, which should be accomplished without increased reliance on distant sources and without penalizing domestic industry, if possible. An in-depth study of this matter is urgently needed.

15. Research should be continued and intensified for the use and development of synthetic fuels. The vast oil shale and coal deposits of this Nation cannot be ignored as they make up the greatest potential source of fossil fuel energy in this country.

This subcommittee reaffirms its position that intensified research and development, both by the Federal Government and private industry, are necessary in the synthetic fuels field. Any cutback in Government research funds in this area at this time could force this Nation into a position of dependency upon unreliable sources of foreign crude.

16. The increasingly omnibus situation in the Middle East is of grave concern to this subcommittee and any increased reliance upon this geographic area as a source of oil appears to be less than prudent. In this respect the reservations expressed by the Secretary of Defense are well taken. The subcommittee fully agrees with Secretary Laird that the tone of the majority report infers a capability of reacting to an oil emergency that is overly optimistic. The subcommittee also fully agrees with his observations that the residual fuel oil question has not been adequately analyzed and that it must be given further consideration. And last, but of utmost importance, the subcommittee fully concurs with the Secretary's views that domestic exploration must be maintained at approximately current rates and that no re-

duction in reserves be allowed. The subcommittee, while agreeing with the Secretary on these and most other reservations he expressed, differs in that it is of the strong opinion that adoption of the majority task force recommendations will prevent the realization of these national security objectives. In view of the very grave storm signals coming from the Middle East this subcommittee cannot stress enough the danger in further reliance upon oil from this area. The subcommittee feels it would be remiss if it did not stress the national security aspect of this problem and strongly advises that top level consideration be given to any additional dependency upon oil from these troubled and unreliable sources.

#### SAFEGUARD NOW LEADS TO SUCCESSFUL SALT LATER

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I listened with great interest to the speech which my distinguished colleague from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) made today in support of the committee's position on the ABM. I concur with his reasoning and applaud his logic and forthrightness.

I have also read with interest, but some dismay, and wish to comment on a letter to the editor published in the Washington Post of August 10 entitled "The ABM Vote and the SALT Talks" and is signed by W. Averell Harriman, Carl Kayson, Adrian S. Fisher, Franklin A. Long, and Herbert Scoville, Jr., and was placed in the RECORD by the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES). I cannot agree with the rationale of the five gentlemen who attached their names to that article and who concluded by stating:

In our judgment, a Senate vote against the ABM is a vote for success in SALT.

It seems to me that quite the opposite is the case and for fairly simple reasons.

First, Safeguard and its ongoing momentum constitutes our principal, if not our only, current leverage to obtain a halt in the buildup of Soviet offensive missiles. The Soviets cannot help considering that a SALT agreement must cover both offensive and defensive systems, since their own statements have expressed clearly the interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive systems. Furthermore, the United States-Soviet agreement to begin SALT negotiations specified that SALT would deal with both offensive and defensive systems. Safeguard has already appeared as one of our principal bargaining agents in the SALT talks. In the present and continuing hard bargaining, as to what specific offensive systems shall be covered, and particularly in achieving our objective of stopping the continuing Soviet construction of 25-megaton SS-9 nuclear missiles, Safeguard plays a most important role.

Next, it is of extreme importance that we do not lose sight of the fact that Safeguard is designed to achieve a number of U.S. strategic objectives in the absence of a SALT agreement. The Soviets continue to build their SS-9 missiles and their nuclear missile submarines even during the commencement of these talks. Certainly, cutting back Safeguard would mean interruption of the orderly and timely prosecution of the program, which includes several elements which have very long leadtimes. A signal flag to the Soviets would be hoisted

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indicating to them the prospect of further delaying or blocking the program by protracting negotiation—while, of course, as noted, their own missile construction and testing would continue apace.

In the absence of a SALT agreement, protection of Minuteman would be essential. The defense of Minuteman by Safeguard must deal with the threat of continued build-up of a potential Soviet first-strike capability. A SALT agreement, if reached, would deal with the Soviet first-strike threat in a different way—by stopping construction of SS-9's and also limiting the number of other Soviet missiles, such as the SS-11 which, through increased accuracy, might partially contribute to a first-strike capability. If the Soviet offensive first-strike capability is constrained by a sound SALT agreement, we will have made a significant contribution to the survivability of Minuteman as well as our bombers and, because of the long lead time for Safeguard, would enable us to review the degree of need for continued expansion of Safeguard or enable us to limit this deployment in accord with the terms of the agreement without undue risk or unnecessary expenditures.

Since the Soviets have already deployed their Moscow ABM system, and since it is unlikely that the Soviets would agree to dismantle this system in the face of Chinese capability and uncertain intentions, the United States Safeguard program now under way and anticipated will probably remain.

The authors of the letter have said that history has demonstrated that restraints, not accelerated deployments, pave the way for arms control. This argument is not a good generalization and certainly is not supported in the case of the current SALT. In fact, only after the announcement of the Sentinel deployment—prior to Safeguard—did the Soviets officially announce their willingness to negotiate strategic arms control.

Finally, I find it particularly noteworthy to consider a statement made this year by our chief spokesman of the SALT conferences.

Mr. Gerald Smith, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 26, 1970:

It seems to me that the program that (the President) recommended will not prejudice the SALT talks, will not make the Soviets lose interest in the talks, and it is a sufficiently moderate program as, I should think, not to lead the Soviets to a reaction in the form of some new weapons system, since the Soviets presently have the beginnings of a defensive missile system.

It is very apparent to me that Mr. Smith, who is, after all, dealing directly with the Soviets, should have a clear feel for Soviet sensitivity. His apparent belief that the Safeguard program should be adopted must carry great weight in this debate.

In short, directly contradictory to the Harriman letter, a Senate vote in favor of the ABM will be a vote in aid of successful SALT negotiations, which we all seek.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter to the editor of the Washington Post be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE ABM VOTE AND THE SALT TALKS

Recently administration spokesmen have been insisting that unless the Congress authorizes the continued construction and expansion of the Safeguard ABM, it will not be possible to negotiate an agreement with the Soviets at SALT to limit strategic armaments. They argue that the negotiators need the Safeguard bargaining chip to induce the Russians to halt the deployment of their large SS-9 ICBMs.

This would appear to be an attempt to exploit the desire of the Senate and the public to achieve success in SALT in order to rescue the Safeguard program from defeat. The administration has always defended the Safeguard ABM defense of Minuteman sites on the basis that it was not a threat to the U.S.S.R. If true, why then should the continuation of this program be a chip to induce the Soviets to agree to limit their offensive missile deployment?

The major U.S. threat to Soviet security lies in the deployment of the U.S. MIRV systems. On April 9, 1970, the Senate passed a resolution by a vote of 72 to 6 urging that the President propose to the U.S.S.R. an immediate suspension by both countries of further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems. Yet this MIRV chip has been thrown away by the accelerated deployment of the Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles with their MIRV warheads and by the reported proposal that any MIRV limitations must be accompanied by Soviet acceptance of extensive inspection of both offensive and defensive missile sites. There is no security justification for such urgent MIRV deployment since the heavy Soviet ABM which they were designed to penetrate could not be deployed and become operational for many, many years.

It has also been reported that the possible outcome of SALT would be an agreement that henceforth the United States and the U.S.S.R. will limit their ABMs to the defense of their capitals. The continued deployment of Safeguard at the Minuteman sites will not in any way contribute to the defense of Washington, and the Senate is being asked to endorse the expenditure of funds for useless hardware if SALT is successful and for an admittedly at best marginally effective system if it is unsuccessful. Why the U.S. should try to get the Soviets to agree to the deployment of ABM defenses for Washington and Moscow instead of a complete ABM ban is not clear, since the defense of Washington will not accomplish any of President Nixon's three objectives for an ABM system. A complete ban would eliminate the need for MIRVs and simplify the problems of verification by obviating any possible need for inspection. It is reported that the Soviets have indicated interest in such a complete ban.

Finally, history has unmistakably demonstrated that restraints, not accelerated weapons programs, pave the road to arms control. Overwhelming superiority did not induce the Soviets to accept the Baruch plan. On the other hand, President Kennedy's American University pledge to halt atmospheric nuclear testing as long as the Soviets did the same rapidly produced agreement to negotiate the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Similarly, the Senate passage without dissenting vote of the Pastore Resolution in 1966 endorsing efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons broke the ice toward starting serious U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty.

If the Senate wishes to conserve funds and make a maximum contribution toward improving U.S. security by achieving arms limitations and agreement at SALT, it will refuse authorization of funds for the expansion of Safeguard and forbid the expenditure of additional funds for the continued deployment at the two Safeguard sites approved last year until it is satisfied that the negotiators have not been able to persuade the Soviets to agree to limitations on offensive and defensive missile systems.

In our judgment, a Senate vote against the ABM is a vote for success in SALT.

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN.  
KARL KAYSEN.  
ADRIAN S. FISHER.  
FRANKLIN A. LONG.  
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

WASHINGTON.

#### THE CAUSE OF OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, the University of Denver magazine, Winter/Spring 1970, contains an article that is written with a sprightly good humor, that in no way detracts from its seriousness.

The title of the article is "There's Always More Where This Came From, Baby" and the author is Dr. Jack McCroskey, who holds the chair of finance at the College of Business Administration at the University of Denver. His thesis is that we had better stop hunting fashionable scapegoats for our economic problems and face the truth that the Federal Government is causing a goodly portion of our economic problems.

Dr. McCroskey argues his indictment and suggests some cures with force and clarity. So that all Senators may enjoy his article, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THERE'S ALWAYS MORE WHERE THIS CAME FROM, BABY

There was a time recently when the American economy seemed to be grinding to a halt. The Post Office went out of business. The air lines operated only fitfully. And the trucks and the railroads stood only a hairbreadth from a complete shutdown.

How could the U.S. economy, once hailed as the Eighth Wonder of the World, come to such a sorry state?

Traditionalists have one answer: a breakdown in authority. Radicals have another: a sickness in the society. As an economist, I have still another: a precipitous decline in the value of the dollar.

Economists have long preached against the evils of inflation. We have talked long and fervently about how deeply inflation hurts people on fixed incomes, particularly people who must live on pensions and social security.

But while we have often sympathized with such people, most of us have done so in a detached and abstract sort of way. We generally weren't in that position ourselves, and many of us failed to appreciate the day-to-day hardships these people must endure—although we might have gathered a vague idea if only we had paused to really see the elderly people we encountered in the grocery store (we with our overloaded push carts) who seemed in such torturous self debate about picking up a can of coffee at 89c or a box of tea at 78c.

We moaned and we groaned, but our hearts weren't really in it, primarily because these

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increase our defenses as well as our offensive power. Our capacity to escalate and continue the arms race, amply demonstrated by our MIRV'ing of Minuteman and our deployment of Poseidon, is our strongest bargaining card. The administration's argument that Safeguard is needed for bargaining would clearly seem to be merely another straw grasped in an effort to justify an unjustifiable system, the latest in a long series of rationales for a worthless boondoggle.

Mr. President, many supporters of the Safeguard system cry that those who oppose this system are antimilitary or anti-American or soft on communism or unaware of strategic realities of world power. That is not true. We are antiboondoggle, antihysteria, anticires of false alarm. No one is saying that the United States should disarm unilaterally or endanger its national security by foolishly reducing its strategic arsenal. There are obviously and undeniably real threats we must be ready to meet.

However, Safeguard ABM is not the answer. In these troubled and dangerous times, with our Nation over-extended abroad, divided at home, and suffering severe economic problems, we must look with great care at every decision we make. For too long the military was given everything they sought, without limitation, with hardly any question. We can no longer afford this luxury.

The military and its defenders must realize that we are not antimilitary, but rather that we are forced by circumstances to choose among alternatives and allocate scarce resources accordingly. We can no longer have everything we want, and the decisions about what we need are hard ones.

Our economy is beset with inflation and high unemployment. We have urgent domestic spending priorities. The Federal Government itself is in severe financial straits. In the light of all these facts, the challenge we face in determining our defense posture is how to get the most defense for our money, whether this be through better contracting procedures, closer supervision of contract work, or more efficient systems. Mr. President, the Safeguard ABM system does not answer this challenge. It is a dangerously costly and ineffective system, which will not do the job proposed for it and which by lulling us into a false sense of security and draining away scarce dollars from other better systems would do much to reduce our national defense.

There are other, better, less costly ways to do the jobs proposed for Safeguard. We must halt the development of this new Maginot line.

#### MIGRANT WORKERS—FORGOTTEN AMERICANS

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the recently televised NBC white paper on the plight of migrant workers once again awakened Americans to the inhuman circumstances under which so many of our farmworkers must live. Unfortunately, the horrible living and working conditions of these millions of Americans are noticed only at those infrequent

intervals when a television program of this type is broadcast. However, the compelling plight of migrant laborers in the United States is a national disgrace that we can no longer afford to ignore. These workers who toil to provide food for our tables live in a twilight world of hunger, abject poverty, and lack of opportunity in the midst of plenty.

More than a quarter of a million migrant farmworkers are today laboring in fields across America, and before the end of the year well over 1 million people—men, women, and children—will have been so employed. They will work in all of the States and will harvest the crops that will feed Americans for the coming year. They and frequently their wives and children engage in the hardest sort of backbreaking manual labor.

According to the U.S. Department of Labor, migrant workers receive an annual wage lower than that of any other income group in the country. In 1969 they worked an average of 85 days a year and they averaged a meager annual salary of only \$891. This is approximately \$30 less than the average migrant salary for 1967 and 1968. Their pitiful income is in shabby contrast to the earnings of American factory workers. The basic necessities of food and clothing consume all of their meager paychecks and more.

This month in my home State of Ohio approximately 15,000 migrant workers are laboring to harvest tomatoes and sugar beets. By November more than 50,000 migrant laborers will have worked, often on their hands and knees, in nearly half the counties of Ohio for the lowest wages paid to any sizable economic group in the State. They will have worked an average of fewer than 100 days and earned an average annual wage of less than \$1,000.

Mr. President, nationwide more than 2½ million men, women, and children are caught in this dismal web of poverty and degradation in the midst of plenty.

Housing for migrants both at home and while traveling is disgracefully below what the average American expects for his own family. Because we have not yet devised programs to eliminate poverty amongst a mobile population, social and poverty legislation have been of minimum benefit to the migrant worker who travels a substantial portion of the year. Unlike most other labor groups in our society agricultural migrant workers are totally lacking in either political or economic power. Their economic and political weakness is even more disgraceful when compared with the awesome power of the agricultural growers and processors who purchase their labors.

Migrants are excluded from the protection given to other workers in their attempts to organize or strike. They are not protected by age requirements in child labor laws. They are not guaranteed workmen's compensation and they are ineligible for unemployment insurance. In addition, because of residency requirements in most States, they are usually not allowed to vote.

In many localities there are legal restrictions against providing public services to nonresidents, therefore barring the migrant farmer and his family from

most of the health and welfare services offered to other citizens. One worker at an Ohio camp had a child who was seriously ill. He was told by local welfare officials to take the child to a public clinic which was open only on Thursday and Friday. Unfortunately, the child was dying on Saturday.

Mr. President, the fate of this child is all too typical of what such an existence does to the children of hapless, helpless migrant workers. Because there is no one to care for the children while their parents are laboring in the fields, many of them must work also. Being constantly on the move, the children cannot stay long enough in one place to receive an adequate education. Thirty percent of all migrant children have less than 8 years of education; 40 percent, less than 11 years. If they survive their early childhood they are virtually doomed to repeating the dismal life of their parents.

The fact is that 17 percent of migrant workers today are functional illiterates. Half are under 25 years of age and one-fourth of them are between 14 and 17. Because of their youth or lack of education, most migrant workers and their youngsters have no awareness or interest in the political process. They move from county to county, and from State to State. They have no Representatives or Senators in the State legislatures or in the U.S. Congress to whom they can turn for help. Theirs are the unheard voices of misery and despair.

In the past, only local remedies were sought. State and local governments and private organizations have in many instances acted to aid these people. However, because of the great number of migrant workers and because of their constant movement their plight is a national problem of concern to all Americans.

While the Congress has enacted legislation to alleviate some of the problems afflicting these people, additional action must be taken to allow them and their children to share in the benefits of our society.

First and foremost, migrant workers urgently require coverage under the National Labor Relations Act. They must have the right to utilize the collective bargaining process to improve their economic and social status as industrial workers have for more than 30 years.

Mr. President, one of the most critical needs of the migrant agricultural worker and his family is for decent housing and sanitation. Programs must be developed to assist in the construction of adequate housing facilities for these workers and their dependents.

The migrant worker faces unemployment with no reserve in the form of unemployment compensation which the industrial worker has long taken for granted. Our unemployment insurance laws must be amended to provide benefits for workers employed on large commercial farms.

At the present time a farmworker is eligible for social security if he receives \$150 in cash wages from his employer during the year or if he works for the same employer for cash wages for 20

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days or more during the year. Because of their constant movement, short periods of employment and low rate of compensation, most migrant workers do not meet the requirements to be eligible for social security benefits. Our social security law should be amended by reducing from \$150 to \$50 the amount which must be earned from a single employer each year by farmworkers. In that one act social security benefits would thereby be extended to 500,000 farmworkers, the great majority of them migrant laborers.

Mr. President, while these proposals recognize the problems of migrant workers and, to some degree, will correct their wretched working and living conditions, they by no means completely solve the problem of bringing the living standard of these forgotten people to the level enjoyed by most other Americans.

The migrant worker and his family face a near hopeless future. Each year as the educational and skill requirements of tomorrow's farm jobs are increased, opportunities for migrants will become further limited. Additional and improved programs for housing, unemployment compensation, and social security will help. These programs must be cohesive, comprehensive, and extensive. We must not allow any group in our affluent society to continue to be so consistently abused and so long forgotten.

It is the duty of the Members of Congress, before adjournment this year, to take affirmative action in their behalf.

#### ECONOMIC MADNESS

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, interest rates on home mortgages rose 26 percent in 1969. Today, the buyer of a \$20,000 home must pay nearly double that amount—\$35,000—for interest alone. Almost half of the money a home buyer pays goes not to the builder, not to the worker, not to the seller, but to the lender, primarily the big bankers whose 1969 profits ranged from 10 to 50 percent. Bank earnings during the tight money year of 1969 were among the fattest in history. Most families with annual incomes under \$13,000—more than half of all Americans—cannot really afford to buy homes. After an unprecedented period of prosperity, we have suffered an unfortunate downturn. The overall index of industrial production declined for 6 months in a row. We hope that has now been halted. Unemployment, which was 3.3 percent in December 1968, was above 5 percent last May. At the same time inflation is choking the economy. The cost of living rose 6.3 percent in 1969 and continues soaring. The inflationary effect of the Vietnam war must result ultimately in a 10-percent reduction in the standard of living of the average American. This according to one expert economist. Meanwhile, a few become rich from high interest rates while families' workmen and small businessmen pay and suffer.

#### TAKING SALT WITH A GRAIN OF SAFEGUARD

Mr. JAVITS. As a cosponsor, for the third consecutive year, of the Cooper-

Hart amendment I wish to state my reasons for supporting the substance of this year's amendment, which I had a hand in shaping. The amendment I support authorizes approximately \$1 billion—including resource and development funds—for continuing work of phase I of Safeguard at Grand Forks and Malmstrom. I am nonetheless convinced that the Safeguard system should not—and may well never be—constructed.

Spokesmen for the President have insisted most urgently that Safeguard is an indispensable "bargaining chip" at the strategic arms limitation talks—SALT—with the Soviet Union. It has been intimated by administration spokesmen that a SALT agreement to limit offensive and defensive strategic systems is within our grasp. It is further intimated that the Senate action to kill Safeguard altogether is the single action most likely to jeopardize the achievement of a SALT agreement at this time.

That is an arresting argument. It has been criticized on several grounds and none of us are happy with it. The Senate has not been consulted, or adequately briefed, on the conduct of the SALT negotiations, as called for in the Constitution. Consequently, we are not in a position to dispute the administration's assertion regarding the direct correlation between Safeguard and the prospects for a SALT agreement. Under the circumstances, we must give the benefit of the doubt to the President. I am prepared to authorize an additional billion dollars for further work on the two sites authorized last year to enhance the prospect of an early SALT agreement—which reportedly calls for the subsequent dismantlement of the two authorized sites. In short, I am prepared to take SALT with a grain of Safeguard.

Five distinguished men, with important experience in arms control negotiations in previous administrations, in a letter published in the Washington Post on August 10, have challenged head on the "bargaining chip" rationale for Safeguard. This joint statement by Averell Harriman, Karl Kaysen, Adrian Fisher, Franklin Long, and Herbert Scoville asserts that—

In our judgment, a Senate vote against the ABM is a vote for success in SALT.

On the other hand, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator STENNIS, has stated:

It is my firm opinion—and this is not an overnight thought—that to defeat Safeguard in the Senate this year would be the worst possible setback that we could hand to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Vienna.

Senator JACKSON, the floor manager, has stated:

I remain convinced that deployment of Safeguard is an essential condition for the SALT talks to succeed.

It is no secret that the position asserted by Senator STENNIS and Senator JACKSON is the position of the highest authorities of the administration. It is a position which is also maintained by lower level officials who have been intimately involved in the day-to-day negotiating process of the SALT talks.

In its boldest form, the assertion that Safeguard is essential to the success of

SALT lacks a compelling persuasiveness. I have heard one plausible "explanation" of this proposition which has helped to overcome my own skepticism and which I would, accordingly, like to share with the Senate.

It has been explained to me that the Soviet negotiating team represents a coalition of interests having diverse reasons for wanting a SALT agreement. It is said that the Soviet negotiating coalition is a delicately constructed one and that the element representing Soviet military is the most reluctant and suspicious element. The group representing the Soviet Union's military viewpoint is said to be interested primarily in halting the development of an American ABM system. Presumably—using the "worst case" war-gaming approach—the Soviet strategic planners place a higher efficacy factor on Safeguard's capabilities than our own scientific community does. Accordingly, it is contended that the Soviet military component, which is prominently represented in the Soviet negotiating team, might lose interest in achieving SALT agreement if the Safeguard system is killed off in the Senate. The defection of the Soviet military element could disrupt the delicately constructed Soviet negotiating consensus and thus jeopardize an agreement otherwise desired by other elements of the Soviet hierarchy.

I feel that I have no choice but to give the benefit of doubt to the President and his negotiators in this situation. For this reason, in discussions leading to the formulation of the Cooper-Hart amendment I urged that appropriate account must be taken of the administration's "bargaining chip" contention. I am satisfied that this consideration is fully accommodated in the Cooper-Hart amendment, in authorizing further construction only of the two sites authorized by the Senate last year.

In accepting the "bargaining chip" thesis to the extent that it is accommodated by the Cooper-Hart amendment, I nonetheless wish to express my dissatisfaction with the administration's handling of the crucial question of the relationship of the SALT talks to the Safeguard program.

In my judgment, the Soviet Union undoubtedly has a variety of incentives motivating it to seek an agreement to limit the strategic arms race. In an overall sense, I believe that concern over Safeguard, per se, is a minor factor in Soviet calculations. The broader and more significant incentives I would judge to be such factors as: First, a compulsion to avoid the vast economic expense of an accelerated arms race involving the next generation of strategic nuclear weapons and uncertainty as to the capacity of Soviet technology in the computer and electronics fields to compete successfully with the United States on the next generation of weapons systems; second, a desire to achieve formal international acceptance of its position of strategic parity with the United States; third, a desire to ease and stabilize its strategic relationship with the West, in anticipation of a growing strategic threat from Communist China in the East.

The major incentives of the United States in seeking a SALT agreement are



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matters which go to the very heart of our national life and values and of our position in the world. In my judgment, concern over the alleged SS-9 threat is also a minor factor in the overall national decision to seek a SALT agreement, with its inevitable far-reaching implications.

The themes and issues of SALT are the great and encompassing questions of our era. They are preeminently the issues most in need of thorough debate and consideration in the Senate. In this context, it is regrettable, in my judgment, that the administration has chosen to depict SALT to the Senate as a bargaining process essentially concerned with trading off ABM against SS-9.

As recently as his July 30 press conference, President Nixon publicly expressed optimism at reaching a SALT agreement. Virtually the whole case for Safeguard this year is being made on the grounds of its indispensability to the prospects of a SALT agreement. It is precisely because the Senate shares the constitutional responsibility for SALT that I consider the Administration's handling of this issue with the Senate to be inadequate and unsatisfactory.

At the opening of my statement I expressed my conviction that the Safeguard system should not—and never may be—constructed. The technical justification for Safeguard has been called into such grave doubt that even the Pentagon has conceded key points in the criticism and has indicated the intention to modify Safeguard extensively along lines suggested earlier by its critics.

In my judgment, the basic flaw of the Safeguard system from the technological viewpoint is the same as that which proved to be the undoing of the TFX. By attempting to design a system which could perform several divergent missions—that is, light area defense as well as hardpoint defense of Minuteman—Safeguard ends up being unable satisfactorily to perform any of its assigned missions. The analogy to TFX and its ill-fated albatross of "commonality" is now branded conspicuously onto Safeguard.

Senators COOPER and HART and others have summarized the technological case against Safeguard in some detail. Moreover, there is extensive testimony by a blue-ribbon roster of American scientists—in and out of government—in the printed Hearings before four congressional committees detailing at length the technical deficiencies of Safeguard.

It is not surprising that Safeguard should prove to be so vulnerable on technical grounds—considering its diverse background. It was first presented to Congress in its Sentinel configuration as a system intended to provide a light population defense against a Chinese Communist threat. Even in this incarnation, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ranking members of the Armed Services Committee supported the system primarily as a "building block" in a potential "thick" area defense against a Soviet threat. Early in 1969, the system was reconfigured out of the same components, rechristened Safeguard and

given the primary mission of "hardpoint" defense of Minuteman deterrent. To this, the subsidiary missions of defense against a Chinese "blackmail" threat and defense against a Soviet "accidental launch" were subsequently added.

This year, the Senate Armed Services Committee has again altered the mission of Safeguard. In the words of Senator JACKSON:

Safeguard has been confined to defense of the deterrent; authorization of a thin area defense has been specifically denied.

However, according to the recommendations of the O'Neill report—specifically solicited by the Defense Department from a blue ribbon panel of defense scientists—

If the only purpose of Safeguard is defined to be to protect Minutemen, Phase IIA as defined in March 1969 should not proceed. Instead, a dedicated system for active defense of Minutemen should replace or . . . augment Phase IIA.

In addition, the O'Neill report specifically states:

Phase I alone is not worth its cost.

These are the technical reasons for my conviction that the Safeguard system should not, and never ought to be, built.

There is an additional ironic, and perhaps more significant, reason for my conviction that Safeguard will never be built—the SALT negotiations which are now cited as the main justification for Safeguard. According to reports, we are on the verge of reaching a SALT agreement which will provide for "zero" ABM, or, more probably, for ABM systems restricted exclusively to protection of the national command authorities—that is, Washington and Moscow. Accordingly, if there is a SALT agreement it is likely to require the dismantling of work completed thus far at Malmstrom and Grand Forks.

If the SALT talks fail, on the other hand, it will be necessary for us to reconsider the entire question of our strategic posture, both with respect to offensive as well as defensive systems. I do not believe that Safeguard where it is now, could justify its survival under either set of circumstances.

It is precisely because the failure of SALT will result in circumstances which require a thorough—and wholly unpleasant—rethinking of our entire strategic posture and requirements—with the most ominous and dangerous implications for world peace and security, that I am prepared to concede the benefit of the doubt to the administration's contention that it needs Safeguard for the success of SALT. If we are able to get an agreement limiting offensive and defensive weapons—and thus averting a new round of the nuclear arms race—I would consider the \$1 billion authorized for additional work on Safeguard to be money well spent.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, with a limitation of 3 minutes on statements made therein.

#### CORRECTION OF THE RECORD

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, an error in the printing of the Record of yesterday resulted in the omission of a crucial provision of Senate amendment 829, filed yesterday by me and other Senators.

The omission occurs in the third column of page S13059 of the Record for August 10, 1970.

To correct the error and give notice of it to my colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment (Senate amendment 829) be printed at this point in the Record.

I also ask unanimous consent that the permanent Record be corrected to show the entire text of Senate amendment 829 at the appropriate place in the Record of August 10, 1970.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

On page 2, line 2, of the amendment, strike out "\$838,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$881,200,000".

On page 2, of the amendment, beginning with line 8, strike out all down through and including line 20 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"TITLE IV—PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF SAFEGUARD SYSTEM

"Sec. 401. None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used for the purpose of deploying a safeguard system at any site."

#### THE KENDALL SCHOOL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1078, S. 4083, introduced by Mr. YARBOROUGH and other Senators.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 4038) to modify and enlarge the authority of Gallaudet College to maintain and operate the Kendall School as a demonstration elementary school for the deaf to serve primarily the National Capital region, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, the bill, S. 4083, would authorize the board of directors of Gallaudet College to construct and operate a demonstra-

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tion preschool and elementary school for the deaf in connection with the Kendall School on the campus of Gallaudet College.

In its continuing efforts to serve deaf children from the National Capital region, the Kendall School must become a national demonstration preschool and elementary school for the deaf. There are a number of reasons why this is so:

First. The evolution of the Kendall School into a demonstration elementary school represents a natural progression in its development:

Second. The establishment and operation of the Model Secondary School for the Deaf—Public Law 89-694—has created a new perspective on the education of the deaf; and

Third. The rubella epidemic of 1963-65 and the predicted epidemic in 1972-73 are creating a need for a more appropriate learning environment. Professionals agree that unless major efforts are directed to the elementary level many deaf students will not be able to benefit from federally supported programs such as the Model Secondary School for the Deaf and the National Technical Institute for the Deaf—Public Law 89-36—because it is too late to bridge the educational gap. Focus must be on the establishment of a demonstration school for preschool and elementary-age deaf children.

The Kendall School is an established school of quality with a competent staff and physical facilities. Therefore, a demonstration elementary program for deaf children can be established with minimum additional expenditures of Federal funds. There is such a demonstration or model school now for high school level operated on the Gallaudet campus. This bill would authorize the same type of demonstration school for pre-high school level.

If what the experts tell us about the "rock generation" is true, the hearing of many people will be affected by this loud, raucous music. The jet planes are injuring the ear drums of many people, and many veterans are losing their hearing because of noise from bombs and cannon fire. So we have a growing incidence of deafness in the populace.

Preschool deals with children who are deaf while quite young. The people who work in this field have warned us that unless a child's deafness is detected at a very early age and treated at a very early age, the child will never catch up in learning with other children.

We know that if a child's deafness is detected while quite young, before he is old enough to go to school, and if he receives training at an early preschool age, then, with proper schooling that child will have a better chance in life.

At the present time, the average deaf person in America earns, on an average half as much money as a nondeaf person; but with proper education from very tender years, they could earn as much money as the average person who can hear.

I will give an illustration, Mr. President. A few years ago, the school for the deaf in my State, established in 1856,

asked the new Internal Revenue office there, the district area that covers many States, where they have the computers, to employ some deaf people. They had great difficulty getting them to try some deaf people. Finally, they put deaf people to work on the computers.

The computers are in vast rooms which are kept dust free and have soundproof walls but there is quite a bit of noise. Occasionally, one employee working on the computer will speak to another. They found, after a year's experience, that the deaf person, because of having less distractions, makes fewer mistakes than the nondeaf person. The deaf person, working with the computers in that great Internal Revenue Center, is a more efficient worker with the machines than the nondeaf person.

With new opportunities opening up for the deaf, with the proper training, we hope to give the deaf a better life and an economic opportunity equal to that enjoyed by the nondeaf.

The interest and commitment of the Congress in the Kendall School and Gallaudet College dates back to February 16, 1857, when the Congress approved an act to incorporate the Columbia Institution for the Deaf, Dumb, and Blind—renamed the Kendall School for the Deaf in 1885. In succeeding acts and in its annual appropriation, Congress has continued its support of and interest in the operations of Gallaudet College and the Kendall School.

It is interesting to note that Kendall School was started in February of 1857, just a year after the Texas School for the Deaf was founded in Austin in 1856.

The original program of education for deaf children began in a log cabin on a 65-acre site in Austin near the Colorado River.

The Texas School for the Deaf has continued to grow since its establishment, and by 1910 it had a residential population in excess of 500 children. A modern building program began 15 years ago, resulting in a modern school unique for its cottage living arrangements. The Texas School has a current enrollment of approximately 680 pupils.

The total population of deaf people in Texas is estimated at approximately 11,500 profoundly deaf people, with another 100,000 hard of hearing individuals.

Although great progress has been made made in the education of deaf children in the Texas school system, there is an imperative need for a national demonstration center to operate in a setting such as that provided on the campus of Gallaudet College where educators of the deaf will have a whole spectrum of deaf students from preschool through college for training under optimum conditions. In this way it is hoped that the best and newest methods of education of deaf children can be put to use with experimental equipment and curriculum.

Over the past decade an extensive body of knowledge has been accumulated concerning new approaches to improvement of the education of young deaf children. The Kendall School for the Deaf must obtain the resources to enable it to develop programs and to disseminate this knowledge to other schools.

Demonstration of the success of these programs would facilitate the development of other area centers throughout the United States.

Mr. President, I urge passage of this much needed legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill (S. 4083) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed, as follows:

S. 4083

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That for the purpose of providing day and residential facilities for elementary education for persons who are deaf in order to prepare them for high school and other secondary study, and to provide an exemplary educational program to stimulate the development of similar excellent programs throughout the Nation, the directors of Gallaudet College are authorized to maintain and operate Kendall School as a demonstration elementary school for the deaf, to serve primarily residents of the National Capital region.

SEC. 2. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "elementary school" means a school which provides education for deaf children from the age of onset of deafness to age fifteen, inclusive, but not beyond the eighth grade or its equivalent.

(b) The term "construction" includes construction and initial equipment of new buildings, and expansion, remodeling, and alteration of existing buildings and equipment thereof, including architect's services, but excluding off-site improvements.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 3. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year such sums as may be necessary for the establishment and operation, including construction and equipment, of the demonstration elementary school provided for in section 1.

(b) Federal funds appropriated for the benefit of the school shall be used only for the purposes for which paid and in accordance with the applicable provisions of this Act.

SEC. 4. In the design and construction of any facilities, maximum attention shall be given to excellence of architecture and design, works of art, and innovative auditory and visual devices and installations appropriate for educational functions of such facilities.

REPEAL OF EXISTING STATUTES

SEC. 5. The following statutes or parts of statutes are hereby repealed:

(a) Section 1 of the Act of March 1, 1901 (31 Stat. 844), as amended.

(b) Section 1 of the Act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 962), as amended.

(c) Act of November 7, 1966 (80 Stat. 1399).

(d) Section 1 of the Act of March 1, 1905 (33 Stat. 901), as amended.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. HUGHES. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF PERIOD FOR THE TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I ask unanimous consent that, notwithstanding the previous order providing for the

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full production, in less than a year's time, a massive weekly payroll will be added to the community. This will make productive citizens and taxpayers out of hundreds of welfare recipients.

Nearly \$2 million of private money will go into this plant. Local money from the city of Jackson has already purchased the site for this operation at a cost of \$49,000. A local bank has pledged \$80,000 of development money. The State of Kentucky has constructed \$165,000 in access roads to the site. And the company, U.S. Shoe Corp., will eventually spend between \$1,400,000 and \$1,500,000 to build and equip a factory, and has already invested \$180,000 in preliminary development.

In order to break ground for this factory, the city of Jackson must obtain approval of a pending Economic Development Administration application for \$385,000. Since January of this year, one of my staff members has worked with officials of Jackson in trying to obtain this approval, and the application has been continually held up by one technicality after another. It took 2½ months to clear the area office in Huntington, W. Va., and it has been in the Washington office of EDA since June of this year.

Jackson, Ky., is asking an agency of the Federal Government—EDA—to help a community supply jobs for people who want to work. We all know economic development is the only real solution to the poverty of this Nation. Yet those charged with assisting such growth allow the people of my State who seek to build new life to languish while they wallow in the hopeless maze of bureaucratic red-tape.

In summary, the right hand knows not of the activities of the left and it appears the handout continues to take precedence over the hand up. I denounce the decision by HEW to dole out \$100,000 while productive EDA projects such as that of Jackson, Ky., remain unfunded.

#### AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND OTHER PURPOSES

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 17123) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1971 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

#### MIRV, SALT, AND STRATEGIC STABILITY: A DUAL APPROACH

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, Senate consideration of the defense procurement authorization comes at a moment of extreme delicacy in many realms of national security policy—the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are in a crucial phase, the strategic balance is poised at the edge of far-reaching changes, defense spending is tottering under the challenge of competing domestic demands. Among the many issues we must

consider in this debate, none is more critical than that of MIRV, the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles whose incipient deployment is drastically changing the composition and capabilities of American strategic forces.

As Members of the Senate will recall, I have long argued that our security and that of the Soviet Union would be best served by a mutual suspension of MIRV testing and deployment. If such weapons were deployed in large numbers and were developed to levels of very high accuracy, they could seriously threaten hardened missile silos and could undermine the stable deterrence on which both countries depend.

It is, of course, reassuring to know that any such "hard-target MIRV" systems are years away from being perfected and that the initial systems now being deployed do not in fact pose a threat to the Soviet Union's retaliatory forces. Yet, as has often been pointed out in this Chamber, unless clear safeguards are established, technical improvements could eventually transform the first-generation MIRV systems which are capable only of a retaliatory mission into more dangerous weapons which might seem capable of a first strike. This could only induce a larger arms race, as the Soviets would be obliged to increase the number of offensive weapons or take other countermeasures to insure their ability to deter us, just as we are determined to do whatever is necessary to guarantee that we can deter them.

Under these circumstances, how we resolve the dilemmas posed by the development of MIRV technology will do much to shape the stability of the strategic balance. I remain convinced that a mutual ban on MIRV testing and deployment is the wisest course, and I am still hopeful that the SALT negotiations will eventually produce such an understanding. However, we do not know when, how, or if SALT will address the complicated problems of MIRV, and we must seek to shape a sound policy which will deal with two contingencies: either mutual limitation on MIRV in the SALT negotiations, or a continued deployment of MIRV in the absence of such a limitation.

In line with the sentiments voiced by the Senate in Senate Resolution 211, which urged a limitation on both offensive and defensive strategic weapons, particularly MIRV, we should do everything possible to facilitate a reasonable agreement on this difficult issue.

Toward this end I am today proposing an amendment which could make a major contribution to this objective. This amendment will direct the Department of Defense to initiate development of single reentry vehicle systems for both the Minuteman III and the Poseidon missiles, which are presently designed specifically as MIRV launchers.

So long as the United States has only MIRV systems for deployment on these two missiles, a proposed MIRV limitation would be tantamount to a de facto reduction in U.S. strategic forces. This is an especially critical factor with regard to the Poseidon system, since a number of submarines are being converted to

carry this missile and a MIRV ban would mean that those subs could not be on station for a number of months, that is, until the Poseidon missile was altered or boats refitted to Polaris missiles.

Thus, as a matter of simple prudence, the United States needs to prepare for the contingency of a MIRV limitation by developing single reentry systems which could be mounted on these weapons. Dr. John Foster and other Defense Department spokesmen have alluded to precisely this possibility in remarking that Minuteman III and Poseidon could be fitted for single warheads. It is important to delay no longer in undertaking the work to make this a live option. This amendment would authorize and mandate such work, and I believe it will meet with the Department's approval.

I should perhaps mention that there are several advantages to pursuing such a development. Mounting a single reentry vehicle on the Poseidon could permit the submarines to operate at greater ranges from their targets. By increasing the maneuvering room for the boats, this option would contribute substantially to their invulnerability to attack by antisubmarine warfare forces. This is a significant advantage in its own right, but it could become even more so if the United States were gradually to evolve toward heavier reliance on the so-called blue-water option, that is, concentrating the largest fraction of its deterrent forces at sea and reducing or phasing out fixed-site land-based missiles. I consider it premature to elect this option at this time, since I believe it could best be pursued in the context of a larger strategic arms agreement which limited ASW forces as well as other weapons. If ASW forces were not so limited, the invulnerability of sea-based forces might erode over the longer term. Nevertheless, the blue-water option is a serious candidate for coming decades and there could be a special value in the added operating space which a single RV Poseidon would give our boats.

A further consideration is also worth noting. It is quite possible that, even in the absence of a MIRV ban, other agreements in SALT might make it desirable to substitute a single-reentry vehicle for the MIRV systems presently planned for Minuteman III and Poseidon. For example, since our MIRV is designed to assure U.S. ability to penetrate any Soviet ABM deployment, a very low limit on ABM coupled with a freeze on the number of offensive launchers might make it desirable to elect the single-warhead option. Under that contingency, MIRV would not be required to penetrate an ABM and a single-warhead system would contribute more to nuclear stability than a multiple RV deployment.

This is a question we will need to reassess in coming months as, hopefully, the results of SALT become visible. The MIRV-capable missiles authorized in the fiscal year 1971 bill will not be deployed for many months. As we approach that date we can then determine whether they should be MIRVed or fitted with single warheads. But we can only do so, if the single-reentry vehicle systems are

ready. It is for that reason that this amendment is essential. The Department has long studied this option and I believe it will welcome congressional guidance in initiating such a development.

A second and even graver contingency also confronts us and it is imperative that the Congress prepare to meet it. That is the possibility—one might say the probability—that the initial MIRV deployments will continue and that these weapons will be in the arsenals of the United States and probably the Soviet Union for the indefinite future. If that trend continues, our fundamental concern must be to insure that the MIRV's that are deployment reinforce strategic stability. They can do so only if they are exclusively, explicitly, and credibly designed for the retaliatory, second strike mission. In short, we must erect standards which make clear that the United States will not deploy MIRV systems capable of threatening the Soviet strategic forces.

The United States has, of course, been committed to a second strike posture for many years. The task here is to see that MIRV systems are compatible with that posture. President Nixon has consistently stressed this principle in his decisions and declarations on strategic weapons. For example, in proposing the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system, the President wisely underscored his concern to avoid actions which appeared to threaten the Soviet retaliatory forces. In his remarks of March 14, 1969—surely one of the most important and enlightened strategic statements by any statesman—Mr. Nixon repeatedly applied the American doctrine of deterrence. He rejected the possibility of a heavy ABM defense because "it might look to an opponent like the prelude to an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet deterrent." He also decided against meeting the Soviet build-up by increasing U.S. offensive capabilities, since such an increase "could be misinterpreted by the Soviets as an attempt to threaten their deterrent. It would therefore stimulate an arms race." And the President partially justified the reorientation of the U.S. ABM system to defense of the Minuteman force by stating:

The program is not provocative. The Soviet retaliatory capability is not affected by our decision.

President Nixon applied the same standard in his redirection of the U.S. MIRV program. As the Senate will recall, Mr. Nixon informed us some months ago that a proposed development of a hard-target MIRV system had not been approved and that the United States has no such program.

In testimony before the Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Laird further commented on this important decision by pointing out:

The President has made it perfectly clear that we do not intend to develop counterforce capabilities which the Soviets could construe as having a first-strike potential.

I believe the Secretary, who has been so deeply concerned by the deployment of Soviet weapons with an evident potential for attacking U.S. ICBM's, must have a special appreciation of the hazards of such destabilizing weapons. It is

clear to every careful analyst that weapons capable of counterforce attacks only make the existing strategic balance more dangerous and the ensuing arms race more costly.

There is, obviously, no disagreement that, if MIRV is required to penetrate a Soviet ABM system and to maintain a credible second strike capability, then this country will continue deploying such systems. However, the retaliatory mission can be performed with relatively modest yields limited accuracies that would be unsuitable for any first strike against enemy missile forces. The truth of this simple axiom is apparent when one recalls that Hiroshima was almost obliterated by a 20-kiloton atomic bomb—much smaller than today's missile-borne payloads—delivered with an accuracy which has long since been surpassed.

The Armed Services Committee has expressed its concern about the implications of MIRV for the credibility of America's commitment to a second strike or mutual deterrence doctrine. In reducing the funds for the so-called ABRES—advanced ballistic reentry systems—program, the Committee has stressed in its report that the reduction is related to "any future hard-target kill capability." The report points out that the strictly retaliatory objective "can be met with substantially less accuracy and more modest yields than needed for the counterforce mission." Thus, the committee has thoughtfully discouraged even preliminary development work which might be viewed as pointed toward a destabilizing counterforce capacity—a capacity that is unnecessary and indeed highly detrimental to deterrence.

In pursuit of this same objective, so clearly enunciated by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Armed Services Committee, I am proposing a second amendment setting the standards for deployment of a retaliatory MIRV capability. This amendment would prohibit the use of funds for operation development, testing or procurement of a hard-target MIRV system and would specifically define what a hard-target MIRV system capability is.

Much discussion of this issue has been impeded by the absence of an agreed definition of hard-target capability. Obviously it is meaningless to declare that the United States will forego a capability to attack Soviet strategic forces unless that capability is defined in believable and understandable terms. Both in the interest of our own understanding, and even more, of Soviet perceptions of our intentions, this amendment would limit U.S. MIRV systems to yields and accuracies no greater than one-third the level considered necessary to enable a single warhead to neutralize a hardened missile silo.

I have developed this definition in extensive discussions with the Department of Defense and with colleagues in and out of Congress. As I am sure the Department of Defense agrees, it provides more than ample latitude for MIRV systems to meet the requirements of a second strike, while it establishes a threshold well below that which could jeopardize Soviet missile forces. I believe

it to be an even more urgent provision than the first amendment I have presented. On the real likelihood that MIRV deployment may continue, we must have firm guidelines for our subsequent action in this field.

Because of their deep concern on this matter, more than half the members of the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have individually joined in a petition to the President and the Senate to forego any hard-target MIRV development. Growing numbers of responsible spokesmen in the technical community, including many proponents of MIRV, recognize that we do not need and in fact cannot afford to move toward hard-target MIRV's, since the result can only be a diminution of our own security. This amendment can be a decisive affirmation of our determination to avoid ambiguous or provocative improvements in MIRV systems.

The logic for this proposal is rooted in mutual deterrence itself, as President Nixon has so well indicated. Stable deterrence requires that neither side threaten the other side's capacity to retaliate. This is necessary not only to avoid endless cycles in the arms race, as one or the other side moves desperately to protect its retaliatory capacity. It is primarily important because, should a nation find its forces to be vulnerable, those weapons can only be used if they themselves are launched first. If they are withheld, they run the risk of destruction. This is the insight which years ago led Albert Wohlstetter and others to note that the "balance of terror" is delicate, and that security in the nuclear age demands that strategic weapons be invulnerable.

Thus, U.S. security is in no way served by an capability to threaten Soviet strategic forces. Such a capability would only raise the prospect that Soviet weapons might be launched in some moment of crisis out of fear that otherwise they would be disarmed in a first strike. The same is no less true of any Soviet deployment threatening our retaliatory forces.

We cannot tolerate hair triggers in an era of instant and total devastation. The only sane policy for both countries is to refrain from such destabilizing systems and to take those measures which create unambiguous and invulnerable second strike forces.

That is the purpose of this amendment. By setting this criterion for American MIRV systems, we can enhance our own security and set a model for the Soviet Union to match. Even if they fail to do so, we will have insured that any American MIRV systems are compatible with the policy to which the United States is dedicated. We will also have struck a note of prudence which could respond very helpfully in the strategic arms limitations talks.

To sum up, the subject of MIRV is complex but the case for these two amendments is itself quite simple. In the event that the SALT negotiations produce an agreement limiting MIRV systems, we will need to have the option of installing single-reentry vehicles on the expensive Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles in which we are investing. In the event that such an agreement is not



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reached and MIRV deployment continues, we shall need to insure that the American MIRV systems remain strictly retaliatory weapons which do not undermine the stable deterrence on which our security rests.

The two amendments I offer will serve these vital objectives, I commend them to the Senate.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the two amendments I have submitted be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments will be received and printed, and will lie on the table; and, without objection, the amendments will be printed in the RECORD, in accordance with the Senator's request.

Mr. BROOKE'S amendments, ordered to be printed in the RECORD, are as follows:

On page 14, at the appropriate place, insert a new section as follows:

SEC. 206. The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to initiate a program of research to develop at the earliest possible date, a single re-entry vehicle system for the Minuteman III missile and a single re-entry vehicle system for the Poseidon missile. For purposes of this section "a single re-entry vehicle system" is a system capable only of deploying a single re-entry vehicle and its associated penetration aids. The funds to be expended in carrying out the provisions of this section shall be funds transferred from other projects by the Secretary pursuant to his authority under existing law to transfer funds from one project to another.

At the end of the bill add a new section as follows:

No funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used for operational development, testing or procurement of any Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) system in which an individual re-entry vehicle provides a capability to destroy a hardened target. For purposes of this section, "a capability to destroy a hardened target" means that combination of warhead yield and accuracy required to generate the equivalent of one third the level of blast over-pressures and related effects considered necessary to enable a single warhead to neutralize a hardened missile silo.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. BROOKE. I am very pleased to yield.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Massachusetts on a very important and significant speech. It is important that we hold down expenditures for the American taxpayer, to prevent inflation and to provide for an opportunity for securing other national objectives in addition to the immediate military purposes involved in defense.

The Senator from Massachusetts goes much farther with this amendment and much farther in his speech. As I understand, the purpose of this amendment is primarily to increase the security of the American people, and of the world, for that matter.

Mr. BROOKE. That is correct.

Mr. PROXMIRE. By conforming our actions to the expression by President Nixon that he did not want to take any action, or want us to take any action, that would in turn provoke the Soviet Union to feel that we were going after a first strike; and what the Senator's amendment would do would be to provide that

we act, with this terrific increase in firepower that we will have with the multiple independent reentry vehicle, in a way that would make clear that what we are trying to do is to strengthen our own forces so that we could continue to have a credible second strike capability, but make it obvious and clear that we are not trying to develop a capability that would destroy the Soviet Union's missiles. Is that correct?

Mr. BROOKE. The Senator is correct; yes.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I think that this is most significant, not only from the standpoint of actually, I presume, saving funds, although that is important—in this case it is certainly secondary—but also, it is very significant in terms of the security of our country.

As I understand it, the proposal of the Senator from Massachusetts has the great advantage, too, of being logical and appropriate, regardless of whatever position one might take on the SALT talks. Is that correct?

Mr. BROOKE. The Senator is correct.

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are viewed differently by various Senators. Some feel that because of them, we should provide everything that the administration and the Defense Department have requested in the way of military force. Others have argued that that might not be the wise course, for various reasons.

But, regardless of the position one takes with respect to the SALT talks, in view of the President's statement that we should not take any action that would convince the Soviet Union that we were trying to develop a first strike, the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts is completely logical and consistent with that view of President Nixon, and the amendment is one which I can support enthusiastically.

Mr. BROOKE. I am very pleased to have the support of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin.

The Senator is quite correct in his analysis of the amendment and what the amendment would do. As the MIRV technology has developed to date, we do not have the accuracy which would enable us to have a first strike against the Soviet Union. The Russians know this and the United States, of course, knows this. But if we were to continue improving and perfecting our MIRV technology, the time would come when obviously we would have a first strike capability.

The President and the Secretary of Defense have said that we are not seeking a first strike capability. One of our military leaders at one time made a statement which was interpreted as meaning the United States was seeking a first strike capability. But the President denied this in a letter, which I made public to the Armed Services Committee and to the Senate, in which the President made clear that we are not seeking such a capability. As the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin has well pointed out, this would be most provocative, and we do not seek it.

All we are trying to do by this amendment is make explicit, write into law, the expressed policy of this administration that we will not perfect this MIRV tech-

nology to the point where it could become a first strike capability and be considered by the Soviet Union as having a first strike capability. Such a threat could easily provoke them into further development and deployment to the point where they would have a first strike capability, and the arms race could continue on indefinitely, out of balance.

So long as we are able to keep the mutual deterrents—and we can do this by limiting the MIRV technology, as would be done by this amendment—then, of course, there will be no fear of either side having a first strike capability.

This amendment would by no means stop our deployment of MIRV. I want to make that very clear. I think the Senate should understand that.

Senate Resolution 211, which I introduced in the Senate a year or so ago, and which was passed by the Senate by a vote of 72 to 6, never suggested a unilateral cessation of operational testing of MIRV. It was a mutual cessation of operational testing of MIRV. This, of course, would be something that would have to be done by the United States and the Soviet Union in the SALT talks. But we just do not know at this point what is going to come out of SALT. I think we are all hopeful and prayerful. In the interim, we are going ahead with MIRV, as the Senator well knows, so far as our Poseidon and Minuteman III are concerned. We know that. That is public information. That is not secret information at all.

The Senator was not in the Chamber when I discussed the other amendment in my prepared text. The other amendment would direct the Defense Department to develop a single warhead weapons system that could be used on Poseidon or on Minuteman III. In the event that we are able to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union at the SALT talks for a ban on MIRV, then we would have a single reentry vehicle system that could be put onto our Minuteman III missile and our Poseidon missile.

Mr. PROXMIRE. As I understand, the position of the Senator from Massachusetts is that in the event we did go ahead—if we did go ahead—with the multiple MIRVing, which the Senator's amendment is designed to prevent, we would greatly increase the likelihood that the Soviet Union in turn would feel compelled to go ahead with multiple MIRVing.

Mr. BROOKE. The Senator is correct.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Furthermore, we would greatly increase the likelihood that they would consider a first strike, for fear that we might initiate a first strike before they did, because they would feel that we were developing a first strike capability.

On the other hand, if we do not go ahead, some will argue that we are not advancing our technology, that we are not advancing our capability, but how do we know, absent effective unilateral inspection, that the Soviet Union is not going ahead with theirs? I take it that this is the reason why the Senator's amendment would provide for a stronger second strike capability.

Mr. BROOKE. That is correct.

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Mr. PROXMIRE. So that whatever technological advance they might have, it would be most unlikely to be preemptive. We not only would have the submarines, which seem to be pretty much invulnerable to a first strike—and nobody I know of has argued that they would not be—but also, we would have the bombers, which are mobile and highly invulnerable to a first strike, and the second strike weapons which the Senator's amendment is designed to improve.

Mr. BROOKE. Yes. Because the existing single reentry vehicle systems have not been improved—the old Polaris and the old Minuteman I. So we would have to improve our single reentry vehicle systems if we were to enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union on a limitation on MIRV's.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator.

I hope the Senator from Massachusetts—and I know the Senator from Mississippi would join me—will call up his amendment as soon as he can. I know that there are considerations he may have as to the exact timing of that. I am hopeful that we can get some amendments before the Senate, and I know that the Senator from Mississippi and other Senators would like to have action as soon as possible.

Mr. BROOKE. As I have said, I am very pleased to have the support of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin. It is certainly my intention, as I have said to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, to call these amendments up very soon.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BROOKE. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I commend the Senator for the clarity and completeness of his speech. It is a subject matter in which he is well versed. He has worked on it this year and last year and perhaps before. The committee heard his presentation with great interest. I am sure the entire membership of the Senate will be interested in this question.

I want to get the quotations again of just what the President of the United States said about this. The Senator has this matter now before the Department of Defense, as I understand.

Mr. BROOKE. That is correct. I have asked the Secretary of Defense to give the department's position on both of these amendments, and I expect a reply momentarily.

Mr. STENNIS. I am really glad the Senator did ask that. I do not think we ought to take them up until the Senator has received a response.

This morning, in anticipation that this matter was coming up, because the Senator had told me so, I initiated inquiry over there, also, that the committee was interested in the subject. Can the Senator give any indication when he might offer them? I am thinking about the prospect of getting them up tomorrow, say, or this week?

Mr. BROOKE. I had thought the early part of next week.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. We are really in a distressing situation here. I know that

the Senator is always willing to cooperate—

Mr. BROOKE. I certainly am always glad to do so.

Mr. STENNIS. With the committee, even though we do not vote together.

Mr. BROOKE. In response to the inquiry of the Senator from Mississippi, a great deal will depend upon the response I receive from the Department of Defense.

Mr. STENNIS. Well, it is a very important matter. I was not suggesting any hasty consideration here, but if we could get it up this week, we could start debate. I do not know whether we could finish it or not, but the Senator makes a good suggestion that we should find out what the Secretary of Defense will say.

Mr. BROOKE. I am certainly sympathetic to the Senator's problems here and assure him that I will move as expeditiously as possible in calling up the amendments.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator very much. As of now, though, he merely submits his amendments for the information of the Senate?

Mr. BROOKE. That is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator does not propose to call them up until further notice?

Mr. BROOKE. That is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENNET). The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### MERCURY CONTAMINATION OF THE WISCONSIN RIVER

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Nation is facing its first water pollution crisis. While most people have always thought of water pollution only in terms of dirty, unsightly water, the present crisis involves, according to Secretary Hickel, "an intolerable threat to the health and safety of Americans." The cause of this new crisis is mercury contamination.

Within the past 3 weeks, mercury has been found in large quantities in many streams and rivers throughout the United States. Unrecognized as a threat until just over a month ago, mercury poisoning has already caused the deaths of four persons in New Mexico. Waters now threatened by mercury contamination include Lake Onondaga, parts of the Tennessee River, the Mobile and Tombigbee Rivers in Louisiana, the Mississippi River above New Orleans, the Rio Grande River in Texas, Lake Ontario, much of Lake Erie, and many rivers in Alabama. New reports of contamination are being received almost daily and the Federal Water Quality Administration has established a special emergency task force to deal with the crisis.

Wisconsin, my State, has been particularly hard hit by the crisis. Recently I learned that the Wisconsin River is

heavily contaminated. According to a spokesman from the Federal Water Quality Administration—FWQA—concentrations up to 1,000 parts per million have been found in sludge deposited at the bottom of the river near Port Edwards. This sludge contains the highest concentration of mercury reported to FWQA anywhere in the country, according to the same spokesman. Fish tested at various points along the river have been found to contain concentrations of mercury ranging from 1 part per 10 million to 1.83 parts per million. While these quantities appear to be extremely small, mercury is toxic to certain species of fish in concentrations as low as .004 parts per million. The Federal Water Quality Administration is presently attempting to enforce a standard of .000 parts per million. Needless to say, the concentrations reported in fish in the Wisconsin River are well above the danger levels.

Perhaps the most frightening thing about the situation is that the threat posed by the mercury may persist for many decades. Sludge containing as much as 1,000 parts per million now resting at the bottom of the Wisconsin River may pose a permanent source of contamination. While the transfer process between the sludge and the river water is not completely understood, it is clear that the mercury does not sink harmlessly to the bottom, as previously believed. Michigan State University geologist, Dr. Robert Ehrlich, points out that:

We failed to take into account a process called organic complexing—the way organic matter in lake bottom sediment and lake waters pick up electrically charged atoms of a metal like mercury and force them into solution throughout a lake.

From evidence already gathered, it is clear that mercury contamination may threaten man for up to 100 years. Commenting on suggestions that all plants dumping mercury be forced to cease all discharges immediately, Richard Ronk, mercury project officer for the Food and Drug Administration, pointed out that:

Even if we close all the plants today, the problem won't go away. The mercury will still be there, and nobody can really tell you how long it will take the biosphere to take care of it.

In Sweden, where mercury poisoning has caused a drastic decrease in the bird population, scientists have predicted that the threat will persist for 10 to 100 years unless the mercury is made inactive.

The symptoms in man of mercury poisoning may occur weeks to months after an acute exposure to toxic concentrations. For this reason, no one really knows how much damage may have already been done. Mercury is a slow acting poison which gradually destroys the brain, a few cells at a time. One of the first signs is the impairment of the coordination of muscle movement. With severe intoxication, the symptoms are irreversible and death follows within a matter of months. The most serious threat caused by mercury is to human fetuses. Methyl mercury easily penetrates to the fetus via the placenta, and the concentration of mercury in the fetal

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admirers and highly capable students of Roman civilization. And since they knew that from the time of Marius (157-86 BC) the eagle (aquila) had been the standard of the Roman legions whose duty it was to fight for that civilization, it was clearly no accident that this symbol of the power of republican government in the Ancient World should become the symbol of the first republic in the New World.

With this explanation, I hope that everyone is now in a position to answer this simple but rather important question which we as Americans should have full knowledge of.

WELCOME, DR. JOHN BUNZEL

**HON. DON EDWARDS**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 29, 1970

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, a new president has been appointed at San Jose State College. He is Dr. John Bunzel, formerly chairman of the political science department at San Francisco State College and now with the center for advanced studies in behavioral science at the University of Santa Clara. His impressive professional credentials are matched by a record of equally impressive courage and personal integrity, demonstrated by his conduct during the faculty strike at San Francisco State last year. I would like to join with the rest of my community in welcoming Dr. Bunzel to San Jose and wishing him all success in his new position. There being no objection, I would like to add the following editorial from the San Jose Mercury on the importance of this most welcome appointment:

## NEW PRESIDENT OF SAN JOSE

Dr. John Bunzel, the newly-appointed president of San Jose State College, comes to his new post with an impressive record of qualifications and experience. He will need them.

San Jose State, perhaps more so than any other California state college today, is overcrowded, under-funded and—to a lesser degree than some other state colleges—beleaguered and belabored by a minority of politically-oriented students and faculty.

The job of a college president is never easy. It is harder than it needs to be in California today precisely because society is in a state of flux. Confusion abounds—about the nation's war aims, about its own internal priorities and about the state and direction of its economy. Public institutions of higher education are a focus for these tensions and confusions, and the college president is truly the man in the middle.

Dr. Bunzel, as a political scientist and sociologist, is surely familiar with the problems he will face at San Jose State, but knowing what to expect and coping effectively with it when it arrives are often two entirely different things. If he is to do the best possible job, Dr. Bunzel will need the confidence and cooperation of his faculty, his fellow administrators, the students of the college and the citizens of San Jose. He deserves them, if for no other reason than that every man deserves a fair chance to succeed.

There are, of course, more and better reasons for strong community cooperation with the new San Jose State College president. The college is a precious community asset. It can provide—and has on occasion pro-

vided—leadership and manpower for many community development projects. It would be a loss both to the school and the community if this relationship should be weakened.

Equally important, San Jose State College has the potential to become a first-rate university. It is well on the way to that status now, and it is imperative therefore that its president be a man dedicated to the pursuit of truth and knowledge and demanding of scholarship and professional competence from his faculty.

Dr. Bunzel's record as a professor of political science and, most recently, as chairman of the political science department at San Francisco State College, suggests that he understands the nature and value of scholarship and the responsibilities of a college—responsibilities to itself, to academic freedom and to society as a whole.

It is a pleasure to welcome Dr. Bunzel to San Jose and to wish him a successful and productive tenure as president of San Jose State College.

## FOUNDER'S AWARD

**HON. JOHN O. MARSH, JR.**

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 29, 1970

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, recently the Izaak Walton League of America at their 48th annual convention held at the Golden Triangle Hotel in Norfolk, Va., in July of this year, presented the "Founder's Award," which is their highest award, to our colleague, JOHN SAYLOR of the 22d District of Pennsylvania.

The nature of the award and Congressman SAYLOR's achievements which led to his selection, are more fully set out in the news release of the Izaak Walton League, which I call to the attention of the membership.

Although it is not mentioned in the news release, I bring to the attention of the House that Mr. SAYLOR serves as a trustee of the Massanutten Military Academy which is located in my congressional district at Woodstock, Va. Inasmuch as I have the opportunity to serve with him as a trustee on that same board, I can state that the distinguished service reflected in the award of the Izaak Walton League is also found in his service to Massanutten Military Academy.

## The article follows:

NORFOLK.—Congressman John P. Saylor (R-Pa.) has been selected to receive the prestigious Founders Award of the Izaak Walton League of America. It is the highest award given by this citizen-conservation group which is presently holding its annual convention in Norfolk, Va.

The Founders Award is given in honor of the 54 men who organized the League in 1922, and is awarded "to that person, group or institution judged to have made an outstanding contribution to the conservation of America's renewable natural resources."

In announcing the Award to Congressman Saylor, Raymond A. Haik, president of the Izaak Walton League of America, noted, "Congressman Saylor has always been one of the first to stand up and really fight for clean air and water, the establishment of parks and our other environmental needs. He has been one of the strongest conservation leaders in Congress."

Saylor, who has served in Congress continuously since 1949, has been a staunch supporter of conservation legislation and the efforts of conservation groups. Notable among his efforts in Congress is his strong support of the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 and its annual funding. Saylor was one of seven key Congressmen who successfully sparked a House vote to increase the funding of the Act in 1969 from \$214 million to an \$800 million Senate-House agreement. He also gave strong support to the measure's \$1 billion funding this year in the House.

Saylor has also been a prime supporter and cosponsor of other air and water pollution legislation and of national parks' bills. He has been a strong supporter of youth conservation legislation presently pending in Congress. This measure would annually provide summer jobs in outdoor related federal government programs for youngsters 13 to 17 years of age.

He is the first member of Congress to receive the National Parks Association award for Distinguished Service on behalf of national parks and monuments, 1954; a recipient of the National Conservation Award for distinguished service to conservation given by major conservation groups, 1958; named Conservationist of the Year by the Pennsylvania Outdoor Writers Association, 1965; received the National Wildlife Federation's Conservationist of the Year Award, 1964.

He served on the President's Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission and the Public Land Law Review Commission which just submitted its final report to Congress and the Administration. Saylor is presently serving on the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission; National Forest Reservation Commission, and the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee.

A native of Johnstown, Pa., Saylor is a graduate of Mercersburg Academy, Franklin, Pa., and Marshall College, Dickinson Law School. He received an Honorary LL.D. from Saint Francis College.

A World War II Navy veteran, he is a Captain in the Naval Reserve.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
CRIME BILL**HON. RICHARD T. HANNA**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 29, 1970

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Speaker, the District of Columbia crime bill has been signed by the President. The task now is to calm unreasonable fear and to make the law work as fairly and effectively as possible. It should be remembered by liberals that when the income tax bill was enacted, conservatives cried, "the power to tax is the power to destroy." Justice Holmes' reply should be applied to this crime bill: "Not while this Court sits."

Let us, however, be cognizant of the basic and compelling facts that remain unchanged with the passage of the new crime bill package. The conditions in the streets and in the prisons are turning out criminals faster than society has a present ability to control. However, it is a mistaken premise that short cuts are possible in effectively coping with the complex problem of crime. Crime has many tangled roots. To treat correctively its basic feeders requires large sums of money. Society should not expect impressive progress until it has effectively

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applied and invested substantial sums. The cost of crime is enormous. The cost of lasting cures is equally impressive.

Unfortunately, the cost of crime is indirect and not tagged as such in the budget of governments. It is, therefore, more readily tolerated even while being decried by political leaders. To provide sufficient money to carry out the reforms in the new crime bills and to effect other needed reforms would require budget commitments of identified and directed funds. Political leaders and this administration are not likely to assume the burdens this implies.

On the other hand, those who expect that mandatory sentences, wiretapping, preventive detention, and the "no knock" provision, will make either a dramatic or lasting imprint on the pervasive presence of antisocial behavior are heading for a port of disillusionment and disappointment.

## SALT AND SAFEGUARD

HON. JEFFERY COHELAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 29, 1970

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, the Senate is about to begin debate on the military procurement authorization for fiscal 1971.

A vital component of this bill is the authorization for phase 11 of the Safeguard ABM. As is well known by my colleagues I have opposed deployment of the ABM since its inception nearly half a decade ago.

While the House voted to authorize the funds for Safeguard for fiscal 1971, it appears likely that the Senate will delete this program when it considers the bill.

This deletion would be a most constructive step.

In its lead editorial for July 27, 1970, the New York Times forceful case for this deletion. I strongly recommend it to my colleagues.

The editorial follows:

## SALT AND SAFEGUARD AND THE FUTURE

The Administration's claim that success in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with Russia requires Congressional authorization of an expanded Safeguard program is the least credible of the many unconvincing arguments made for this antiballistic missile (ABM) system in the past year.

The Soviet Union has suggested that ABMs could be limited at "zero level," rather than at low or higher levels. This apparent readiness to ban missile defense entirely opens an attractive prospect. The hypothetical Pentagon thesis that the Soviet Union might clandestinely "upgrade" its thousands of antiaircraft missiles into an effective antimissile defense is based on the theory that they would be secretly linked to the giant ABM radars. If those radars and the rest of the embryo Soviet ABM system around Moscow are dismantled, that would also demolish the argument that Russia could alter the power balance quickly by deploying secretly manufactured ABM launchers around those radars, which take five or six years to construct.

If missile defense were entirely banned, the Pentagon's argument for deploying MIRV multiple warhead missiles at this time would also collapse. MIRV (multiple independent-

ly targeted re-entry vehicle) is sought to insure penetration of a heavy Soviet missile defense if Moscow should build one. With a "zero ABM" agreement at SALT, no one could argue that the Soviet Union could deploy a missile defense in the future faster than the United States could increase its offensive capability to overcome it.

Yet the Nixon Administration, in its new Vienna proposals, reportedly has not proposed a MIRV ban; on the contrary, it has made unnecessary demands for intrusive on-site inspection, something it knows is anathema to Moscow, in discussions at SALT of a possible MIRV deployment halt. For eighteen months the Pentagon has been permitted to press ahead on testing and, more recently, deployment of the American MIRV.

The Soviet suggestion of an ABM ban evidently has not been rejected; it reportedly remains among the alternative "low level" ABM limits presented in the American proposals. But there are indications that the Administration prefers, and will seek at SALT, an ABM agreement that would permit both sides to have systems equal to or larger than the obsolete 64-missile defense the Soviet Union has deployed.

The agreement the Administration now projects at Vienna would not halt the strategic arms race, but would continue it in a seemingly controlled form. The degree of control, however, would be an illusion.

With ABM systems deployed on both sides, even at a low level, there would be a continuous race for qualitative improvement and, every few years, replacement of the system with a new generation of antimissiles, radars and computers. Far more dangerous, absence of limits on MIRV would permit a rapid multiplication of separately-targeted nuclear delivery vehicles in the strategic offensive missile forces of both sides. A five-fold increase is now under way in the American forces, from 1,700 to about 8,000 nuclear delivery vehicles.

Moreover, a race to improve the accuracy of MIRV warheads would also be beyond control, giving each side at some point the capability of destroying the other's fixed land-based ICBM's. Fixed land-based missiles would be made obsolete by this development and both countries would be forced to replace them with sea-based or mobile land-based ICBM's.

The tens of billions of dollars that would be devoured in this post-SALT arms race is reason enough to seek to avoid such an evolution. But even more important would be the dangerous instabilities that would be repeatedly introduced by permitting the stable nuclear balance that now exists to give way to a new kind of missile race.

The issue that confronts the Senate as it opens debate on the defense authorization bill, which includes funds both for ABM expansion and the rapidly growing MIRV deployment program, is not how to help the Administration achieve the SALT agreement it seeks. The real issue is how to influence the Administration to seek the kind of SALT agreement the country and the world needs. That would be an agreement banning both ABM and MIRV.

The Senate has already overwhelmingly voted a resolution urging the Administration to propose a halt in ABM and MIRV deployment on both side while SALT talks proceed. The need now, is voting the defense authorization bill, is to put "in escrow" whatever funds are voted for ABM and MIRV deployment until the Administration, which has ignored the moratorium vote, implements the Senate resolution.

It may be inconvenient to permit the ABM and MIRV programs to grind to a halt pending the outcome of the SALT negotiations. But no strategic necessity requires that they go forward at this time, while every imperative of arms control demands that they be halted before it is too late.

## LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1970

SPEECH OF

HON. B. F. SISK

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 29, 1970

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 17654) to improve the operation of the legislative branch of the Federal Government, and for other purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I am seeking the attention of the gentleman from Arizona, or someone else who is a proponent of this amendment.

Our only desire here is to seek clarification. I said I have no great opposition. I know there are times when motions are made or a motion is made to recommit a matter with instructions where, frankly, there is not very much information available. So I have certain sympathies with what the gentleman proposes.

Now, as we explore the language needed here, it does seem to fit properly. If the gentleman has before him the rules of the House, rule XVI, clause 4, that he attempts to amend—

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, could he give me the page number?

Mr. SISK. That would be found on page 397 of Jefferson's Manual, at the top of the page, reading.

After the previous question shall have been ordered on the passage of a bill or joint resolution, one motion to recommit shall be in order.

And of course the point I am making here is that the previous question ends debate at that point.

Now, the only question I have, and I am not trying to confuse the amendment, but I am wondering if there should not be some additional language "except as provided herein," because, as the gentleman understands by the Rules of the House once the previous question is ordered, debate has been closed.

I will gladly yield to the gentleman for a comment on that.

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, I would defer to the gentleman from Washington, Mr. MEEDS.

Mr. MEEDS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, actually this amendment would not prevent the Committee on Rules from adopting a rule as they have in the past, which makes the previous question in order, and which follows through the practice of the House. Then, true, the question of the previous question is then voted and debate is then cut off. What this amendment really does is to signal the attention of the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives that we want a minimum of 10 minutes to debate a motion to recommit with instructions, five minutes of that time to be given to the mover of the motion, and five minutes of the time to be given the opponents.



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untary quotas when overall steel import tonnage was reduced as compared to 1968: alloy and tool steel imports up 16 percent; stainless imports up 7.7 percent; welded steel tubing imports up 3 percent.

This trend has accelerated in 1970. According to an AISI—American Iron & Steel Institute—announcement on June 5 citing U.S. Commerce Department reports:

A shift in the product mix of steel imports has made welded pipe and tubing the most heavily imported steel mill product of 1970.

WSTI companies made the specialty items in this category, such as welded boiler tube, welded stainless pipe and tubing and sophisticated types of mechanical tubing used in metalworking industry. In 1968, 3,641 tons of welded alloy pipe and tubing—most of which is stainless—were imported. This jump to 5,682 tons in 1969 and during the first 4 months of 1970 accelerated to 3,713 tons, or an annual rate exceeding 10,000 tons.

Members in explaining the reasons for their growing concern, point out that specialty tube mills are expensive. It is uneconomical to build and operate a small mill since large tonnage production is required to be practical. Domestic manufacturers are capable of producing and supplying the entire country's needs, with surplus available for export. Now, with imports capturing a larger share of the U.S. market and with export markets decreasing, domestic manufacturers of specialty tubing are beginning to question seriously whether their share of foreign and domestic markets is sufficient to support profitable operations.

Mr. Speaker, the pertinent Government agencies involved should reexamine the voluntary quota systems and their effect on manufacturers of higher priced specialty steel items.

## WATER POLLUTION—PART I

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, we are all deeply concerned about the pollution of our water, but often feel powerless to do anything about this contamination. In the Borough of Manhattan we are an island bounded by the Hudson and East Rivers. Daily more than a billion gallons of sewage and industrial waste are poured into those rivers. Industrial users by the hundreds throughout the State daily pollute our waterways. The ordinary citizen feels frustrated but there is something that can be done. There is a little known but powerful Federal statute known as the Refuse Act of 1899. The statute provides that anyone discharging refuse into navigable waters without a special dumping permit from the Army Corps of Engineers is liable to the extent of a fine of \$500 to \$2,500 for each day of pollution and a jail sentence of from 30 days to 1 year. I have written to the Army Corps of Engineers and have ascertained that no such permits have been issued. Since the inception of the New

York State pure waters program of 1965, the State department of health has kept a list of such polluters. I have secured the names of those polluters and have called upon the U.S. attorneys in the southern and eastern districts of New York, covering the entire city of New York, vigorously to prosecute those offenders.

In my affidavit filed with the U.S. attorneys, I named the 10 polluters doing business in New York City who, as of January 1970, were listed by the State department of health as polluters of major importance. Moreover, they had done the least to abate their pollution. Since filing my affidavit, two of the firms which I named have had final abatement plans approved by the department of health.

It is important to note that under the Refuse Act of 1899 any citizen who provides the U.S. attorney's office with information that leads to a conviction is entitled to one-half of whatever fine may be set by the court. In the event I were to be awarded part of such a fine, I would, of course, turn it back to the city and State of New York for use in cleaning up our waterways. I would hope that Congressmen and individuals across the country would call upon the U.S. attorneys in their districts to prosecute these industrial water polluters. For those interested in having all of the material pertinent to that law, Congressman HENRY REUSS, of Wisconsin, Congressman MICHAEL HARRINGTON, of Massachusetts, and I have put together for our constituents an environmental do it yourself enforcement packet. I would be pleased to provide any citizen with it.

# ESSENTIALITY OF CONGRESSMEN BECOMING KNOWLEDGEABLE OF NUANCES OF MODERN WEAPONRY AND STRATEGY

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include related material.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, with the Soviet Union's recent buildup in SS-9 ICBM's capable of destroying Minuteman missiles positioned in their silos, and thereby reducing or destroying our "second-strike" capability; with the Chinese recent advancements in both hydrogen nuclear weapons and delivery systems—they exploded their first hydrogen bomb 3 years ago, June 17, 1967, and orbited their first satellite on April 24, 1970; and with the extremely essential SALT talks now in progress, it is most essential that all Congressmen become knowledgeable of the nuances of modern weaponry and strategy.

We still live in a world of nations who, as a matter of policy, are willing to resort to force in order to achieve their national goods and interests. As Congressmen we must provide this country with sufficient means whereby to resist the attempts of others to impose their interest over ours.

I, therefore include the following article which appeared in the June 20, 1970, issue of Barrons, written by Dr. James D. Atkinson, professor of government, Georgetown University, a member of the

National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council, and a member of the British Institute for Strategic Studies, in the Record for the benefit of all:

## TIPPING THE BALANCE: WASHINGTON MUST COUNTER MOSCOW'S GROWING NUCLEAR MIGHT

When former Secretary of Defense McNamara stated in September 1967 that the United States would proceed with a "relatively light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system," it might still have been possible to be moderately complacent about defending America from either a Soviet or a Chinese Communist missile attack. In June 1970 any slightest cause for complacency has vanished, although our people are not yet fully aware of the magnitude of the threat. In short, the on-going pace of military-technological innovation has become such that a country which forecloses defensive options in the nuclear-missile age places itself at the mercy of a country which is less scrupulous in the build-up of both advanced offensive and defensive weapons systems. And the Czechs are prepared to testify that mercy is currently in short supply among the leaders of the Soviet Union.

The pioneering study of the American Security Council entitled "The ABM and the Changed Military Balance," published in May 1969, was an excellent analysis of the growing Soviet threat. It was a warning signal of the necessity for a U.S. ballistic missile defense to prevent the Soviets from being tempted into launching a surprise nuclear strike on our country.

But although it pointed out that the Soviet Union had already surpassed the United States in overall strategic missile strength, the Soviets have pressed even more strongly since the publication of the American Security Council study. Thus, for example, the Soviet Union has test-fired double the number of strategic missiles compared to the United States from November 1969 to April 1970. And, ironically, November was the month in which SALT—Strategic Arms Limitations Talks—negotiations began between the United States and the Soviet Union.

An even more convincing argument for early deployment of the Safeguard ABM than the number of test missiles fired is the developing qualitative factor. The splashdown pattern—the technical terminology is the "footprint"—of recent multiple test missiles fired from the Soviet Union into the Pacific Ocean was approximately 60 miles apart. And our Minutemen missile silos are roughly 60 miles apart.

A convincing example of how the Soviets have been running while the U.S. has been standing still is given by the recent Report of the House Armed Services Committee, dated April 24 and released April 27, 1970. The Report points out that "in the past five years the Soviets have increased their strategic offensive missiles from around 300 to around 1,500 and have achieved a fourfold increase in the megatonnage of their strategic arsenal. The U.S., by contrast, is proceeding on a strategic offensive force level that was determined in the mid-1960s and in which no essential change has been made despite the change in the nature of the threat. In the comparable time frame, the U.S. has reduced its nuclear megatonnage by more than 40%."

The Report went on to state that "in considering these facts, it should be kept in mind that the decision to make MIRV a part of the U.S. Minuteman force was made in the 1965-to-1967 time frame. Since this step was considered appropriate and necessary for U.S. security against the then-projected threat, it should be apparent that the continuation of MIRV and ABM programs are but the continuation of deployment for a deterrent policy formulated on a

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global strategic threat of considerably smaller magnitude than that which now faces us. Despite this, the U.S. has not taken any further steps to increase its strategic offensive force. *There has not been an arms race; the Soviets have been running at full speed all by themselves.* (Emphasis supplied.)

The Committee also gave the following figures, which graphically illustrate the speed of the Soviet strategic arms build-up: "Five years ago the Soviets had neither a depressed trajectory ICBM nor a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System. The Soviets have tested both types of systems and could have an operational version deployed. The U.S. has no such systems. Five years ago the Soviets had about 25 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on submarines. The Soviets now have over 200 SLBMs and in the next two years could have over 400 to 500 SLBMs on Polaris-type submarines."

Ominously, too, the Soviets now have 64 ballistic missile defense launch vehicles actually deployed around Moscow, and are testing either a new ABM system or an advanced version of their present Galosh ABM system. By contrast, only two U.S. Safeguard ABM sites have been authorized and—unless we speed up our defense effort—these Safeguard sites will not be operational before 1974–1975.

Although the Chinese Communist threat is presently a lower-risk one than the high-risk threat of the Soviet Union, it gives us no cause for complacency. The Chinese Communists exploded their first H-bomb on June 17, 1967. It was apparently a sophisticated implosion type in the two-to-seven megaton range. The complicated electronic triggering and measuring devices that were required in this and in other Chinese tests were a warning that the Chinese were much further advanced in military technology than we had been led to believe. If any doubts remained, they were resolved when, on April 24, 1970, the Chinese Communists put their first satellite vehicle into orbit. It is noteworthy that the Chinese Communist satellite was heavier than either that of the United States or the Soviet first-launch satellites. We can expect, therefore, that the Chinese will have an ICBM capability well in advance of previous estimates in the West.

The high-risk Soviet threat, and the lower-risk but growing Chinese Communist threat, pose problems to the survival of the United States. The Soviets quite soon, and the Chinese Communists at a later time phase, will be able to hold a nuclear pistol at Uncle Sam's head. No amount of wishful thinking will make these hard, unpleasant facts go away. Those who still live in a world of dreams rather than the real world might well ponder the words of Soviet Party leader Brezhnev. On April 21, 1970, with the other 10 members of the Politburo ruling group standing behind him, Brezhnev made a highly significant speech, "The Living and Triumphant Cause of Lenin." He said that not only would the Soviet Union move forward in the present arms build-up, but that the policy of the USSR was to "equip our army with the most up-to-date weapons." In other words, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the Soviet goal is to become the mightiest military-technological power the world has ever seen.

With the rapid growth of the massive megaton pay-load SS-9 Soviet ICBM (220 operational now, and 60 being built) and its approaching multiple independently targetable capability, if, indeed, this MIT capability has not already been achieved, the locust years of complacency are ended. This is reinforced by the fact that the Soviet Y-class nuclear submarines, with Polaris-equivalent 16-tube ballistic missile launchers, are now believed to be operating off our Atlantic coast.

Surely no American would argue that we can put a price tag on the lives of our people. Yet this is what we shall do, if we ignore

these threats. And, if we ignore the nuclear war threat, such vexing problems as air pollution and other irritants of modern life will have been solved for us. But the solution will be in rather a different way than we would like.

The urgency of the threat indicates the following courses of action for the common defense and the protection of the people of the United States:

1. The Safeguard ABM System. We should move forward more vigorously to deploy this land-based system on a faster time phase than presently contemplated. As we deploy the system, we have a solid technological base for refinement and increased reliability of ballistic missile defense, and we reduce the risk of nuclear war, a course of action on which all Americans would surely agree.

2. Deployment of a Sea-Based Missile Defense. A sea-based missile defense system (Sabmis) would not replace the Safeguard land-based system, but supplement it. The two systems are not in competition, but are complementary, since each would support the other. As the then Chief of Naval Operations and now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee two years ago, the Safeguard and Sabmis systems are not competitive. He indicated, instead, that deployment of both Safeguard and Sabmis would constitute a "defense in depth mix" which "would be an effective combination to deal with future sophisticated weapons that Soviet and Chinese technology will be able to produce." Now, in 1970, we can see that Admiral Moorer's 1968 analysis was correct. Soviet and Chinese Communist technology is providing them with sophisticated weaponry.

A sea-based ABM would be a highly valuable addition to the protection of the American people offered by the Safeguard ABM, since it can be geographically positioned so that America can use the oceans to offset the land mass advantages which the Soviet Union especially possesses, and which Communist China has to a lesser extent over the United States.

An additional advantage is that a sea-based ABM defense would permit mid-course interception of missiles fired against the American homeland. This is especially important with reference to multiple warhead vehicles, since interception early in flight would permit killing the main vehicle before multiple warheads and/or penetration devices could separate from the main body. It may also be envisioned that knocking out some of the warheads in a mid-course interception would prevent overwhelming terminally-based defense ABM sites by the simultaneous arrival of several warheads.

We must be honest and admit that this would be expensive. But what Englishman would have refused to pay for air defenses in 1937, if he had been fully informed of the high-risk threat of air attack on Great Britain? In 1970 and beyond, the risk, as we study the continuing Soviet technological advances in weaponry, will be far greater for Americans than it was for Britons before the Second World War.

In 1937, too, Winston Churchill—even though he was a voice crying in the wilderness—told the truth to the British people. Who, in 1970, will give the hard but nuclear-war-preventing facts to the American people? Above all, who will put a price tag on the lives of the American people?

## NUTMEG RAILROAD PROBLEMS

(Mr. MONAGAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, the recent debacle of the Penn Central has

emphasized the critical state of public transportation in the State of Connecticut. The Cheshire Herald and Wallingford Post recently published a column on this subject in which one of my constituents, Mr. R. L. McLaughlin of Cheshire, Conn., graphically stated the plight of the railroad customer who desires to use a passenger train in Connecticut today.

I have assured Mr. McLaughlin of my concurrence with him in his objective and I stressed my support in the past of Federal legislation dedicated to providing funds for the general improvement of our transportation and the establishment of turbotrain and Metro-liner runs.

The Penn Central crisis has served to emphasize the predicament of our railroads today and it is my earnest hope that with this crisis freshly before us, even though the current bankruptcy has complicated matters, all concerned with this national problem will concentrate our efforts and work to bring about a long-term revival of our railways.

I am not now prepared to discuss in depth the question of Federal assistance, but certainly any help of whatever character that the Federal Government might consider granting should be conditioned on: first, the discovery and placing in office of competent and public-minded executives; and second, the maintenance and expansion of adequate, fast, clean, and reasonably priced railroad passenger service.

The column referred to, follows:

PLEASE, MR. MONAGAN

On this 300th anniversary of our sister town of Wallingford, let me appeal publicly to our shared Congressman Monagan to please, Sir, save the railroad service at Wallingford:

Every morning 20 to 30 people come out of the Wallingford station—an architectural prize, by the way—and board the train at 7:35 for New Haven and Grand Central Terminal. There are no other stops. Actually this is the old "eight o'clock" out of New Haven and in more colorful times past was known as the "Bankers"—the fast express to the city. It arrives in Grand Central at 9:25, a perfect train for a day's business.

Through the long travel on the old "New Haven", the Bankers' usually reached the city on time. The cars were dirty and jam-packed and the ride was too rough for comfortable reading. But, basically, the thing worked. To return to Wallingford you knew you could leave Grand Central on the hour every two hours. In other words, trains left at 2:00, 4:00, 6:00, 8:00 and 10:00. All stopped at Wallingford.

## THE INCREDIBLE YEAR

Then the Penn-Central took over and there was hope. Many of us thought passenger service would improve. But look what has happened to that hope. Although the Bankers' still stops at Wallingford in the morning and sometimes reaches Grand Central on time, only the 4:00 returns to Wallingford. Like it or not, the Cheshire businessman must take the 4:00. There is no real alternative. But look what has happened even to this train. Someone, somewhere down in the depths of the railroad changed the Grand Central starting time from 4:00 to 4:01. (What on earth for, do you suppose!) But what is worse, it no longer arrives at Wallingford at 6:05 in the evening as it systematically did when the much better New Haven ran it. Again, someone, somewhere in the depths of the railroad changed the arrival time to 6:14.

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prescribed by the Secretary pursuant to section 1 of this Act, unless such instrument or instruments in fact comply with such regulations.

## PENALTIES

SEC. 4. Any person who willfully and knowingly violates section 3 of this Act shall be fined no more than \$1,000 for each such violation.

## DEFINITIONS

SEC. 5. As used in this Act—

(1) The term "commerce" means commerce between any place in a State and any place outside thereof, or between places in the same State but through any place outside thereof.

(2) The term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any possession of the United States.

(3) The term "motor vehicle" means any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power which is manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, or highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.

(4) The term "bus" means any motor vehicle designed to carry more than eight passengers.

(5) The term "truck" means any motor vehicle designed to carry property in furtherance of any business activity.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MILLER) is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. MILLER of Ohio addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

## NATIONAL SERVICE ACT OF 1970

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. HALPERN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to discuss a bill which I have cosponsored, the National Service Act of 1970. This bill is designed to avoid many of the dangers of an all-volunteer army while giving a young man the option of serving his country in a military or civilian capacity.

Under the National Service Act of 1970, each young man would register at age 17 with the local office of the National Service Agency. At that time he would be informed of the three alternatives available to him when he turns 18. First, he could volunteer immediately for military service. Second, he could allow his name to be submitted for consideration in the draft lottery for that year. Third, he could volunteer for civilian service. The first two options are the same as under the present system, while the third would enable those young men who wish to do socially valuable civilian work to do so in place of military service.

A registrant who elects civilian service may directly attempt to find a job with an employer participating in the civilian service program. Suitable employers would include Federal, State, and local agencies, schools, nonprofit hospitals, police, and Federal programs such as VISTA, Peace Corps, and Teachers Corps. A registrant unable to find a qualified job on his own would enter

the National Service Corps. The Corps would directly operate Federal programs in areas of social need such as reforestation or mass-produced housing for the poor.

A Civilian Service Volunteer would be required to remain in the position he has selected for a period of time determined to be the equivalent of 2 years of military service. He would be paid a subsistence wage, and his employer would pay the difference between that wage and the market wage for the job to the Federal Government. This source of funds would be used by the Federal Government to offset the administrative costs of the program, and to help meet the expenses of the National Service Corps when it functioned as the employer of last resort. An 18-year-old who chose civilian service could postpone actual service for up to 4 years in order to obtain an education or complete his training.

Enactment of the National Service Act of 1970 would be beneficial in several respects. First, the flexibility of the present system to expand draft calls rapidly in times of national emergency would be retained. Second, it would continue the voluntary aspect of the present system in which the majority of our military personnel are citizen soldiers on short-term duty. Third, because a force of professional soldiers would not have to be purchased at existing market prices, the overall cost to the country would be lower than with an all-volunteer army. Fourth, enactment of this bill would be an indication that Congress considers our civilian needs as pressing as our military needs. Finally, the universality of national service would emphasize that all citizens have an obligation to serve their country in some capacity, not just those unable to obtain educational or occupational deferments.

## RECORD VOTES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. BROWN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BROWN of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, together with a bipartisan group of my colleagues, I have today introduced legislation under which a minimum of one-tenth of the Members of the House could compel a record vote on any amendment to any bill debated by the House in the Committee of the Whole House.

Few changes we might make in the system would mean more than the power of a responsible minority to compel a record vote on controversial issues. The cornerstone of our American system is responsible representation of the changing needs and desires of the people whose will we assemble here to voice.

No procedural gimmick should be permitted which denies to the people the recorded judgment of each Member of the House, especially on those issues where a significant number of Members feel responsibility to the electorate cannot be effectuated without recordation.

Congress cannot command respect without being deserving of respect, and, any of its procedures which tends to re-

flect an attempt to avoid responsibility causes it to appear to be less deserving of respect.

For many years I have been a strong advocate of congressional reform. Congress, and particularly the House of Representatives as the voice of the American people, must be efficient, hard-working, honest, responsible, well informed, and responsive to those it governs. This requires among other things a constant updating of its procedures and rules.

Since coming to Congress, I have fought for technical changes to give Congress better information on and greater control over the vast sprawling Federal Government and the activities of its 6 million employees and military personnel. The concept of an Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation incorporated in a bill I introduced when I first came to the Congress in 1967 is included in the bill reported by the Rules Committee on May 12, as are many other changes, but far from all those which have been advocated by those of us who have actively sought congressional reform these past several years.

Our first responsibility is to make the American system work, and for my part I shall pursue, one by one, if need be, those changes which are indispensable to that end.

The rule change I seek is necessary because of technical procedures now in effect.

As my colleagues know, the most informal but important debate on a bill takes place in what is called the "Committee of the Whole House"—the Whole House considering a bill as would a committee—a practice necessary to expedite the work of such a large legislative body. To save time, success or failure of amendments is determined by "teller" votes, a counting of "bodies" for or against the measure but not a recording of names, record votes being prohibited, and for good reason. For example, should each Member exercise his right to offer one amendment to each bill, rollcalls alone would require over eight, 40-hour weeks. But, teller votes were intended to expedite the business of the House, not to provide a means of escaping responsibility.

When a bill comes before the House it is often a package worked out by a small number of senior Congressmen. To change this package, two steps are necessary. First, it must be amended in the Committee of the Whole, without a recorded vote. If it passes in the Committee, it must be adopted in regular debate, where a record vote can be taken. Practically speaking, unless an amendment is approved in the Committee of the Whole, there is no opportunity to offer it again except through a "motion to recommit," the usage of this legislative tool being severely limited.

This procedure can—and has been—misused.

Too many times I have seen important amendments decided in Committee of the Whole by too few voting Members without further recourse being available, whereas a recorded vote on the issue

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would have prompted the presence and commitment of all Members. It works both ways; the result sometimes being good and sometimes bad, but it still permits a Congressman to avoid taking a position on critically important votes.

For example, I can sympathize with those who sought a clear cut expression from each Member on the amendments to restrict use of funds for military activities which were proposed last month during debate on the military procurement authorization bill. Although the substantive position I supported prevailed, I think each one of my colleagues who opposed the House action should have had an opportunity to be so recorded.

This procedure can—and must be—changed.

If we are to "secure the blessings of liberty to—our posterity," as each Congressman has pledged himself to do in his oath of office, then Congress must constantly operate out in the open where the people can see how it works and what it does. Every Congressman should stand up and be counted on the issues—even more so—we should be required to sound off and be recorded.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ) is recognized for 10 minutes.

[Mr. GONZALEZ addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. DENT) is recognized for 30 minutes.

[Mr. DENT addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

*SALT*

## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. COHELAN) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, as a consistent proponent of the strategic arms limitation, I was encouraged by the article in the Washington Post today which reports on the progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—SALT.

According to the Post, an agreement to ban deployment of the multiple warhead missiles—MIRV—is a definite possibility in the SALT negotiations.

As my colleagues are aware, I, along with more than 100 Members of the House, proposed to the President that we halt testing and the development of MIRV. This news that a bilateral halt is in the offing is welcomed.

It would be a significant gesture if the administration would formally announce a delay in further deployment of the land based MIRV's pending progress in the SALT talks.

The military reports that testing of the system is complete, therefore our strategic posture is secure. However, I consider delaying deployment a vital step

for the reasons well known to the students of this subject.

The verification of MIRV's can only be accomplished by on-site inspection. It is this problem that has caused the arms limitation agreements to flounder. Thus, if deployment is complete, the inspection issue could cause an agreement to abort.

I take the floor today to urge the administration to announce that it has ordered the cessation of the land based MIRV deployment. I do this because I fear that the business-as-usual attitude exhibited in the past by the Department of Defense could jeopardize the SALT talks.

There is another factor that should be mentioned. If the reports of the SALT talks—that ABM's will be limited to Washington, D.C., and Moscow—are true, then the administration should report to the American people what precautions are being taken so that billions of dollars are not wasted in other areas of the Safeguard ABM.

Personally, I am still convinced that the ABM is unnecessary and will not work as an entire system. However, if there will be an ABM subject to a two-site SALT limitation, I do not wish this Nation's assets further wasted on ABM sites that will never be used.

Mr. Speaker, at this point I insert the article, "Hope for MIRV Curb Rises at Arms Talks" by Mr. Chalmers M. Roberts that appeared in today's Washington Post. I commend the reading of this article to my colleagues in the House:

HOPE FOR MIRV CURB RISES AT ARMS TALKS

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

For the first time there is now a real possibility that the strategic arms limitation talks at Vienna will produce a Soviet-American agreement to prevent the otherwise inevitable massive deployment of multiple nuclear warheads known as MIRVs.

This would be coupled, perhaps as a second stage of a SALT agreement, to an initial pact to freeze at present levels the numbers of rival missiles and to limit anti-missile (ABM) defenses to the protection of Washington and Moscow, as earlier reported by The Washington Post.

The MIRV part of the agreement would be to halt further testing. That would be designed to prevent emplacement of multiple warheads on Soviet missiles and also to end deployment, which is beginning this month, of MIRV warheads on American Minuteman 3 missiles as well as on the Poseidon missiles due to be emplaced on nuclear submarines beginning next January.

If this comprehensive package, which the two nuclear superpowers are now approaching, is eventually signed and sealed, it would be a substantial curb in the nuclear arms race.

But there are many complex issues as yet unresolved and a key decision remains to be made by President Nixon and probably similar major decisions by the Soviet leadership.

It is against this background of what is in motion at the secret Vienna conference table, where the two sides met yesterday for their 15th formal session, that the remarks, also yesterday, of Secretary of State William P. Rogers acquire meaning.

According to the State Department's version of what he said at a closed session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rogers declared that "we have put forward proposals dealing with all offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems, including ABMs and MIRVs. Our approach has been concrete

and comprehensive. The Soviets have also indicated a preference for a comprehensive approach, but have not been as concrete as we in spelling out important specifics."

Rogers said that "both sides have presented their respective positions and are now engaged in a more detailed examination of specific issues." He credited the Soviets with avoiding "polemics even in recent meetings," a reference to meetings since Moscow denounced the American action in Cambodia.

The Secretary coupled his hopeful view with the diplomat's traditional warning that while "some common ground has emerged," there "are still important differences," that "we are in the early stages of exploring the issues" and that "it is already apparent that hard negotiations remain." He added that "it is not clear yet what sort of an agreement will result or when. Nevertheless, we continue to be optimistic."

The most hopeful timetable is for an agreement in principle on at least the initial pact and perhaps also on the MIRV curb at the time SALT takes a summer recess, probably at the end of July. The talks are expected to resume in Helsinki next fall where, it is hoped a formal treaty would be written.

While the Soviets have indicated less interest in curbing MIRVs than has the United States, the verification issue has been the chief sticking point. Moscow has been adamant in the opposition to on-site inspection and scientists say that unless one is within a few feet of a warhead it is impossible, technically, to determine whether it has a MIRV warhead. Hence the use of a MIRV test ban as the way to control multiple warheads.

The belief is that Mr. Nixon would accept this proposal if the ABM-launcher agreements were reached though apparently he has yet to make that decision. But a strong clue to that possibility came on June 4 from an unexpected source, John S. Foster, Jr., the Pentagon's research chief who has been a hard liner on arms control.

In the first such administration statement, Foster said that "if MIRVs were to be eliminated by an arms control agreement, the Minuteman 3 and Poseidon systems could revert to a single warhead configuration."

A MIRV test ban, it is reasoned, would prevent both reliability and increased accuracy tests and thus would greatly limit the importance of multiple warheads. Whatever the risk inherent in a test ban, to be checked by Moscow and Washington by means located outside the other's territory, it would be offset by the ABM-launcher agreement, it is reasoned.

Foster also told the House committee that the excavations for the first ABM site, at Grand Forks, N.D., could be "refilled with dirt or if the foundations had been completed, they could either be abandoned or ripped up."

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. SIKES' remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

## THE AMERICAN ADAGE: OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND—THE PLIGHT OF OUR AGED

(Mr. PODELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, recent events have demonstrated the effectiveness of serious mobilization among a large, vocal, and informed segment of our population. The fact that hundreds of thousands of people came to Wash-



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is fair to say that Representative YATES confounded all the experts by coming within a scant seven switched votes of succeeding. Those of us who are concerned about what the SST may do to the environment—and to the economy—owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Sir YATES. The House vote of 176 to 163 against the effort to strike funds for this SST is extremely encouraging, and augurs well for the amendment I am submitting today.

Our chances of stopping the SST onslaught are brighter than they were last year. The newly discovered environmental impact of the SST, including airport noise, which is several times higher than is now permitted at any airport in the country, and upper atmospheric pollution, was documented by Russell Train, Chairman of the President's Environmental Quality Council, when he testified before our subcommittee the week before last. This information was not available to the Senate last year.

This time, Congress and the public are much better attuned to the problems of pollution, and the seriousness of the environmental crisis, than a year ago.

Some Senators have already shifted positions on the SST because of these environmental concerns, and I have spoken to several who have shifted their positions. Considering the magnitude of the SST's environmental impact, we have an excellent fighting chance to stop the SST appropriations.

Another major stumbling block to approval is the size of the fund request. The \$290 million requested this year is three and a half times last year's appropriation, and far and away the biggest single year appropriation ever asked for this project.

If granted, it will bring the total allocated for this environmental monster up to \$1 billion.

At a time when the need for budgetary stringency is as great as any of us can remember, it is the height of folly to continue funding a project whose ultimate costs may eventually reach \$4 billion and whose risk of failure is high.

It is perfectly clear that this whole project is proceeding on a wing and a prayer. Until the airport and sideline noise are reduced, and until the threatened upper atmosphere pollution is under control, the SST is not likely to fly commercially.

Even then, Mr. President, the Government still would not have any business stepping in where private investors fear to tread.

Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will not fall into the rhythm of continuing funding for the SST just because we have funded it for the past 7 years. The SST was a mistake in 1963; it is an outrage today. I look forward to a vigorous debate on the SST when H.R. 17755 reaches the Senate floor later this year.

cently as May 19, I reiterated on the Senate floor the recommendation contained in the committee's 1970 report that the Council of Economic Advisers should begin immediately to develop price and income guideposts appropriate to our present difficult economic situation. While the need for such guideposts is particularly urgent at the present moment, a price and income policy should not be only a transitory or occasional response to crisis situations. A price and income policy is a necessary and vital component of a total economic policy designed to yield full employment without the sacrifice of reasonable price stability.

Everyone in the country is aware that we have rising unemployment today, with more than 1 million men out of work than there were a year and a half ago, as well as the worst inflation we have suffered in 20 years.

What the proposal is designed to do is to get inflation under control and to do so in a way that will not provoke further unemployment.

In its 1970 report, the Joint Economic Committee further recommended that—

The Council of Economic Advisers should be given statutory authority and responsibility for the annual recommendation of specific voluntary standards for price and income behavior. Business and labor should be consulted in the formulation of these standards, and the recommended standards should be transmitted to Congress as part of the President's Economic Report.

Today I am introducing a bill which would accomplish this objective. The bill would amend the Employment Act of 1946 so as to require the President to begin at once to develop price and income guideposts, to transmit the first such guideposts to Congress as soon as reasonably possible, and in the future to include such guideposts in the annual Economic Report of the President. The bill would require the Council of Economic Advisers to hold consultations with business and labor, to make necessary studies of productivity, prices and incomes, and then to make recommendations to the President regarding the guideposts.

The bill would further require that whenever price or income behavior threatens to violate the guideposts, the President shall make such recommendations to the parties concerned as he deems to be in the national interest.

A similar bill has already been introduced in the House of Representatives by my colleague on the Joint Economic Committee, Congressman HENRY S. REUSS and has been reported favorably by a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations.

Wage-price guidelines are no panacea for our problems. But they can help. We are all aware that the economy is presently in difficulty, that we are suffering serious excesses of both inflation and unemployment. The present exclusive reliance on monetary and fiscal policy where, except for cuts in military expenditures there is almost no room to maneuver, offers little hope of extricating us from this thoroughly unsatisfactory situation. The only way to control inflation, wage and price changes during the first quarter of this year clearly indi-

cate that the hopes so often expressed by the administration that "price increases will soon begin to taper off" or that we have "turned the corner" against inflation, are based more on wishful thinking than on hard analysis.

Let me cite only the single fact that, due to a combination of rapidly rising wage costs and declining productivity, unit labor costs rose at an annual rate of 8.4 percent in the first quarter. This is a significant acceleration over the already disturbing rate of increase in unit labor costs during 1969. When costs are increasing at an accelerating rate, where is the logic that points to a reduction in the rate of price increase? Must we sit back and await the further leap in unemployment, the long period of strikes and labor disputes, and the sharp decline in profits which will be required to restore price stability?

I submit that it is unconscionable to ignore a policy tool which, if vigorously adopted, could do much to reduce the costs of restoring full employment and economic stability.

The belief that the administration is making a serious mistake if it perseveres in its dogmatic determination to ignore price and income policies is not limited to partisan critics of the present administration. My distinguished Republican colleagues on the Joint Economic Committee have unanimously endorsed a resolution calling on the Council of Economic Advisers to bring the force of informed public opinion to bear on inflationary price and wage decisions.

As I pointed out in my speech on May 19, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Arthur Burns, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, George Romney, have recently spoken out in favor of an income policy. None of these distinguished gentlemen would have spoken out the way they have if they did not feel that the need was urgent; that the time for new policy initiatives was long overdue.

Concern with our present economic situation is not limited to domestic observers. We have recently had two important reminders of the concern that other nations feel for the health of the U.S. economy. Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, speaking at an international conference in Geneva on May 19, reminded us that:

Failure to bring U.S. inflation under control has imparted a serious inflationary impetus to the world economy at large. . . . It is becoming increasingly clear that no country intent on restoring or maintaining financial stability can afford to dispense with any instrument which can properly serve that end. In this context, I would not exclude incomes policy.

That is what I am talking about here, Mr. President.

On May 26, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development released its regular annual survey of the economy. Though cautiously worded, the message which this document seeks to impart is clear:

Progress towards price stability and an end to inflation might be enhanced if certain selective measures could be applied in support of continued use of traditional demand management policies.

## S. 3898—INTRODUCTION OF PRICE AND INCOME GUIDEPOST BILL

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, for several years, the Joint Economic Committee has consistently stressed the need for this country to adopt a price and income policy. As re-

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These are conservative, traditional, and classic economists, by and large, who are usually reluctant to depart from the classical kind of analysis and to suggest any new measure if those new measures cannot have a convincing case made for them.

The final paragraph of the OECD report again reminds us of the global importance of a healthy U.S. economy:

Other countries have an important interest in the ability of the United States to follow a path of smooth development in conditions of stability. Not only would the emergence of recessionary conditions in the United States have a disruptive effect on their own economies. Equally important, a continued inflationary trend of prices in the United States would undermine the possibility of price stability in the rest of the world.

When our policies have become so inadequate that official international observers as well as domestic political leaders in both parties feel compelled to speak out in criticism and to urge new approaches, it is time—and long past time—for the administration to rethink its dogmatic position. I hope that Congress can act with all due speed on the measure I am introducing today, but I respectfully remind the President that he need not wait for congressional action in this matter. The consultations with business and labor which must form the foundation of an effective price and incomes policy could begin today.

Let us not delay this matter any longer. It is urgently needed.

It will not solve our problems, as I have said, and I do not mean to offer it as a panacea, but it will help.

I send the bill to the desk and ask that it be appropriately referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL). The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 3898) to amend the Employment Act of 1946 to bring to bear an informed public opinion upon price and income behavior which threatens national economic stability; introduced by Mr. PROXMIER, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

#### THE UNITED KINGDOM—75TH NATION TO RATIFY THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, yesterday, I addressed the Senate to discuss again the imperative nature of this Nation's ratification of the Genocide Convention, and I pointed out that many nations had already ratified the convention. I voted that as of September 1969, a total of 74 nations have acceded to the convention.

Today, Mr. President, that total now stands at 75, through the example set by one of our staunchest allies, the United Kingdom.

On January 30, 1970, the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs received the United Kingdom's instrument of accession to the convention, the Parliament having adopted implementing legislation in March 1969.

The Genocide Convention has become the most widely ratified United Nations

agreement with the exception of the U.N. Charter itself, despite our own reluctance, and despite the fact that this Nation took the initiative and pioneered in the fight for a genocide treaty in the United Nations, under the leadership of former President Harry S. Truman.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the impressive list of nations which have thus far adopted the convention, along with the date of accession.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### LIST OF SIGNATORIES AND CONTRACTING PARTIES

State	Signature	Ratification, accession, notification of succession
Afghanistan		Mar. 22, 1956
Albania		May 12, 1955
Algeria		Oct. 31, 1963
Argentina		June 31, 1956
Australia	Dec. 11, 1948	July 8, 1949
Austria		Mar. 19, 1958
Belgium	Dec. 12, 1949	Sept. 5, 1951
Bolivia	Dec. 11, 1948	
Brazil	do.	April 15, 1952
Bulgaria		July 21, 1950
Burma	Dec. 30, 1949	Mar. 14, 1956
Byelorussian S.S.R.	Dec. 16, 1949	Aug. 11, 1954
Cambodia		Oct. 14, 1950
Canada	Nov. 28, 1949	Sept. 3, 1952
Ceylon		Oct. 12, 1950
Chile	Dec. 11, 1948	June 3, 1953
China	July 20, 1949	July 19, 1951
Colombia	Aug. 12, 1949	Oct. 27, 1959
Congo (Democratic Republic of)		May 31, 1962
Costa Rica		Oct. 14, 1950
Cuba	Dec. 28, 1949	Mar. 4, 1953
Czechoslovakia	do.	Dec. 21, 1950
Denmark	Sept. 28, 1949	June 15, 1951
Dominican Republic	Dec. 11, 1948	
Ecuador	do.	Dec. 21, 1949
El Salvador	Apr. 27, 1949	Sept. 28, 1950
Ethiopia	Dec. 11, 1948	July 1, 1949
Federal Republic of Germany		Nov. 24, 1954
Finland		Oct. 18, 1959
France	Dec. 11, 1948	Oct. 14, 1950
Ghana		Dec. 24, 1958
Greece	Dec. 29, 1949	Dec. 8, 1954
Guatemala	June 22, 1949	Jan. 13, 1950
Haiti	Dec. 11, 1948	Oct. 14, 1950
Honduras	Apr. 22, 1949	Mar. 5, 1952
Hungary		Jan. 7, 1952
Iceland	May 14, 1949	Aug. 29, 1949
India	Nov. 29, 1949	Aug. 27, 1959
Iran	Dec. 8, 1949	Aug. 14, 1956
Iraq		Jan. 20, 1959
Israel	Aug. 17, 1949	Mar. 9, 1950
Italy		June 4, 1952
Jamaica		Sept. 23, 1968
Jordan		Apr. 3, 1950
Laos		Dec. 8, 1950
Lebanon	Dec. 30, 1949	Dec. 17, 1953
Liberia	Dec. 11, 1948	June 9, 1950
Mexico	Dec. 14, 1948	July 22, 1952
Monaco		Mar. 30, 1950
Mongolia		Jan. 5, 1967
Morocco		Jan. 24, 1958
Nepal		Jan. 17, 1969
Netherlands		June 20, 1966
New Zealand	Nov. 25, 1949	
Nicaragua		Jan. 29, 1952
Norway	Dec. 11, 1948	July 22, 1949
Pakistan	do.	Oct. 12, 1957
Panama	do.	Jan. 11, 1950
Paraguay	do.	
Peru	do.	Feb. 24, 1960
Philippines	do.	July 7, 1950
Poland		Nov. 14, 1950
Republic of Korea		Oct. 14, 1950
Republic of Vietnam		Aug. 11, 1950
Romania		Nov. 2, 1950
Saudi Arabia		July 13, 1950
Spain		Sept. 13, 1968
Sweden	Dec. 30, 1949	May 27, 1952
Syria		June 25, 1955
Tunisia		Nov. 29, 1956
Turkey		July 31, 1950
Ukrainian S.S.R.	Dec. 16, 1949	Nov. 15, 1954
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	do.	May 3, 1954
United Arab Republic	Dec. 12, 1948	Feb. 8, 1952
United Kingdom		Jan. 30, 1970
United States of America	Dec. 11, 1948	
Upper Volta		Sept. 14, 1965
Uruguay	Dec. 11, 1948	July 11, 1967
Venezuela		July 12, 1960

#### AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business again be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The BILL CLERK. H.R. 15628, to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

#### AMENDMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 14685.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL) laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 14685) to amend the International Travel Act of 1961, as amended, in order to improve the balance of payments by further promoting travel to the United States, and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. INOUE. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment and agree to the request of the House for a conference, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer (Mr. GRAVEL) appointed Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. INOUE, Mr. CANNON, Mr. PROUTY, and Mr. GOODELL, conferees on the part of the Senate.

#### ADMINISTRATION'S DANGEROUS STRATEGIC ARMS POLICIES

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, last week in a symposium on the arms race at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, I described the dangerous path being followed by the administration in its strategic arms policies. I also pointed out the wide gap between the Secretary of Defense's statements and the administration's actions. The Secretary argued that Safeguard "would give us another year in which to pursue SALT without ourselves exacerbating the arms control environment." Yet the Pentagon now has confirmed that at least 18 of the first squadron of Minuteman III missiles already are in place and that the multiple warheads on this missile squadron will be operational by the end of June. The introduction of MIRV's—which some observers believe can be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a first strike buildup—obviously exacerbates the arms control environment.

At the same time, this deployment of MIRV does precisely what Secretary Laird said the administration would not do. He stated that the administration would not add to the offensive potential of the United States during the SALT talks this year in Vienna. But MIRV constitutes a significant increase in our offensive forces.

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The MIRV deployment comes at a particularly unfortunate moment when the Cambodian invasion and the Mid-East crisis have already alarmed those who believe that the Vienna meetings offer an opportunity to reverse the rising level of nuclear armaments.

World leaders publicly have called on the superpowers to recognize the overriding importance of arms limitations not only for the United States and the Soviet Union but for all nations.

United Nations Secretary General U Thant has termed the SALT talks a "real but perhaps fleeting opportunity for agreement" and Lord Chalfont, the eminent British Minister for Disarmament, has described those discussions as "arguably the most important international negotiations of this century." Their measured declarations reflect a concern that is shared by many of my Senate colleagues.

We are at a critical and transitory moment in the history of the nuclear arms race. Failure to achieve a halt in the escalation now may lead to a qualitatively more dangerous round in the technology of the arms race and may eliminate the possibility of meaningful arms limitation for decades.

As I noted in my speech at MIT, there is no support for the administration's contention that ABM and MIRV deployments are necessary at this time to assure the maintenance of our second strike deterrence. I ask unanimous consent that the MIT speech be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, even the Secretary admits that our Polaris fleet is invulnerable now and will remain so far at least 5 to 7 years. Thus, there can be no justification for embarking on costly, unnecessary and destabilizing systems such as ABM or MIRV right on the middle of the SALT talks.

Since it is apparent that the administration is determined to disregard the advice of the Senate—as it has done by undertaking its Cambodian adventure and by failing to respond to the sense of the Senate Resolution 211, there remains only one course of action: to use our constitutional power of the purse when the military procurement and construction bills come before us.

## EXHIBIT I

## SENATOR KENNEDY URGES HALT TO ARMS RACE

I come here today at a time of deep moral crisis. Many are dying—Americans, Vietnamese and now Cambodians—as we continue our policy of supporting an unpopular regime and an unjust cause. At home, the revulsion against this policy has produced the greatest division among our people in this century. At Kent State, American troops killed American students. On Wall Street, American construction workers beat up American students and businessmen. Even the tragic killings in Augusta, Georgia, cannot be totally divorced from this mood of tension and distrust that now grips the nation.

But in this moment of despair, a new movement is growing, sparked by the young, to awaken the nation's conscience. Young people have organized for peace. Here in Cambridge, massive delegations have been

dispatched to urge Congress to stop the war. Over 15,000 telegrams have been sent to the country's highest leaders from this one city alone.

Now it is clear to all that the nation's youth is in this fight to stay. You have already committed yourselves to participate in the November elections. At Princeton and elsewhere, students are planning to devote two full weeks prior to the elections to political campaigning.

Do not underestimate the impact that has been made. The Congress and perhaps the Administration are beginning to listen. Take this opportunity to tell them that halting this dreadful war is not enough. We also must bring a halt to the nuclear arms race, or we may truly find ourselves in the war which will end all wars. As President Kennedy said nearly ten years ago: "Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us."

Now, for the first time since the Cold War began, there is a real opportunity to reduce the threat of nuclear destruction through arms control. Arms limitations are possible because previous disparities in nuclear forces have been greatly reduced and both superpowers have more than enough weapons to deter each other. On the other hand, two emerging technical capabilities—multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles and anti-ballistic-missile defenses—are creating new dangers. Each side will, however, irrationally, regard deployment of these weapons systems by its adversary as decisively upsetting the strategic arms balance and react accordingly. The upward spiral of the arms race will continue inexorably.

The present challenge is to halt this upward spiral through arms limitations. Unfortunately, it now appears that the United States is not going to meet this challenge. It is true that both the President and the Secretary of Defense have predicted that an agreement will be reached at the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks currently underway in Vienna. But, though I hope it will be otherwise, the Administration's Cambodian adventure may poison the atmosphere at Vienna.

Even more important, the Administration is directly undermining SALT by pressing for the immediate deployment of the Safeguard ABM system and MIRV—the very weapons which the talks are meant to bar. And in his two most recent strategic arms policy statements, Secretary Laird presented a distorted picture of the strategic balance which can only panic and mislead the American people into accepting an escalation of the arms race.

Secretary Laird warned that we are "at a crossroad point in the strategic balance," that the United States is on the verge of becoming a second-rank nuclear power. This is simply untrue. Although the Russians do have a slight lead over us in vulnerable land-based missiles, we hold a commanding lead in nuclear-armed submarines and bombers. At the most, the Russians are approaching parity with the United States as a nuclear power.

The Secretary said he was "concerned about the momentum evident in the strategic programs of the Soviet Union." But the Soviet build-up may be tapering off. Intelligence reports indicate that more SS-9 missile sites were constructed in 1965 than in 1969. Indeed reports are now circulating that the Russians have not constructed any new SS-9 missile sites since last August. Secretary Laird admitted on April 20th that if the Russians remained "at the operationally deployed posture which exist today . . . we would have a tolerable situation." I hope, therefore that he will promptly confirm or deny the reports regarding the absence of any new SS-9 sites since August.

Mr. Laird also stated that, in contrast to the Russians, we have maintained a neutral position in our strategic force level since 1965. This, too, is not true. The budget for strategic forces indicates the increases during those years: \$6.8 billion in 1965; \$9.1 billion in 1969; and \$9.6 billion in 1970. In addition, we announced as early as 1967 that we would test, develop and deploy both ABM and MIRV systems. And we carried out far more nuclear tests in the five years since 1965 than in the preceding 20 years, including 16 tests in the first four months of 1970. Is this "neutral gear"?

Thus, the Secretary's general analysis of the present strategic programs and policies of the two superpowers is inaccurate. His specific analysis of the need for immediate deployment of Safeguard ABM and MIRV is equally unpersuasive.

The Administration's contention that we must deploy Safeguard ABM to protect our second-strike capabilities from Soviet attack is specious on numerous grounds. First, our second-strike capability is protected even without Safeguard by our Polaris submarines. Secretary Laird conceded only this week that he is "fully confident" that our Polaris force "is invulnerable to surprise attack today and should remain so for the next five to seven years and hopefully longer." In fact, the technology which would render this deterrent ineffective is not even on the drawing board yet.

It is true, as Secretary Laird stated, that these submarines represent only 15 of our nuclear weapons. But what the Secretary somehow forgot to add is that this 15% is easily sufficient to destroy the 50 largest cities in the Soviet Union—TWICE.

Second, there are grave doubts that the Safeguard could protect any of our land-based Minuteman missiles under any circumstances. Many scientists believe that the Soviets already have inexpensive penetration aids which would sharply reduce the Safeguard's effectiveness. Nobel laureate Hans Bethe has described the many devices which the Russians could use, ranging from simple decoys which could fool our radars to atmospheric nuclear explosions which could black out our radar. Even more important, it now appears that the Russians could almost certainly destroy the Safeguard's Missile Site Radars (MSR's) and thereby render the entire defense system completely useless. The MSR's are relatively soft targets which are difficult to protect from enemy missiles. Furthermore, they are so expensive (as much as \$200 million for one radar and the associated data processing equipment) that we cannot simply employ a number of redundant radars at each Minuteman base. In short, Safeguard's most crucial link is its weakest link.

At recent hearings, Defense Department officials conceded that the MSR's expense and vulnerability pose serious problems. They admitted the need for research into smaller and cheaper radars which would be adequate for less ambitious "hard point" defense. But they insist on pressing ahead with Safeguard before the required research has been completed.

It is significant that the Administration often referred to Safeguard Phase I as a prototype system, to be tested and proved out. President Nixon stated last year that "we will take maximum advantage of the information gathered from the initial deployment in designing the later phases of the program." But although the two Phase I sites have neither been constructed nor tested, the Administration is now requesting six additional sites for Phase II. It is asking the Congress for a billion dollars to build immediately a third site for the protection of Minuteman and to plan for immediate construction of five area defense sites. No longer is any mention made of "proving out" the Phase I sites, despite the growing doubts about the system's feasibility.

Third, assuming the Safeguard system can

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work, it is an unnecessarily expensive method of assuring our second-strike capability. Rathjens and York have estimated that with Safeguard it will cost \$20-25 million for each Minuteman missile protected. They point out that we can buy new super-hardened Minuteman missiles for about one-third that cost. Indeed, the whole Polaris force cost only about twice as much as Safeguard Phase I.

Fourth, the Administration describes Safeguard as a light \$11 billion system in response to the current Soviet and Chinese threats. But in fact it is an open-ended system both in terms of cost and of impact on the arms race. The whole tragic history of weaponry suggests that it is only the first step toward a heavy ABM system which will cost hundreds of billions of dollars and not add in any way to our security.

It is sheer folly to assume that the Administration's argument that Safeguard is simply a measured response will be accepted at face value by Soviet planners. We must remember that our response to the less than 100 ABM launchers which the Russians built around Moscow is to plan for 5,000 more warheads in our stockpile. Thus, the Russians' ABM program, rather than increasing their security has produced a quantum leap in the arms race and thereby reduced their security. Our ABM will surely do the same. The excessive apprehensions and bureaucratic politics that too often have determined our own defense policies also intrude on the Soviet decision-making process. They are likely to respond to Safeguard by building additional offensive missiles. Indeed Safeguard is so expensive that it will be far cheaper for the Russians to build new missiles than it will be for us to defend our missiles. Once the Soviets increase their offensive power, we may counter with more ABM sites, and so on and so on, and so on. In the end we will have achieved a new level of arms stockpiling without the slightest increase to our security.

Fifth, Secretary Laird's suggestion on May 12th that immediate deployment of Safeguard is desirable because it avoids the necessity of adding to our offensive potential during the SALT talks is complete double-talk. We are adding to our offensive potential right in the middle of SALT by deploying MIRV.

Sixth, a final grisly point is that in the long run there can be no successful ABM defense to a Soviet missile attack. If the radar works, the missiles fire and the warheads destroy the incoming missiles high above the atmosphere—all highly questionable suppositions—the radioactivity released will kill a large portion of our population within a generation.

In his most recent statements, Secretary Laird did not spend much time on the Safeguard system as it relates to China. We can be certain, however, that when the Administration becomes desperate enough the "Chinese threat" will be trotted out once again. I would, therefore, like to address myself to the Administration's earlier arguments on this point.

First, Secretary Laird's contention in his February posture statement that the credibility of our Asian commitments will be reduced as soon as China has any capacity to inflict nuclear damage on this country is unpersuasive. The Soviet Union has had such a capacity for years, but, since we have retained our powerful second-strike capabilities, no one seriously doubts the credibility of our vital commitments in Europe, Latin America and elsewhere.

In the posture statement, the Secretary suggested that our deterrent might not be as effective against China as it is against Russia because China has a more rural population. This again is nonsense. Two-thirds of China's population is concentrated in only about one-eighth of its area. Furthermore, the Chinese have no effective fall-out shelters or defenses against our bombers. There can

be no doubt that the United States, using only its bomber forces (and thereby retaining its deterrent against Russia) could completely destroy the urban and rural population of China. Even ten percent of our SAC bomber forces can deliver more than 100,000 times as much explosive power as the Hiroshima holocaust.

It has also been suggested that the Chinese Communists are so irrational that the total destruction of their society would not serve as a deterrent. This is parochialism gone wild. Many eminent students of China have made clear that the Chinese have recently been extremely careful to avoid serious confrontations with major powers. China seems to be as influenced as any nation by the fear of nuclear destruction.

Second, it is completely unrealistic to predict, as has President Nixon, that Safeguard would be "virtually infallible" against a Chinese attack. The many failures of far less complex weapons systems and the near tragedy of Apollo 13 should caution us against making any such rosy predictions. Furthermore, we must bear in mind that we will never be able to test Safeguard under real battle conditions and that we will never know how sophisticated the Chinese penetration aids are. Nothing could be more tragic than if an American Administration pursued a China policy which depended to any extent whatsoever on an infallible missile defense which was not infallible.

Finally, if we attempt to build an infallible defense we must be prepared to protect each of our cities against the entire Chinese missile force. Dr. Herbert York, Director of Defense Research and Engineering under President Eisenhower, estimates that a really serious Chinese-oriented ABM system would require many thousands of U.S. ABM interceptors. Aside from the staggering cost of such a system, we must consider what the response of the Soviet Union would be. The Russians would not simply rest secure in the belief that this system was only aimed at China. They would recognize that, as former Secretary of Defense McNamara himself stated, "The danger in deploying [a] Chinese-oriented ABM system is going to be that pressures will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM system." The Russians would unquestionably become nervous about the effectiveness of their second-strike capabilities and would begin a massive build-up of offensive missiles.

This, whether we look at the Soviet threat or at the Chinese threat, the Safeguard is a dangerous and unnecessary weapons system. And like so many weapons systems we have built in the last two decades it is sure to cost far more than the Pentagon estimates. Already, the Pentagon has admitted that a complete twelve-site system will cost 10.7 billion dollars, which is 1.7 billion dollars more than originally estimated last August. The ABM is a cost-overflow system before it even gets off the drawing board.

Unfortunately Safeguard is not the only unnecessary system to which the Administration has committed itself. It has also announced that it plans to deploy MIRV's, beginning this June.

The development of MIRV is a classic example of the lunacy of the arms race. The original purpose of MIRV was to counter a massive Soviet ABM system. But this system was never built. We are therefore overreacting to a threat which never materialized just as we did in the fifties and sixties. Instead of acting with a new realism, we are simply repeating old mistakes.

There is no danger that our security will be jeopardized if we fail to deploy MIRV now. As Rathjens and Eislakowsky have pointed out: "There is little doubt that currently designed U.S. MIRV's could be deployed on a time scale [which is] short compared with that required for deployment of any significant Russian ABM defense. Accordingly there

is no need for any MIRV deployment pending firm evidence that the USSR is beginning the construction of such defenses." We will always be able to deploy MIRV if that should prove necessary.

Faced with the fact that the Soviets have not built a massive ABM system, the Administration has come up with a new justification for MIRV. MIRV is necessary "Because the rapidly growing Soviet strategic defense forces could seriously threaten both the U.S. Minuteman and strategic bomber forces by the mid-70's." Once again, this justification totally ignores our powerful Polaris submarine force. Furthermore, if the threat to our deterrent will not occur until the mid-70's why is it necessary to deploy MIRV this June right in the middle of the SALT talks. It is nonsense plain and simple when the Secretary says that we have chosen "to defer major new weapons decisions as long as possible pending developments in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks."

We can have a bilateral limitation on MIRV. Of course, there is the problem of assuring that the Russians honor such a limitation. The United States could not verify whether Soviet missiles had multiple weapons without a program of elaborate on-site inspection which the Russians are highly unlikely to accept. The United States could, however, verify whether the Russians were testing MIRV's. And the Russians could not build a system accurate and reliable enough for use as a first-strike weapon against the United States without extensive testing. Thus, the United States can verify whether the Russians are going ahead with a program that threatens our deterrent. If the Russians do begin substantial testing, our strategic posture will not be impaired, since we can, if necessary, deploy our MIRV's on very short notice.

A final argument made on behalf of immediate deployment of MIRV and Safeguard is that such deployment is necessary to give us a bargaining counter in our hand at Vienna. The illogic of this reasoning has been amply exposed by many commentators. As Shulman put it, "To enter into [MIRV and Safeguard] programs in order to have something to bargain with or in order to apply pressure upon the Russians, is likely to have an effect opposite to what is intended. The logical Soviet reaction to such actions would be to question our real intentions, and to redouble their own military efforts. If SALT proceeds over a long period, as it may do, and if both sides argue the need for continuing their build-up to improve their bargaining advantage, the effect of the SALT negotiations will be to leave us worse off than if they had never begun. Negotiating about strategic weapons is not entirely like a poker game—both sides can lose."

And I'm afraid that we are going to lose at this deadly game. By insisting on immediate deployment of Safeguard and MIRV the Administration is undermining the SALT talks. Even more important the Administration is committing us to an unwise strategic arms policy regardless of the outcome of the SALT talks. The United States has an obligation to follow a reasonable arms policy whether SALT succeeds or not. The ABM is an unnecessary and unworkable system no matter what happens in Vienna. And MIRV is equally unnecessary until we see that the Soviet Union has in fact embarked on a full-scale ABM program.

The Administration's action are subjecting this country to enormous risks. First, there is the risk of spiraling arms costs which will make it extremely difficult for us to meet our pressing domestic needs. At the present time, the strategic forces budget of the United States amounts to about \$9 billion per year, excluding some rather large items for warheads, research and development and communications and intelligence activities.



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Nine billion dollars is more than twice what the Nixon Administration agreed to spend this year on education. It is over seven times more than the Nixon Administration intends to spend next year on crime reduction. But, if we do not limit arms control expenditures in the near future, it is estimated that outlays for strategic systems could double by the mid-70's. That means that eighteen billion dollars a year in federal tax revenues would become unavailable to meet domestic needs.

The second risk we take by unnecessary deployment of Safeguard and MIRV is more ominous. The new build-up in the arms race would increase the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. It would reduce even further the possibility of Soviet-American cooperation in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

The third risk we take is equally sobering. Large-scale deployment of MIRV by the United States would so threaten the Russian's second-strike capabilities that they would probably have to revert to a launch on warning system, an automatic response to apparent nuclear attacks.

In this regard it is important to emphasize that MIRV carries different threats for the Russians than for the United States. If the Soviet Union were to deploy MIRVs, we could begin to increase our nuclear forces with confidence that in the interim period our submarine fleet would be an invulnerable counterforce able to inflict unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, however, clearly lacks that flexibility, since their present nuclear armed submarine fleet is a far less convincing deterrent. Thus, they would be likely to return to a Launch on Warning System.

To reestablish a situation where the world is in jeopardy of a programmed response to a blip on a radarscope is the height of irresponsibility. It will have brought us to the final absurdity in which an automatic response by the machines created by man shall determine the end of man. The United States has sought to avoid such a situation since the early 1960's. The Nixon Administration should avoid it now.

In the United States, we know what our weapons can do to another country. And we know that the same fate awaits us in a nuclear confrontation. But, as in some mad chess game, the continued expansion of nuclear strength goes on. Men, thought rational, coolly, calculate and compare millions of deaths with millions of deaths, megatons are matched against megatons in earnest debates over national security and overkills of four to nine times the populations of a country are discussed as though there is some sense to it all.

To be raised in this atmosphere, to have the ability to destroy the world, and not to treat this ability day and night as the first matter to be solved among nations, goes beyond the limits of the human mind. Can any society view the visions and thoughts of youth as radical or extreme, when the visions and thoughts of men in power include the real possibility of final destruction?

There will have to be some other way for nations in the last quarter of this century to resolve the problems of the planet without reliance on arsenals of obliteration. If the world is to continue, it must not only control nuclear weapons but eventually destroy them. The questions of when and how must be foremost in the minds of our national leaders and not afterthoughts. That is why the SALT talks—the first step toward nuclear sanity—are so urgent and why it is unthinkable that the Administration has embarked on a course that may make meaningful agreement impossible.

There is only one rational policy for the United States to pursue. We must place a freeze on the deployment of ABM and MIRV.

If the Administration will not act rationally, then the Congress must. And just as I have supported the bipartisan efforts to stop the madness in Indochina by cutting off funds, so too, will I again help to lead the bipartisan fight to stop the madness of the arms race by cutting off funds. And I ask you to join me in this fight. When you organize in your community, when you speak to your Congressmen, do not just say "Stop the war." Say also, "Stop ABM, Stop MIRV, Stop the Arms Race."

#### STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN THE C-5A

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I have learned today that preliminary findings of the Scientific Advisory Board—SAB—of the Air Force indicate that a completely new wing design may be needed to correct the structural defects in the C-5A. According to the current issue of the Armed Forces Journal, unless a new wing design in produced and retrofitted on all existing aircraft, the Air Force may refuse to accept further deliveries.

My understanding is that the Scientific Advisory Board is not due to make its final written report on the C-5A structural deficiencies until June 15, although it has transmitted its preliminary findings to the Air Force. Certainly we must withhold judgment about the C-5A's technical performance until final report of the Board is made. I wonder, however, whether we can in good faith and good conscience, approve any additional funds for this program until doubts about its technical performance and most specifically its structural defects are completely dispelled.

It will be recalled that wing cracks in the C-5A have already been produced in ground testing, and that, at best, correction of this defect will be costly and will set the program back. What is now becoming apparent is that the defect is much more fundamental and deeply rooted than we had been previously led to believe.

I urge my colleagues in the Senate to therefore withhold not only their judgment about the technical performance of the C-5A, but also to withhold their approval of any further funding of this program until we are assured that the plane will meet its specifications.

#### ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11:30 A.M., MONDAY, JUNE 1, 1970

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 11:30 a.m. on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 2 o'clock and 16 minutes p.m.), the Senate adjourned until Monday, June 1, 1970, at 11:30 a.m.

#### NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate May 28, 1970:

##### AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Maurice J. Williams, of West Virginia, to be Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development, vice Rutherford M. Poats.

#### CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate May 28, 1970:

##### CABINET COMMITTEE ON OPPORTUNITIES FOR SPANISH-SPEAKING PEOPLE

Martin G. Castillo, of California, to be Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-Speaking People.

##### U.S. AIR FORCE

Maj. Gen. James T. Stewart, 486-14-3093 FR, Regular Air Force, to be assigned to positions of importance and responsibility designated by the President, in the grade of lieutenant general, under the provisions of section 8066, title 10, of the United States Code.

##### U.S. ARMY

The following-named officers to be placed on the retired list, in grades indicated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3982:

##### To be general

Gen. Frank Schaffer Besson, Jr., 579-52-8234, Army of the United States (major general, U.S. Army).

##### To be lieutenant general

Lt. Gen. Oren Eugene Hurlbut, 490-44-9251, Army of the United States (major general, U.S. Army).

The following-named officer, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3066, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President under subsection (a) of section 3066, in grade as follows:

##### To be lieutenant general

Maj. Gen. Richard Thomas Knowles, 340-10-3134, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

The following-named officers for temporary appointment in the Army of the United States to the grade indicated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3442 and 3447:

##### To be brigadier general

Col. Frederick Charles Krause, 549-12-6572, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. William Johnston Maddox, Jr., 577-28-8085, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Thomas Howard Tackaberry, 555-26-9701, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).

Col. John Terrell Carley, 426-78-1673, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Jack Wilson Hemingway, 462-12-6043, U.S. Army.

Col. Conrad Leon Stansberry, 490-44-7980, U.S. Army.

Col. George Anthony Rebb, 373-18-6025, U.S. Army.

Col. James McKinley Gibson, 010-12-8443, U.S. Army.

Col. Wilburn Clarence Weaver, 453-14-5443, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Jeffrey Greenwood Smith, 257-30-8277, U.S. Army.

Col. John Haywood Morrison, Jr., 254-03-9333, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Albert George Hume, 322-14-0581, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Sidney Gritz, 717-09-0044, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Arthur Siegman Hyman, 306-12-9482, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. John Gillespie Hill, Jr., 516-24-4439, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).

Col. Ernest Paul Braucher, 330-10-3593,

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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- Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. John Raymond Pierce, Jr., 289-18-8319, U.S. Army.
- Col. Harry Herbert Hiestand, 418-16-0755, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Joseph Frederick Hughes Cutrona, 134-07-0488, U.S. Army.
- Col. Orlando Carl Epp, 512-10-0894, U.S. Army.
- Col. Samuel Vaughan Wilson, 223-22-6784, U.S. Army.
- Col. Frank Earl Blazey, 464-26-2742, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Olin Earl Smith, 236-16-2006, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Tom Mercer Nicholson, 287-03-9753, U.S. Army.
- Col. Bates Cavanaugh Burnell, 561-54-2806, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Louis John Schelter, Jr., 081-32-3007, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Homer Duggins Smith, Jr., 462-03-8363, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. George Elmer Wear, 522-18-0670, U.S. Army.
- Col. Oliver Beirne Patton, 234-22-5699, U.S. Army.
- Col. Ronald James Fairfield, 330-18-3127, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Eugene Michael Lynch, 391-16-4571, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Winfield S. Scott, 039-09-3623, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Carter Weldon Clarke, Jr., 212-40-4800, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. James Alva Munson, 507-10-3990, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Thomas Edward Fitzpatrick, Jr., 032-05-0115, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Richard Edward McConnell, 092-12-8607, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. Carroll Edward Adams, Jr., 035-14-1876, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Patrick William Powers, 561-54-7517, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Daniel Vance, Jr., 386-18-6003, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. Albion Williamson Knight, Jr., 265-20-4468, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Max Etkin, 502-05-9249, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Dean Van Lydegraf, 544-12-6995, U.S. Army.
- Col. Alton Gustav Post, 473-16-2488, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Richard Wesley Swenson, 285-18-8334, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Edward Francis Gudgel, Jr., 403-22-8571, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Raymond Oscar Miller, 420-52-5538, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. John Benedict Desmond, 021-14-6964, U.S. Army.
- Col. Richard Gregory Fazakerley, 553-22-9262, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. Joseph Corbett McDonough, 145-18-1678, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. John William Vessey, Jr., 703-07-1974, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. John Ember Sterling, 521-22-2777, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. John Crouse Burney, Jr., 025-14-3721, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. George Bernard Fink, 521-28-7313, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. John Alan Hoeffing, 396-38-0355, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Joseph Charles Kiefe, Jr., 144-18-5590, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. Robert Haldane, 131-14-7236, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Donn Albert Starry, 510-22-2130, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. Elmer Raymond Ochs, 322-20-3690, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. Hal Edward Hallgren, 361-12-7064, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Andrew John Gatsis, 224-52-6620, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Rutledge Parker Hazzard, 421-22-2258, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Lynn Wood Hoskins, Jr., 408-22-8027, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Louis Joseph Prost, 272-14-7202, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Henry Hermann Bolz, Jr., 339-12-9183, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. John Edward Stannard, 720-18-0673, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. Stan Leon McClellan, 562-24-6033, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Louis Rachmeler, 562-54-9072, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. John Garnett Waggener, 490-44-8300, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Thomas Willard Bowen, 431-26-2155, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Charles Ralph Bushong, 535-14-8703, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. John Scholto Wieringa, Jr., 150-12-9131, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Samuel Grady Cockerham, 425-34-0437, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Charles Dwelle Daniel, Jr., 260-60-1991, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Wallace Keith Wittwer, 541-16-6670, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. John David Lewis, 074-16-9221, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Paul Eugene Smith, 350-18-7158, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Robert Willoughby Williams, 577-28-6295, Army of the United States (lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army).
- Col. Robert Gibbins Gard, Jr., 449-36-3971, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. Edward Charles Meyer, 205-18-3616, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. Joseph Key Bratton, 472-24-0434, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- Col. Alfred Bradford Hale, 093-22-4582, Army of the United States (major, U.S. Army).
- To be brigadier general, Women's Army Corps*
- Col. Elizabeth Paschel Hoisington, 167-18-6373, U.S. Army.
- The following-named officers for temporary appointment in the Army of the United States to the grades indicated under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3442 and 3447:
- To be major general, Medical Corps*
- Brig. Gen. Spurgeon Hart Neel, Jr., 415-09-2779, Army of the United States (colonel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. Colin Francis Vorder Bruegge, 410-64-0788, Army of the United States (colonel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. Carl Wilson Hughes, 490-22-3522, Army of the United States (colonel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army).
- To be brigadier general, Medical Corps*
- Col. Robert Morris Hardaway III, 586-60-4321, Medical Corps, U.S. Army.
- Col. Edward Henry Vogel, Jr., 453-16-5528, Medical Corps, U.S. Army.
- Col. Robert Bernstein, 086-18-8814, Medical Corps, U.S. Army.
- To be brigadier general, Army Nurse Corps*
- Col. Anna Mae McCabe Hays, 204-01-1015, Army Nurse Corps, U.S. Army.
- The following-named officers for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States to the grade indicated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3284 and 3306:
- To be brigadier general, Medical Corps*
- Maj. Gen. James Arista Wier, 400-54-1473, Army of the United States (colonel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. Colin Francis Vorder Bruegge, 410-64-0788, Army of the United States (colonel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. Thomas Joseph Whelan, Jr., 026-18-7748, Army of the United States (colonel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army).
- The following-named officers for temporary appointment in the Army of the United States to the grade indicated under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3442 and 3447:
- To be major general*
- Brig. Gen. Daniel Arthur Raymond, 081-32-3762, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. William Alden Burke, 446-01-6906, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. Robert Davis Terry, 303-18-8547, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. William Edgar Shedd III, 579-52-8246, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. George Samuel Blanchard, 579-14-7196, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. Charles Wolcott Ryder, Jr., 031-30-0381, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. Winant Sidle, 118-10-9740, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. William Russel Kraft, Jr., 126-12-7279, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. Elmer Parker Yates, 224-52-8485, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).
- Brig. Gen. Donnelly Patil Bolton, 334-09-9687, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

country in the hope of expediting action on S. 30, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969. Today, I would like to call your attention to a revealing article in the May 1970, issue of Reader's Digest, by an associate editor of that magazine, concerning one of the longtime powers behind the scenes in the Mafia—a "prince of plunder" as he is called by the magazine. Mr. William Schulz, the author, describes the rise to great power and wealth of Meyer Lansky. From smalltime thief on the New York City's Lower East Side, to operator of illegal distilleries during the depression, to nationwide gambling operations, to Mafia-related kingpin—this is the chronology of events listed by Mr. Schulz in the biography of a bigtime racketeer. The author describes in some detail how Lansky and his cohorts "skimmed" millions in unreported gambling earnings off the top of income reported to the Government and how this money was sanitized by deposit in Swiss bank accounts and thence back into legitimate businesses in the United States. Mr. Schulz also indirectly suggests that the Mafia may have quite an extensive intelligence operation even in the Federal Government. He gives as an example a top secret report on Mafia operations which several years ago traveled from the Attorney General's office to the councils of the Mafia in less than 72 hours. According to Mr. Schulz, no explanation has ever been found for this leak of information.

Mr. Speaker, in order that my fellow Members of the House and the American public might better realize the full extent of the dangers to our society which S. 30, now pending before the House Judiciary Committee, is designed to combat, I include Mr. Schulz' article in the RECORD at this point:

**THE SHOCKING SUCCESS STORY OF PUBLIC ENEMY NO. 1**

(By William Schulz)

"A perfect gentleman," says a wealthy neighbor at the posh Seasons South, an oceanfront high-rise in Miami Beach. "A quiet guy with simple tastes," observes a long-time associate. A "retired investor," he says of himself on his tax forms.

And 67-year-old Meyer Lansky acts the part. A slightly built man with thinning gray hair and a pinched face, he dresses conservatively in custom-made suits. He lives quietly with his second wife, shuns night life, tips modestly. He drives a rented Chevrolet, and his idea of fun is a leisurely walk along the Miami beach front, his miniature Tibetan Shih Tzu dog, "Brutser," at his heels.

But there is another side to Meyer Lansky. To a veteran New York prosecutor he is a "ruthless mobster whose brains and guile have made him a major underworld figure since the Roaring Twenties." To *The Wall Street Journal* he is a financial genius who "has shaped the organized crime syndicate into a well-disciplined operation." And to a leading government Mafia expert he is Public Enemy No. 1.

Government authorities put Lansky's wealth at more than \$100 million, almost none of it in his own name. His holdings include gambling casinos from the Caribbean to the Middle East, New York clothiers, New England race tracks, Miami hotels—and millions upon millions in foreign banks and U.S. stocks.

**BUGS AND MEYER**

Born *Meier Suchow* in Gdono, Poland, Lansky immigrated to Brooklyn at the age of nine. He dropped out of school after

finishing eighth grade (he earned A's and B's on his report card), and joined a gang of thieves on Manhattan's Lower East Side. He graduated quickly to the big time, and in the late 1920s, during Prohibition, hooked up with another young hood, Bugsy Siegel, to form the Bugs and Meyer Mob. Their gunmen guarded illicit booze shipments between Chicago and the East Coast. They were partners—with Joe Adonis and Frank Costello, rising stars in the Mafia—in at least three illegal distilleries. Their criminal interests grew to include casinos, narcotics, and a nationwide bookie network.

During the early 1930s, *La Cosa Nostra* (LCN), or the Mafia, formed a "Commission" to bring its warring factions under a supreme council. As a non-Italian, and a Jew, Lansky was ineligible for LCN membership. But his power was such that he became an ex-officio member of the commission. His financial genius was eagerly sought by LCN big shots. They, in turn, allowed him to expand his empire.

Working with an outsider is one thing. Trusting him is another. Always, LCN kept a "watchbird" with Lansky, just to make sure that his split with them was honest. For many years, the Lansky watcher was Joe Adonis, a capo (captain) in the "family" of New York's Vito Genovese. When Adonis was deported in 1956, the job was taken over by Vincent (Jimmy Blue Eyes) Alo, another Genovese capo. Alo remains one of Lansky's closest companions.

**"BLACK MONEY"**

Lansky was a very rich man by the end of World War II. He and his brother Jake ran 24-hour-a-day casinos in Florida's wide-open Broward County, north of Miami. His gambling dens and lotteries boomed in New York, New Jersey and Louisiana. In Las Vegas, Lansky was building a multi-million-dollar casino, the Flamingo, to be run by Bugsy Siegel.

The early 1950s brought a temporary setback. U.S. Senate crime-busters led by Tennessee's Sen. Estes Kefauver, exposed the dimensions of Lansky-financed corruption in Florida and New York. The Broward County casinos were shuttered, and Lansky received the only jail term of his long criminal career—three months for operating the plush Arrowhead Inn, an illegal gambling emporium in Saratoga, N.Y.

But, in 1952, Fulgencio Batista, back in power as dictator of Cuba after several years in Florida exile, had laws passed giving Lansky and his associates a complete monopoly on Cuban gambling. The purpose: to convert Havana into a glittering mecca for U.S. tourists. After Batista was overthrown in 1959, the mob tried to work out an "understanding" with Castro. But the end came, a Lansky intimate has disclosed, when Che Guevara sent his gun-toting men into the casino counting rooms to make sure that the regime was getting an honest tally on the taxes due. Lansky & Co. thereupon fell back to Nevada, where the counting rooms were, in the words of one operator, "sacred, inviolate," off limits to tax collectors and government agents.

In Las Vegas, the Lansky Group—Lansky, a few associates and front men—controlled at least four major casinos: the Flamingo, the Fremont, the Horseshoe and the Sands. Three times a day, at the end of each eight-hour shift, the casino chiefs totted up their winnings. Government authorities cheerfully took their word on what taxes they had coming. Thus, the stage was set for a killing.

In 1960, the Lansky Group began a process known as "skimming." The FBI discovered what was going on when agents bugged the Fremont Hotel in 1962. In each casino, huge sums of money—as much as \$280,000 a month—were simply lopped off the top of the winnings. No taxes, state or federal, were paid on the skim. It just vanished from the counting rooms, carried by teams of bagmen

to Lansky in Miami. Lansky kept the lion's share—approximately 60 percent. The rest was delivered to New Jersey's Gerardo (Jerry) Catena, a capo in the Genovese family, which has long shared racket profits with the Lansky Group.

Week after week, FBI agents pieced together details. On January 6, 1963, for instance, they listened as two members of the Lansky Group, Edward Levinson and Ed Torres, discussed the delivery of \$115,650 to the boss. Worried that G-men were tailing Benjamin Siegelbaum, a long-time Lansky aide, Levinson suggested that the money be carried by someone else—Ida Devine, the matronly wife of Las Vegas racketeer Irving (Niggy) Devine, another Lansky associate.

Torres: You want to give Ida the money? Levinson: She'll go down on the train.

Torres: She'll never leave the stateroom. So give it to her.

Levinson: I'll call her tomorrow.

Torres: Safe as could be.

On January 8, Ida Devine packed the money in a black bag and left for Chicago, where she switched trains and continued on to Miami. She delivered the package and returned to Nevada—all under the watchful eye of federal agents.

By the middle of 1963, Attorney General Robert Kennedy was waging all-out war on the skimmers. Couriers were tailed, tax agents pored through casino records. With the heat on, the Lansky Group sold out its Las Vegas hotels and turned its attention to the sunny Bahamas. Legalized casinos opened there in 1964. Whereupon, month after month, couriers carried suitcases stuffed with illegal skim across Florida Strait to Lansky and his cohorts.

A government investigation of Lansky's Bahamian interests alerted authorities to his latest sleight of hand, by which "black money" was transformed into legitimate capital through the use of Swiss banks. An expansive Benny Siegelbaum explained how it worked. "Let's say," said Siegelbaum, "that Mr. X puts a big sum in a numbered account in Switzerland, then wants to invest it in the stock market. The bank buys the stock in its own name. The dividends are credited to the account of Mr. X. He's got an interest in the company, but his name never appears on the books or records as a stockholder."

The same scheme, completely legal in Switzerland, shielded members of the Lansky Group when their deposits served as collateral for Swiss bank loans to enterprises in this country. The records show only that the loans came from a Swiss bank. What isn't shown is the Lansky skim that made the loan possible.

**DELEGATE THE DIRTY WORK**

It has been more than three decades since Lansky helped create the national crime syndicate. Of the mob's founding fathers, he alone survives. The others—from Frank Costello and Joe Adonis to Louis (Lepke) Buchalter and Bugsy Siegel—have been murdered, toppled from power, jailed or deported. How has this frail little refugee shown such remarkable staying power? Here are some clues:

Despite his carefully nurtured image of peaceful legitimacy, Lansky is by nature as violent as any LCN terrorist. But he learned early to delegate the dirty work to others. In 1928, for instance, he attempted the liquidation of John Barrett, an underling he believed to be a police informer. The unsuspecting Barrett was taken for a ride, and Lansky opened fire at point-blank range. He succeeded only in grazing Barrett, who dived from the car and was found by police. Charged with "suspicion of homicide," Lansky arranged for the delivery to Barrett's hospital room of a roast chicken stuffed with strychnine. Barrett, who tossed the poisoned fowl out the window, got the message. He refused to testify, and Lansky walked out of jail a free man.

From that day on, Lansky left the strong-arm tactics to trusted lieutenants. In 1931, his hired gunmen mowed down the No. 1 mafia boss, Salvatore Maranzano, enabling the Young Turks—include Lansky and Lucky Luciano—to consolidate national control of the rackets. In 1947, Lansky's "hit-men" executed his long-time partner, Bugsy Siegel, less than 24 hours after the two had argued violently about Siegel's management of the Flamingo.

#### COURTING POLITICIANS

In Nevada, the casino skimmers shelled out "campaign contributions" to political candidates and to officeholders, to big shots and to small fry. On November 9, 1962, Ed Levinson, of the Lansky Group, sat down with an aide in the bugged Fremont Hotel to fix the amounts of some of their contributions: \$1,000 to Sen. Alan Bible, \$500 to Rep. Walter S. Baring, \$500 to the mayor of Las Vegas, \$500 to a candidate for lieutenant governor, \$300 to a legislative hopeful, \$300 to a county commissioner, \$200 to a candidate for justice of the peace.

Other casinos made similar contributions. One hotel reportedly poured \$20,000 into the campaign coffers of then Gov. Grant Sawyer—who later echoed Sen. Howard Cannon's denunciation of the FBI's "Gestapo-like" bugging of the skimmers. Cannon even went to President Johnson to protest the bugging. Asked recently if he received campaign contributions from Levinson and other casino operators, Cannon said he could not recall, but would be "disappointed" if he had not.

#### WINGED DOCUMENTS

Lansky apparently has allies in many places. On April 24, 1963, the FBI delivered a top-secret report on the Las Vegas skimmers to the office of Attorney General Kennedy. Based on electronic surveillance, it spelled out the theft of millions of dollars.

On April 27, agents listening to the Fremont bug were astounded to hear Levinson and Devine leafing through the FBI report, page by page, reading it aloud. Levinson exclaimed, "My God, Niggy, they even know about Ida."

Government officials have still not determined how the report traveled from Kennedy's office to the skimmers in less than 72 hours. But this was not the only such happening. On August 23, 1963, Ben Sigelbaum walked into the plush Miami offices of attorney Alvin I. Mainik, one of Lansky's trusted money-movers. "Greetings and salutations," he said, tossing a document on Mainik's desk. "This is from the Justice Department."

Indeed it was—a top-secret report that jeopardized the identity of a key government informer.

Lansky himself has dropped an occasional hint about his influence. Once he bragged of arranging the transfer of a federal investigator "who was giving me a bad time."

#### SILENT INSULATORS

Lansky's greatest protection is undoubtedly The Group—the trusted associates who surround and insulate him, who hold his property in their names, carry his millions to secret Swiss banks, and who balance his books at the Eden Roc hotel's Cabana 169. Among them are such men as Hyman Siegel and Isidore Blumenfeld. Siegel, 65, a heavy-lifted, third-grade dropout whose criminal record dates back to the 1920s, oversees Lansky's investments in the New York garment district and his interests in a number of crooked unions. Blumenfeld, alias Izzy Bloom, alias Kid Cann, long-time Minneapolis gambling boss, has been convicted of white slavery, tax-evasion and bootlegging. He fronts for Lansky in at least four Miami Beach hotels—the Singapore, the Aztec, the Kimberly and the Hawaiian Isle.

In recent years, Lansky has pumped new blood into The Group. Alvin Mainik is an

example. Recruited out of the University of Miami Law School, Mainik is known to his neighbors as a successful young attorney, investor and socialist. He has a lovely family and belongs to the best clubs. But his real job is that of a Lansky banker. Accompanied by Lansky hangers-on, he flies regularly to Canada, meets with Swiss contacts and arranges the handling of skim. His future is predictable. "Members of the Lansky Group have lifetime contracts, with no cancellation clause," says one federal agent. "If they get tired or afraid, the mob has its own way of closing out the association—permanently."

The illegal and untaxed enterprises of Meyer Lansky deny the government millions in needed levies. His infiltration of legitimate business constitutes a deadly poison in the nation's economy bloodstream which affects every taxpayer. As a leading lawman says: "This man represents what we're talking about when we use those familiar words, 'public menace.'"

Federal authorities are currently exploring every avenue that could lead to nailing Lansky. His tax returns are examined and re-examined. U.S. officials have applied pressure to open the secret records of Swiss banks. Perhaps one of Lansky's silent associates will decide to talk. Perhaps Lansky himself will slip up. Fortunately for him, the FBI tapes spelling out the great skimming conspiracy are inadmissible as court evidence.

Until Meyer Lansky is brought to justice, his blood-and-theft rise to riches is a story that should shame and concern every U.S. citizen.

#### THE SALT TALKS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from California (Mr. HOSMER) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, there follows the analysis of the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty talks prepared by me and issued to House Republicans yesterday:

#### THE SALT TALKS<sup>1</sup>

Nuclear deterrence may be defined as the obvious intent of a country, if attacked, to employ its nuclear arsenal in retaliation to destroy the attacker. For a quarter-of-a-century relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have been based on this awesome power.

Initially the US atomic monopoly gave it nuclear superiority. Deterrence was unilateral. Survival of the USSR depended on US restraint. As the Soviet nuclear arsenal took shape that country gradually developed a comparable capability for assured destruction of the US. Deterrence became mutual, a circumstance characterized by nuclear sufficiency on the part of each to destroy the other.

US strategic policy during the 1960's encouraged the shift toward superpower nuclear parity. America eased its strategic weapons build up and permitted the Soviets to catch up. US planners of this era believed parity would serve as a plateau from which Communist leaders would be anxious to stabilize strategic relationships either by a tacit or by a formal agreement.<sup>2</sup>

Unfortunately, as parity was reached no slackening of Soviet strategic arms deployment became apparent. It was as though, recognizing their own momentum and our lack of it, they determined to race on to superiority. If they reach this goal the US must depend on the USSR's restraint in its role of a nuclear superior in the mid or late 1970's. However, combining weapons production with arms control talks is not inconsistent with Kremlin's past approaches to

treaty decision making. Events simply have not yet made clear whether Soviet participation in the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) talks is a serious try for a formal end to the strategic buildup or a simple play while arming.<sup>3</sup>

These are the ambiguous strategic circumstances inherited by Richard Nixon when he assumed the Presidency. He can ignore neither the possibility of a vital new danger nor the potentiality for an agreement dramatically easing international tensions.

Both factors underlie his request for the beginnings of an ABM umbrella to protect our land-based Minuteman ICBMs and SAC bomber deterrent forces from surprise attack. Despite their increased offensive arms the move, if carried beyond its present dimension, would help deny the Soviets nuclear superiority by enhancing the survivability of our deterrent. It also gives the Soviets an incentive for success of the SALT talks. They would be unlikely to negotiate for parity if, in the face of their buildup, the US Congress offers them superiority by rejecting President Nixon's Safeguard request.<sup>4</sup>

At the same time the President is directing intense negotiating efforts at the SALT talks to actually achieve an enforceable arms control agreement which limits strategic arms production and, if possible, reduce present stockpiles. Realistically the terms of a treaty must be in the security self-interest of each country and its allies, otherwise the Soviets will not agree and we should not agree.

It is clear that to write a treaty the superpowers first must concede that mutual deterrence not nuclear superiority is the preferred long term status for their relations.<sup>5</sup>

They also will need to determine some mutually agreeable bounds on their nuclear armaments because mutual deterrence can be achieved with various arsenals, so long as that of each country is sufficient to assure the destruction of the other. From the standpoint of allocating national resources between defense and non-defense goals, eventually achieving a low level without appreciable overkill should seem safely preferable to both.<sup>6</sup>

From these references the nitty-gritty of the SALT negotiations would deal with the numbers, kinds and combinations of offensive and defensive weapons allowed. This exercise aims less at nuclear parity in exact terms than it does at formulating conditions reasonably certain to maintain each power in possession of the nuclear sufficiency required to destroy the other. Under this approach, according to Henry Kissinger, both sides should have confidence that their forces are sufficiently invulnerable, reliable and balanced so that no attack could possibly be seen as advantageous, and no attempt to achieve a change in the strategic balance could succeed.

Writing a treaty that substantially cuts armaments outlays will be considerably simplified if the nations will forego anti-ballistic missile systems or strictly limit their use to protection of capitols and protection against third countries. An extensive ABM defense can seriously alter strategic equations if used to protect an ICBM force. To the degree that ABM is a successful defender, it enhances its owner's strategic power. To the degree an opposing nation estimates ABM will succeed, it encourages a boost in offensive power for the purpose of saturating the ABM defense.

Considerable attention during SALT negotiations is expected to focus on the ABM problem, including the possibilities for upgrading existing air defense missiles to give them ABM capabilities. Most observers believe that neither building or dismantling ABM sites nor upgrading AA missiles can be monitored adequately except by an intru-

<sup>1</sup>Footnotes at end of article.



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sive inspection system. However, the very large radar antennae needed for ABM target acquisition, identification and interception can be satellite monitored. It is possible that some ABM limitations might be handled in terms of antennae limitations.

A further complication for the two superpowers in their treaty writing is a need by each to anticipate dangers posed by third powers. Both have noted possible threats from nuclear armed Red China. Probably the strategic levels established by the superpowers vis-a-vis each other will need to be increased sufficiently to remain adequate even after weapons expenditures required to deal with third powers.<sup>7</sup>

Set forth below are the four most frequently mentioned approaches to writing a strategic arms limitation treaty and some discussion of each:

1. A limit on the number of allowed strategic systems, without restrictions as to quality items such as warhead yields, use of multiple individually guided re-entry vehicles (MIRV), etc.

Intrusive inspection may not be required as in the case of quality limitations. Most quantity limitations can be policed by each nation's own satellite surveillance system. However, surreptitiously produced systems such as orbital bombardment weapons and mobile ICBMs probably cannot be detected by satellites. One's assessment of the risk element of this potential for cheating will influence his judgment of the degree of confidence with which quantity limitations may be policed non-intrusively.

2. Limitations on quality features of strategic weapons systems which make on-site inspection mandatory if treaty compliance is reasonably to be assured.

Development of "black box" instrumentation eliminating a need to dismantle weapons to monitor quality features inside still will not obviate intrusions at military bases by inspectors utilizing the instruments. Hereafter this degree of inspection has been unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

3. A combination of quantity and quality limitations.

Discussion under 1 and 2 applies.

4. A ban on deployment of additional strategic systems coupled with a phased reduction in the allowable number of systems during a specified time period.<sup>8</sup>

The strategic defense requirement of the superpowers are asymmetrical. This approach permits each, within the limitation, to arm in the manner believed appropriate for its own defense. So long as the overall limit is honored it also permits upgrading from time to time and switches between types of weapons systems.

(NOTE.—This is a quantitative approach and subject to the confidence factors discussed under 1. However, to the extent that the "honest" nation can maintain a highly survivable deterrent which, even after surprise attack, is capable of retaliating with assured destruction of the "cheating" nation, the potential for "profit from perfidy" could be assessed as very low. A contrary view is that with reduced legitimate numbers of weapons systems, surreptitious weapons take on a greater importance, therefore the risks are large.)

Hypothetical case: Assume a maximum of 1008 allowed systems and no ABM allowed. Assume the US now has 1050 Minuteman systems, 450 SAC bombers and 656 Polaris missile systems (in 41 submarines with 16 each); total, 2156 strategic systems. Believing its land-based Minutemen and SAC bombers vulnerable to surprise attack, the US elects to scrap these 1500 systems, leaving only the 656 Polaris and a deficit of 352 systems. To get back up to its allowed 1008, the US build 22 new submarines to carry 352 added missiles in undersea safety. In the process the US is allowed to convert all Polaris missiles to new, improved yield and

accuracy Poseidon MIRV systems. Thereafter the US converts the entire fleet to the Undersea Launched Missile System (ULMS). The intercontinental range ULMS missiles then permits US submarines to hide anywhere in all the world's oceans.

Similarly the Soviet Union may tailor its mix of allowed strategic weapons to best advantage during its reduction process and afterwards. Presently the number of its systems is in the same order of magnitude as our own and its submarines also carry 16 missile systems. Past Soviet preference has inclined to very high yield warheads. It is unlikely that all its strategic systems would be put in submarines where warhead weights and yields are circumscribed.

It is emphasized that the analysis here presented is just that, an analysis of the SALT talks. It is not to be read as proposals which have been made either by the US or the USSR. Rather, it is a guide for evaluating SALT proposals when and if made, and when and if publicized. Therefore, it is respectfully suggested that this document be filed for ready future reference.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> For several years the possibility of strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union has been under discussion. Initiation of talks was thrown off track by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Finally, a first round of talks began in Helsinki on November 17, 1969 and continued until December 22nd. A second round convened in Vienna on April 16, 1970, and is continuing. A third round at Helsinki again is anticipated. Both sides have made considerable effort to keep the talks private and uninfluenced by propaganda and public opinion considerations. It is a general view that if talks have not produced a treaty by the summer of 1971 there is little likelihood of success. For an informed assessment of the negotiations see: Jonas, Anne M., "The SALT Negotiations: Keeping Hope in Line with Reality," *Air Force & Space Digest*, v. 53, Mar. 1970: 39-42.

<sup>2</sup> Principally former Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, their Secretaries of State and Defense, and their national security advisors, including numerous members of the academic community.

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion of Soviet behavior in disarmament matters see: Scanlan, James P., "Disarmament and the USSR," *US Command & General Staff College Military Review*, v. 50, Mar. 1970: 29-42.

<sup>4</sup> The previously proposed Sentinel nationwide ABM system intended to protect populations would be destabilizing. Rather than move to this posture President Nixon adopted the Safeguard system to achieve the objectives of guarding against accidental attacks, protecting our land-based deterrent forces, and protecting against the kind of small attacks third countries could launch in this decade. Soviet ABM deployment is relatively advanced compared to that of the US.

<sup>5</sup> For a view that mutual deterrence can be better maintained without a treaty and by progressive modernization of retaliatory forces by both sides see: Brown, Neville, "An Unstable Balance of Terror?" *World Today*, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 38-46.

<sup>6</sup> A minority of students of nuclear strategy believe that assured destruction capabilities are inherently unstable and that a damage limiting approach to arms control is preferable. This approach emphasizes passive (civil defense) and active (ABM) defense measures calculated to so limit damage from surprise attack that the incentive for initiating it is absent. See: Schneider, Mark B., "Strategic Arms Limitation," *US Command & General Staff College Military Review*, v. 50, Mar. 1970: 20-28.

<sup>7</sup> For arguments for permitting Red China a minimal credible nuclear deterrent see:

Barnett, A. Doak, "A Nuclear China and US Arms Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, v. 48, Apr. 1970: 427-442.

<sup>8</sup> A MIRV ban and other qualitative limitations cannot be reached directly by this approach. However, reducing the number of allowed weapons systems below a number otherwise acceptable might indirectly approach some sought after qualitative goals.

#### NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS WEEK

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CONTE) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, this week has been designated by President Nixon as "National Small Business Week." It is a week for paying deserved attention and just tribute to the remarkable accomplishments of small business and to the vital role it plays in our country's economy.

At the same time, however, there is also incorporated here the clear realization that the accomplishments, as well as the needs and the problems, of small business are not just a 1-week matter, but rather a full-time, year-round matter.

That is why we have the Small Business Administration for one and that is why both the House of Representatives and the Senate have seen fit to establish special committees on small business.

The economic well-being of the more than 5 million small businessmen of this Nation is of critical importance to our society. As senior Republican on the House Small Business Committee, I would like to note that we on that committee consider it our job to make sure that the voice of small business is heard and that its needs and interests receive full consideration and attention.

The SBA, of course, has similar responsibilities within the executive branch, and let us be frank for a moment—neither of us has an easy job. There are a great many competing forces in Washington, all striving for priority treatment and consideration for their own particular areas of interest. In too many cases in the past, the problems of small business have just not been able to demand the attention they required.

Despite this, however, I believe that we can look with pride on the assistance we have been able to provide for small business.

Our House committee for one has a long history of successful advocacy in dealing with numerous problem areas for small businessmen.

Most recently, our committee has completed lengthy hearings in Washington and throughout the country to review present Government and industry procurement practices as they relate to small business.

I believe our recommendations based on these hearings will prove to be quite valuable in implementing Congress' stated goal that small business must receive its fair proportion of Government contracts and subcontracts.

SBA can similarly be proud, I believe, of the important contributions it has made to the cause of small business. I think it should be particularly proud of its programs designed to combine the

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private and the public sector in a partnership effort, such as the newly emphasized programs of guaranteed bank loan financing.

Despite the difficult economic conditions presently facing the Nation, furthermore, I believe the present administration has demonstrated its deep interest in improving the status of small business in our economy.

This can be seen in the report of the President's Task Force on Small Business and in the Presidential message on small business sent to Congress in late March.

These documents contain concrete proposals for various new methods of assistance at the Government level as well as new small business incentives at the private sector level.

The President's interest in small business can further be seen by his Executive order of March 20 directing the Small Business Administration to emphasize its role as the advocate of the interests of small business and directing all Federal agencies to take these interests fully into account in their activities affecting small business.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, this Nation was built upon a foundation of small business. This foundation, while being threatened by consistently increasing economic concentration, remains as vital today to our society as it has ever been.

It is responsible for the fact that an employee can become an employer in this Nation as he can in no other country or society in the world.

On this occasion let us pay tribute to the millions of small businessmen throughout the Nation and let us rededicate ourselves to assuring that they will continue to play a fundamental role in the economy of our Nation.

#### A NEWSWEEK POLL: MR. NIXON HOLDS UP

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. RHODES) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, a Newsweek magazine poll conducted by the Gallup organization last week contains some rather interesting findings. In the wake of recent heated and intense criticism of the President—including a march on Washington estimated at some 100,000 persons—his standing with the electorate remains undamaged.

The poll indicates that fully 65 percent of the American electorate are satisfied with the way President Nixon is handling his job—better than a 2 to 1 margin. Moreover, with regard to the recent Cambodian border operation, 50 percent approve of the action and 39 percent disapprove.

I am confident that as the military dividends of the Cambodian operation become more apparent, and the war in Southeast Asia is shortened as a result of those operations, we will see an even greater surge of support for the courageous decision made by President Nixon. The article of May 25, 1970, follows in its entirety:

A NEWSWEEK POLL: MR. NIXON HOLDS UP  
Even after the Cambodian invasion and

the killings at Kent State University, the "silent majority" appears to be alive and well in Richard Nixon's corner. A NEWSWEEK Poll Conducted by The Gallup Organization last week suggests that—despite the recent intense criticism of the President by college students and academic leaders and by liberal politicians and commentators—Mr. Nixon's standing with the electorate remains undamaged. The poll indicates that Americans find Mr. Nixon's conduct of the Presidency "satisfactory" by better than 2 to 1, that 50 per cent favor the Cambodian operation and 39 per cent oppose it, that a strikingly large majority is far more willing to blame student demonstrators than National Guardsmen for the deaths of four students at Kent State, and that Vice President Spiro Agnew's rhetoric about dissenters still enjoys the approval of a silent plurality if not a majority.

To get swift results, the survey was conducted by telephone on May 13 and 14 and covered a scientifically selected national sampling of 517 persons.\*

Although the poll gave the President majority approval of his decision to send U.S. troops into Cambodia, the favorable rating was by no means as high as some opinion experts have come to expect after dramatic strokes of U.S. military power, when Americans have a tendency to rally round the President. Following the air raids on North Vietnam that President Johnson ordered in 1968, for example, public approval (as measured by Louis Harris) soared to 83 per cent. And 69 per cent (polled by Oliver Quayle) favored the entry of U.S. troops into the Dominican Republic.

Women were far more dovish than men on the Cambodian issue. They opposed the President's action, 49 to 37 per cent, while men supported it, 63 to 30. Women also tended to be distinctly less enthusiastic about the Vice President's speeches on dissent: in a near even split (37 to 35 per cent), they approved the Veep's line, whereas men applauded him by a margin of more than 2 to 1. Young people, too, were predictably more skeptical of the Administration than their elders, but even in the 21-34 age bracket, 55 per cent gave the President a favorable rating and 49 per cent approved of Cambodia. And if youth was by no means arrayed entirely on the left, neither were blue-collar workers all to the right: those without a high-school education came down hard against Mr. Nixon's Cambodian policy. A hefty 56 per cent opposed it, and only 26 per cent approved.

The question on the Kent State killings produced an unusually high number of "no opinions," suggesting that the no opinion column might harbor some people with qualms about the guard's behavior who were reluctant to say so outright. It also seems likely that some of those polled were suspending judgment about who was most to blame until the conflicting accounts of the shooting could be cleared up. But even if all those with no opinion were added to those who pinned major responsibility on the National Guard, a surprisingly strong majority of each group—by age, sex, education and political party—put the main blame on the protesters.

#### NIXON AS PRESIDENT

How satisfied are you with the way Richard Nixon is handling his job as President?\*

[Answers in percent]  
Very satisfied..... 30  
Fairly satisfied..... 35  
Not to satisfied..... 18

\*Telephone surveys, it should be noted, contain a slight built-in bias—about two percentage points, in this case—in favor of Republicans, since non-telephone households are necessarily omitted from the sample and these tend to be low-income and Democratic.

Not at all satisfied..... 13  
\*Undecided not shown.

#### U.S. TROOPS IN CAMBODIA

Do you approve or disapprove of President Nixon's decision to send American troops to Cambodia?

Approve..... 50  
Disapprove..... 39  
No opinion..... 11

#### WHO'S TO BLAME AT KENT

Who do you think was primarily responsible for the deaths of four students at Kent State University?

The National Guard..... 11  
Demonstrating students..... 58  
No opinion..... 31

#### AGNEW'S STAND

Do you approve or disapprove of Agnew's stand on dissenters and student protesters?

Approve..... 46  
Disapprove..... 30  
No opinion..... 24

#### TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS UNDERCUTS ARGUMENTS FOR THE SST

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, the Department of Transportation has just provided me with a summary of an economic analysis of the SST done early last year by the Office of Economics and Systems Analysis at DOT. I was prompted to request a copy of this analysis by an off-hand reference to it by DOT witnesses in the just-published hearings on the SST before the House Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee. DOT witnesses said there that the analysis predicted an SST market of only 420 planes, rather than 500 needed for the Government to get its money back plus 4 percent interest—see hearings, pages 556, 577.

It turns out that this is not the only item in the analysis which is damaging to the administration's case for the SST.

Take, for example, the administration's argument that the SST will greatly benefit our balance of payments position. Their own economic analysis came to the following conclusion:

The effect of the SST on the balance of payments appears to be negative following the same method of calculation developed by IDA. The aircraft and air fare payments estimates associated with the SST are positive, but are likely to be negated by passenger expenditures abroad and entries in other lesser accounts.

The administration also argues that that SST program is set up in such a way that the Government will get back its entire investment in the SST, plus 4 percent interest. Here is what their economic analysis concluded on that point:

If the government has as its primary objective recovery of past SST program expenditures (\$633.4 million by the end of FY 1969) as well as future investment, the principal would be recovered plus a small return on investment. The profits to industry in excess of the normal industry return are not sufficient to cover the federal sunk costs plus future planned federal expenditures at either the interest rate specified in the present contract or recommended by the Bureau of the Budget.